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A bstract
This thesis focuses on education and work choices of individuals in both 
developing and developed economies. Such economic settings are distin­
guishable partly in terms of the features and constraints underlying indi­
vidual decision-making, which impact on the disparity in education levels 
between low- and high-income economies. In particular, low-income settings 
are characterised by a large degree of poverty, risk and uncertainty in daily 
life, the effects of which are often exacerbated by a lack of risk diversification 
mechanisms due to thin insurance markets and high borrowing constraints. 
These features have important implications for investment in education.
The higher levels of investment in education in developed economies are 
largely due to higher levels of wealth, opportunities and well-functioning in­
stitutions including markets for insurance and credit, along with the higher 
availability and quality of educational institutions. Even so, the severity of 
constraints right throughout the education lifecycle varies extensively across 
the income spectrum within developed economies. This is reflected in the 
lower levels of educational attainment of low-income individuals compared 
to individuals from richer backgrounds.
To begin with, I examine the effects of living in an environment that is 
inherently risky, on human capital accumulation in Indonesia. I then move 
on to an analysis of work and education decisions of children in rural Mexico, 
specifically considering potential interactions between the opportunity costs 
of education and the sibling composition of the child. Finally, I assess the 
impact of the Education Maintenance Allowance, a conditional education 
subsidy, on post-compulsory education and work choices in the UK.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the forthcoming chapters, education and work choices are considered, 
both in less developed and developed economies. For reasons to be ex­
plained, the emphasis is on the former. The theoretical predictions of the 
standard pure investment model for education are applicable to both: in the 
absence of credit constraints, individuals accumulate the level of education 
that equates the marginal return from that level to its marginal cost, and 
household resources are extraneous to the decision.1 However, the complete 
lack of credit constraints is clearly implausible, more so for less developed 
countries (LDCs), and it is important to consider the more realistic case of 
limited availability to borrow to invest in education. One implication of this 
is that in the absence of being able to borrow to augment human capital, re­
liance for funding is shifted to current income and other household resources. 
Varying degrees of capital market imperfections, coupled with varying lev­
els of current income and resources across developed and less developed 
economies, lie behind much of the observed disparity in the education levels 
of individuals across such economies.2 However, whilst sub-optimal educa­
tional investments are primarily attributed to capital market imperfections, 
and unequal levels of investment in developed and less developed countries
xNote that human capital is multi-dimensional and throughout, I focus on the education 
component.
2It is worth noting that even in the absence of credit constraints, current income 
matters if education holds a direct consumption value and/or if there is uncertainty of 
future earnings.
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are largely explained by the varying severities of such imperfections, im­
portant insights into education choices can be gained by considering other 
factors that exhibit variation between economies. Differences in environ­
mental constraints, for example, are apparent from the different gradations 
of availability and quality of schooling, the occurrence of and susceptibility 
to income shocks, the functioning of insurance markets and the availabil­
ity of other less formal risk diversification mechanisms. Clearly, observed 
education choices are also determined by the perceived and actual returns 
to education, which also differ across economies. An extensive body of em­
pirical research points to the high private and social returns to education 
in both types of economic environment.3 However, the realisation of such 
returns is contingent on education being valued in the future occupation 
of the child, which is further dependent on such factors as the extent and 
availability of agricultural versus market work and gender-biased work op­
portunities. This point is closely related to deep-rooted cultural differences 
across economies that also have important implications for education and 
work choices, and again the propensity to invest in the education of children 
is partly predicated by such norms.
Therefore despite the common theme of education and work choices 
throughout the ensuing analyses, the focus of each chapter is influenced 
by the important underlying characteristics of households and the environ­
ments within which they dwell. Specifically, in developing economies I stress 
the importance of accounting for the inherent and persistent riskiness of the 
village-level environment, the availability of credit and insurance markets, 
the widespread availability of work as a (partial) substitute for schooling, 
along with household-level factors such as income variability and sibling 
composition. In the analysis of choices in the UK on the other hand, fac­
tors such as persistent risk and child labour are much less relevant in the 
decision-making process, and I consider decisions of low-income individuals 
concerning participation in post-compulsory education, along with subse­
3See for example Blundell et al (1999) for evidence on the private returns to education, 
Sianesi and Van Reenen (2003) for a review of the macro literature and Psacharopoulos 
(1985, 1994) for evidence on the returns to education in LDCs.
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quent enrolment in university. Indeed this represents another key difference 
in the analyses, with the focus for LDCs on choices from primary school on­
wards, compared to the focus in the UK on decisions from post-compulsory 
school onwards. This is indicative of earlier declines in participation in ed­
ucation in LDCs compared to developed economies.4
A distinctive feature of LDCs that features to a large extent in the sub­
sequent chapters, is the prevalence of child labour. The ability of children 
to generate earnings and to contribute to household income from an early 
age renders them a highly productive economic resource for indigent par­
ents in the impoverished environments of LDCs, which manifests itself in 
the overall levels of child labour.5 This has important implications for un­
derstanding decisions concerning investment in human capital. Child work 
activities encompass a variety of work of varying degrees of intensity, from 
part-time informal household chores and family work, to full-time formal 
work outside the household and - in the extreme - to hazardous and bonded 
forms of labour.6 The long-term effects on child welfare and human capital 
accumulation are by no means uniform across the wide spectrum of activ­
ities. There is no clear evidence on just how detrimental it is to human 
capital accumulation and on the subsequent effects on the welfare of the 
child as an adult. This would require a long-term analysis of the effects of
4 This is borne out in policies that are designed to promote participation in educa­
tion via conditional subsidies. Post-compulsory participation in education along with in­
creased university enrolment are the key targets of the Education Maintenance Allowance 
programme in the UK. The Progresa programme in Mexico is instead aimed at fostering 
an increase in the transition of poor rural youth into junior secondary school and at the 
further continuation of children in secondary education.
51 abstract from all definitional complexities surrounding the term ‘child labour’. It 
should be noted however, that this elusive term must be refined to deal with issues such 
as the age of a ‘child’ and what exactly constitutes ‘labour’. The International Labour 
Organisation, defining a child as a person between the ages of five and fifteen, and labour 
as full-time and part-time work, estimates the number of child labourers at 250 million 
worldwide, practically all of whom are situate in developing economies.
6There is very little empirical work on hazardous forms of child labour, or on the 
activities of homeless children on the streets, as data on such activities are extremely 
sensitive and difficult to collect.
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working as a child, which axe difficult to quantify.7 However, it is generally 
agreed that even less severe forms of child labour such as working on the 
family farm, have, on the whole, adverse long-term effects on human capi­
tal accumulation.8 Consequently there axe compelling economic arguments 
advocating the implementation of policies to reduce child labour, including 
the positive private returns to education and the spillovers to society from 
increased human capital accumulation.9 These are quite apart from human­
itarian concern for the health and welfare of children. A brief description of 
each chapter follows.
In chapter two I study the effects of living in a risky environment on 
education and child labour in LDCs. The central idea is that households 
that face more uncertainty, and with limited or no access to formal insur­
ance, have a higher motive for self-insurance and this may, under a set of 
plausible assumptions, have adverse effects on levels of investment in edu­
cation. The model predictions are tested using Indonesian data. A negative 
effect of risk on education would constitute some evidence of children being 
used as insurance tools to smooth consumption. On the other hand, whilst 
a negligible effect of risk may indicate that formal insurance markets are 
well-functioning, it might also reflect the fact that households axe using a 
wide range of other self-insurance mechanisms instead. A key contribution 
of the chapter is the decomposition of risk into aggregate (village-level) and 
idiosyncratic components using a unique measure of risk based on five years 
of wage data on the main earner of the household. Results indicate that 
in small rural villages where one might expect formal insurance markets to 
be thin or lacking, idiosyncratic risk has no significant effect on the child’s 
education. There is evidence however, that aggregate village risk affects ed­
7See Basu (1999) for an analysis of the dynamic effects of child labour.
®However casual types of labour such as working on the family farm during harvest 
time, may simply lengthen the process of human capital accumulation, without having 
an adverse effect on the end stock. Indeed work may have adverse effects on schooling, 
but without work, many children may not be able to attend school at all. However, the 
evidence points towards child work showing a high degree of persistence, making transition 
back to school problematic. See Freije and Lopez-Calva (2001) and Guarcello et al (2003).
9See for example Weale (1992).
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ucation adversely in these villages. These findings are in line with a range of 
literature which shows that aggregate risk is more difficult to diversify than 
idiosyncratic risk.10 This suggests that policy should be carefully crafted 
in order to provide insurance for households against pervasive income risk, 
whilst at the same time ensuring that household-level informal insurance 
mechanisms are not crowded out.
In chapter three I investigate a number of aspects of education and work 
choices across children within households in rural Mexico. To begin with, 
I examine the associations between observed activities and the structure 
of the sibling set of children, taking household size and sibling structure 
as exogenous. In addition, I also incorporate an analysis of the effects of 
the child wage on such choices and allow for the (opportunity) costs of 
schooling to depend on the number of siblings by interacting the wage with 
sibling composition. In line with previous literature in this area, I find that 
larger households are associated with less schooling, particularly so for large 
numbers of very young siblings and/or older brothers.11 The analysis of 
schooling costs yields some important new insights, with evidence that the 
responsiveness of children to wages increases in accordance with the number 
of the child’s siblings. This is particularly so the older the child.
In chapter four I specify and estimate a dynamic discrete-choice multiple- 
state model for young adults in the UK, some of whom are entitled to a 
conditional post-compulsory education subsidy, the Education Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA). I model choices amongst education, full-time work, part- 
time work and unemployment. The estimation methodology controls for 
educational selectivity through time along with an extensive range of long­
term family and parental background characteristics, thus allowing for het­
erogeneity and diversity in the EMA population in both observed and unob­
10Townsend (1994) presents evidence that whilst agents axe successful in insuring against 
non-covariant (idiosyncratic) forms of risk, pervasive uncertainty is more difficult to insure 
against. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) similarly find evidence that common shocks 
appear to have substantially greater consequences for consumption than does idiosyncratic 
risk, with comparable findings by Udry (1994).
11See for example Parish and Willis (1993) and Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997).
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served dimensions. I also model attrition from the panel through time. This 
is important as attrition will introduce selection bias if there is a correlation 
between unobserved characteristics that affect attrition and unobservables 
that affect the individual’s choices. Therefore the effectiveness of the sub­
sidy is not confounded with either dynamic selection bias or attrition bias. 
Simulations from the estimated model are used examine the sensitivity of 
schooling choices to education costs. The overall effect on education in re­
sponse to the subsidy is positive. The proportions in full-time education 
with a job decrease, but there is a relatively higher increase in participa­
tion in full-time education without a job. Increasing the generosity of the 
subsidy is likely to increase participation in education even further. There 
is, however, almost no effect of the programme on subsequent university 
participation.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Risk on 
Education and Child Labour 
in Indonesia
2.1 Introduction
In light of the widely documented disparities in the levels of child labour be­
tween high and low income economies, it is natural to suppose that observed 
divergent decisions on the use of a child’s time are largely the result of the 
incongruent economic settings underlying economic choices in both types of 
economy. In particular, low-income settings are characterised by a large de­
gree of risk and uncertainty in everyday life, and it thus seems reasonable to 
expect income risk to play an important role in shaping household economic 
choices. The ability of households to deal with such risk and to smooth 
consumption across time may be constrained by thin insurance markets for 
income and higher borrowing constraints, thus cutting off important risk di­
versification channels. These distinguishing features of low-income settings 
create the need for households and villages to form alternative ways of cop­
ing with uncertainty.1
1 There is an extensive literature that examines the importance of the family unit in 
coping with uncertainty, and the incorporation of risk into the economic choices and be­
haviour of households. See for example Rosenzweig (1988), Rosenzweig and Stark (1989),
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Within such environments, it is widely accepted that child labour is 
strongly associated with household poverty. Indeed the relative importance 
of a variety of observable individual, household and area characteristics, 
all of which measure poverty to some degree, for child education and work 
decisions, is widely documented.2 However, this association is very gen­
eral, masking as it does the underlying (often unobserved) channels through 
which poverty translates into lower investment in human capital and higher 
levels of child labour. Indeed whilst it captures a contemporaneous associa­
tion between child labour and household resource constraints, it does little 
to aid an understanding as to the precise reasons why poverty matters. Risk 
and poverty are strongly correlated, as households with fewer resources are 
less likely to be able to cope with adverse shocks. However, the effects of 
risk have been less widely examined, due to the difficulty in quantifying 
risk. A growing literature examines the specific role of a child as an ex-post 
mechanism for smoothing out income shocks. Much of this literature finds 
that unanticipated shocks have positive effects on child labour.3 Whilst this 
goes some way towards isolating the key channels through which poverty 
affects child labour, it is however more informative on the extent to which 
households face liquidity constraints such that the lack of borrowing oppor­
tunities in the event of a shock, may force them to send the child to work 
instead.
Paxson (1992) Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) and Kochar (1995).
2 A number of characteristics such as parental education and work status, household 
income, family size, the gender of the household head, ownership of land and school avail­
ability, has consistently emerged across studies. See the empirical analyses of the effects 
of current indicators of household and individual welfare on child labour in Grootaert 
and Kanbur (1995), Jensen and Nielsen (1997), Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997), Du- 
raisamy (2000), Ravallion and Wodon (2000), Ray (2000), Freije and Lopez-Calva (2001), 
Ejrnaes and Portner (2002) and Emerson and Souza (2002).
3See Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Portner (2001), Ranjan (2001), Sawada and Lokshin 
(2001) and Beegle et al (2003). The role of a child as an insurance tool against unforeseen 
circumstances was proposed by Cain (1982), and work by Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) 
discusses how child labour may be part of a strategy to minimise the risk of interruption 
of a household’s income stream.
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In this chapter, I consider child labour more specifically as part of an 
intra-household strategy to diversify risk in an uncertain environment.4 
Rather than viewing children as an ex-post mechanism for smoothing con­
sumption, I consider the cumulative effects of merely living in a (perceived) 
risky environment, on child human capital. The idea is that the riskier the 
environment, the greater is the incentive of economic agents to build up 
a buffer stock to cushion against unforeseen adverse events. Insofar as the 
child is viewed as a liquid economic resource with immediate earnings poten­
tial, (s)he can work and contribute to the stock of precautionary savings of 
the household. The motive for building up a buffer stock will be higher, the 
less well-functioning are formal mechanisms, such as insurance and credit 
markets, for protecting against unanticipated shocks.5 Thus evidence that 
risk affects child labour in this framework, is indicative of poorly function­
ing formal insurance markets. To my knowledge, this analysis is among the 
first to explicitly examine the extent to which living in an intrinsically risky 
environment affects child education and work choices. Whilst Sawada and 
Lokshin (2001) show the theoretically negative effect of income instability 
on investment in education of children, via a precautionary savings motive, 
their empirical analysis deals with the occurrence of actual household shocks.
I use Indonesian data to test whether children are used to build up buffer 
stocks in risky environments. I distinguish between risk that is specific to 
the household (idiosyncratic risk) and risk that is pervasive within a vil­
lage (aggregate village risk).6 I find important evidence that children in 
households facing higher village-level risk do indeed have lower educational
4 Of course household diversification mechanisms interact with each other, with child 
labour just one possible strategy amongst a host of others. Ideally one would like to 
take into account the whole range of possible risk-reducing mechanisms of the household, 
clearly an onerous task.
5As Morduch (1995) discusses, the general consensus regarding insurance markets is 
that even if household income is partly insurable, as is most likely the case, full insurance 
is highly unlikely in LDCs.
®The distinction between the two is important. A wide body of empirical research un­
derlines the importance of decomposing risk into idiosyncratic and aggregate components, 
given the range of evidence on the differing responses of economic agents to both types of 
risk. I refer the reader to footnote (10) in chapter one.
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attainment than their counterparts in low-risk environments. To the extent 
that labour is a substitute for schooling, this translates into higher child 
labour in these households. The effect is strongest for 10 to 12 year olds, 
which is the age range that is likely to be most sensitive to severe economic 
constraints. I find no evidence of idiosyncratic risk affecting children’s ed­
ucation. These findings are indicative of pervasive village risk being more 
difficult to insure against than idiosyncratic risk, and provide some insight 
into the functioning of insurance markets in these villages. In particular, 
whilst household-level risk is being diversified away, whether through for­
mal or informal mechanisms, without resorting to children, evidence that 
aggregate village risk affects education, propels an argument for favouring 
intervention in the market for insurance against such risk.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: in section 2.2 I 
outline a simple two-period model of investment in human capital in a risky 
environment. I show that under certain plausible conditions, investment in 
human capital is negatively related to the degree of earnings risk facing the 
financier of the child’s schooling (the parent). The theory does not however, 
rule out possible offsetting positive effects of risk on education, and these 
are also discussed. In section 2.3 the Indonesian data used in the empirical 
analysis is described. In this section I define risk more clearly and show 
how I measure both idiosyncratic and aggregate village risk. Section 2.4 
describes the main results and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical effects of a volatile parental income stream on child edu­
cation are considered within a two-period model. In period 1, a household 
consists of one parent and one child.7 This period corresponds to the po­
7This enables us to abstract from issues concerning (a) intra-household bargaining 
amongst parents concerning the child’s activity (see Galasso (1999) and Basu (2001)) and 
(b) compensating and reinforcing human capital decisions amongst siblings (see Becker 
(1991)). Their incorporation into a formal model and their empirical importance, are 
topics for future research.
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tential schooling phase of the child, throughout which the parent works and 
earns an exogenous amount of income, yf. Decisions on the use of the one 
unit of child’s time in period 1 are made by the parent. A child may work, 
go to school, or engage in some combination of the two. This decision is 
made jointly with the household choice of consumption. In period 2, the 
child has become an adult and has formed his own household (thus the term 
‘adult’ refers to the offspring in period 2). He earns income, y§, which is 
an increasing function of human capital. The parent earns an exogenous 
amount of income, yj.
Within this framework, I lay out one set of plausible conditions that is 
consistent with risk adversely affecting education. The first assumption is 
that human capital investments are motivated by parental concern for their 
offspring. This is modelled by making the adult’s utility an argument of the 
parent’s utility function. I assume that there are no transfers from the par­
ent to its adult offspring in the second period, and that the parent leaves no 
bequests to the child. This rules out the parent compensating for any lack 
of investment in human capital of the child.8 Transfers from the offspring 
to the parent in the second period are also ruled out, in order to capture a 
realistic intergenerational commitment problem.9 This may be viewed as a 
strong assumption, in the sense that one important reason for investing in 
human capital in low-income countries, is an old age security motive of the 
parents. This assumption could be relaxed to allow for ad hoc transfers from 
the adult to the parent in the second period, but the crucial assumption is 
that these transfers are not an enforceable (by the parent) repayment for the 
parental investment in education.10 Below, I consider the effects of allowing 
for transfers from the adult to the parent. Finally, borrowing to invest in
8Whilst this is clearly an extreme assumption (see Rosenzweig (1988) for evidence on 
the importance of intergenerational transfers in developing countries, and Altonji et al 
(1997) for the US), the simplification is made in order to focus on altruism that acts only 
through human capital investment.
9Baland and Robinson (2000) highlight the importance of this inter-generational prob­
lem.
10To further justify this assumption, I present evidence in section 2.4 that intergenera­
tional transfers in Indonesia are not increasing in the education level of the donor.
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human capital is not permitted, which means that parents must bear all of 
the costs of their child’s schooling, both direct and opportunity in the form 
of foregone child earnings.11
A central feature of the model is uncertainty about future labour income. 
It is the only source of uncertainty considered throughout and it may arise 
in two possible ways. In the first, the parent makes its choices about invest­
ment in education and household consumption at the beginning of period 1, 
without knowing its income stream for the following period, y However, 
the parent knows its average income over time, fi, and the variability of its 
income stream, a 2, which is general in the sense that it incorporates all past 
shocks to income, both at aggregate village and idiosyncratic levels.12 The 
more volatile its past income, the more uncertain it is about next period’s 
income, yj, and the higher the motive for self-insurance. Households are het­
erogeneous in the sense that even if their current observed income levels are 
the same, some have had very volatile past incomes whilst others have had 
very smooth income draws. Such heterogeneity reflects different risk profiles 
of households. A second source of potential uncertainty is adult earnings in 
period 2, y%, which are a function of the fraction of the child’s time spent 
in school in period 1. For simplicity however, I assume that conditional 
on education, parents anticipate adults’ expected earnings with certainty. 
This assumption is made in order to focus on the effects of uncertain future 
parental income on child education. The theoretical effects of relaxing this 
assumption are considered briefly below.
Parental utility in period 1 is a function of household consumption only, 
and in period 2 is a function of both own consumption and the utility of 
their offspring, subject to an altruistic parameter. The household chooses 
consumption and education in period 1 so as to maximise lifetime utility 
subject to the constraint that the present value of consumption is equal to 
the present value of income. Assuming that preferences are intertemporally
11 See Ranjan (1999) who uses a simple two-period model to show how the non-existence 
of markets for loans against the future earnings of children may give rise to child labour.
12The empirical work distinguishes between the two forms of risk.
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additive, the parent’s problem is to
max U ( 4 h) + 0 E iU (4 )  + (2.1)
Cih,Di
where c* refers to consumption in that period, i = 1, 2, the superscripts 
hh, p and a refer to the household, parent and adult respectively, D\  is the 
fraction of child time spent in school in period 1, f3 =  is the parental dis­
count rate, r  is the interest rate, 0 < 7 < 1 measures the weight the parent 
places on the adult’s utility and converts the utility of the adult into that of 
the parent, the expectations operator, f?i, reflects uncertainty (as at time 1) 
about 2/2 j and the individual period subutility functions axe increasing and 
concave in their single arguments. The concavity assumption is equivalent 
to the assumption that the parent is risk averse. From (2.1) it is clear that 
parents derive no utility from education per se and care about the end stock 
of human capital only insofar as it contributes positively to the consumption 
of their offspring in period 2, thus motivating parental investment in human 
capital.
The human capital of the child is produced according to the following 
increasing and concave production function
# 1 = 0(0 !), where < /(£> i)>0, / ( £ > i ) < 0  (2.2)
where Hi  is the child human capital stock at the end of the schooling period.
Period 2 earnings of the adult are an increasing and concave function of 
their end stock of human capital
ya2 = / ( # ! ) ,  where f ' (H i)  > 0, / " ( # i )  < 0 (2.3)
The life-cycle budget constraint of the parent is
Y l  = cj* +  4  + (pD + wi)Di  (2.4)
where Yl is the present value of the lifetime income of the parent, as­
suming that the labour market earnings of the child when young are pooled 
with parental resources. Thus Yl may be written as Yi, =  yj +  +  wf,
22
where y? equals the exogenous parental earnings in period i, w\  is full child 
income in period l 13, and pD is the direct cost of schooling.
Rewriting (2.4) in terms of Cj and substituting into (2.1), the parent’s 
problem is
max U ( 4 h) + PExu ([Yl -  cf* -  (pD + t/f lU i]) +  /W < 3 )  (2-5)
c\h,D i \  J
2.2.1 Education Choice
From (2.5) the first order condition for D\  is
(p D +  (<*)] =  7 [^ (^ ) / ' (9 (A ) ) ]  (2.6)
Equation (2.6) shows that the utility-weighted expected marginal cost of 
schooling to the parent equals the utility-weighted marginal benefit of addi­
tional earnings to the adult in period 2, as a result of schooling. From this 
first order condition, it can be seen that the risk in second period parental 
income will affect the education decision in the first period insofar as it af­
fects the expected second period marginal utility of the parent.
Equation (2.6) is used to solve for D*, the optimal level of education in 
period 1. The problem is complicated by the presence of the expectations 
operator over the parent’s marginal utility of consumption in period 2. There 
is in general no closed form solution for this problem when labour income is 
uncertain, with the solution for optimal education choice largely depending 
on the form of the utility function.
Parental Income Risk
In order to isolate the effect of future parental income risk on and I 
follow Sandmo (1970) who defines a pure increase in dispersion as a stretch­
ing of the distribution of income around a constant mean. This is a com­
bination of additive and multiplicative shifts in the distribution of parental
13Note that similar to previous authors (see for example, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997)), 
I assume that the child wage is not a function of human capital.
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income: the additive shift increases the mean whilst holding all other mo­
ments constant, and the multiplicative shift stretches the distribution on the 
right side of zero (assuming income is non-negative).14 We can thus think 
of the expected parental income in period 2 as
E W 2 +e\  (2.7)
where S > 1 is the multiplicative shift which increases and 9 is an addi­
tive shift.
In order for the increase in risk to be mean-preserving, it must be the 
case that the change in the expected value of future parental income is 0,
i.e.
dE[5y% + 6] =  E[$d5 + d,0] = 0
=» dO/dS = -E[yP] =  (2.8)
The effects of such future income uncertainty on savings and consump­
tion choices have been examined extensively in the literature.15 The key 
findings in this extensive literature show that under certain restrictions on 
household preferences, uncertainty about future income decreases current 
consumption through increasing expected future marginal utility relative to 
current marginal utility. In line with this research, it can be shown here 
that under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) in 
Cj, -Jjpld,o/d5=-z < 0- However, the effects on education choice have not 
been formalised in this literature. Taking expectations of (2.6), the first 
order condition for education is
(pD + Wf) j  U ' ( 4 ) M ) d S  = 7[U'(4)f'(9(Di))]  (2.9)
As shown in the appendix, the effect of a mean-preserving increase in 
risk on investment in education depends on the sign of 
dDi
OS d9_  c
d S ~  *
=  0(pD + wc1)U"(ch1h)El [u”(4)(yp2 -  0 ]  (2-10)
14In all of what follows, derivations follow closely on Sandmo (1970) and are detailed in 
the appendix to this chapter.
15See the seminal papers by Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) and more recently, 
Deaton (1992).
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Under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, the above term 
is negative for all values of y which implies that d D \ j88^ $ <  0.
It is clear from (2.10) that the more risk averse the parent, the more 
adverse is the effect of risk on education choice; the same is true the higher 
the costs of schooling. Note that in the extreme case where (pD +  w\) =  0, 
risk has no effect on education. Clearly, changing education in this case 
would have no effect on savings as education is costless anyway.
To summarise, under the above conditions, pure risk will never have a 
positive effect on education, D\.  Uncertainty leads the parent to increase 
precautionary savings in period 1 in order to maintain a smooth marginal 
utility of consumption profile across the two periods. Given the assumption 
that the adult’s future environment conditional on education is determinis­
tic, there is no reason for the parent to increase D\  in response to increased 
risk of 2/2, as D\  does not cushion against j/f shortfalls.
Apart from parental prudence and not being able (or not wanting) to 
borrow to finance investment in education, this unambiguous negative effect 
of risk on investment in education is driven by two important factors. The 
first is the assumption of no transfers from the adult to the parent in period
2. If such transfers were allowed, it is plausible that education might in­
crease in response to increased parental income uncertainty. This is because 
in the event of the parent receiving an unexpectedly low income draw in the 
second period, the adult could make transfers to the parent which are an 
increasing function of adult income and therefore of education.
The second reason for this unambiguously negative effect, is the assump­
tion of a deterministic environment for the adult in period 2. Clearly this is 
unrealistic in the sense that there is no reason to believe that future labour 
market conditions for the adult, conditional on education, would be known 
with certainty, whilst the parent would face a stochastic future environment. 
It is more reasonable to expect such uncertainty to also affect future adult 
earnings, differentially across education levels, and therefore the education
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choice. Below, the theoretical effects of relaxing these assumptions axe dis­
cussed.16
R everse  A ltru ism
If we assume that the adult makes transfers to the parent in period 2 (and 
that the parent anticipates this), the effects of income risk on child education 
become ambiguous. There are now two competing effects of risk: on the one 
hand, parents may use child labour as a buffer against short-term income 
shortfalls, whilst on the other, if transfers are an increasing function of 
education, they will invest more in their child’s education in order to receive 
more transfers in the event of a possible future income shock. Allowing 
[/(c§) =  V (c^) 4~ XU(c^), where 0 < A < 1 represents adult altruism towards 
the parent in period 2, the parent’s problem in period 1 is now to
max U(c1k) + 0(1 + 7 \ ) E XU[ [YL -  c f  -  (pD +  w[)Dl + T(J3,)]
cf\£>i \  /
+ 07e 1[v(4 ) + \ u ( 4 )] (2.11)
where T(D\)  are transfers from the adult to the parent in period 2, and axe 
increasing in D\.
The first order condition for education is
(l +  7A)[(pD +  tI>f)-T(I»x)]£i[tl'(c5)] =7[V''(c2)/'(flp1))] (2-12)
and the effect of a mean-preserving increase in risk on education choice 
depends on
dDl
dS
= 0(1 + 1 \)((Pd + w ci ) - T ' ( D 1)].
d O   ta j - ”«
C/"(cf)B [C l"(4)(y?-C )] (2.13)
16It is worth pointing out that whilst the focus here is on education, the model is very 
general in the sense that it can be applied to any type of investment good that may be 
used to buffer consumption, and the effects of risk on the accumulation of such goods 
can similarly be considered. The focus on education, however, underlines how the lack of 
adequate insurance mechanisms may perpetuate long-term poverty.
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the sign of which depends on the relative magnitude of education costs, 
pD +  twf, and the effect of education on transfers, T' (D\), and is ambiguous 
overall. As one would expect, if pD + w [>  T'(Di),  it is negative.17
Adult Income Risk
The assumption of deterministic earnings for the adult in period 2, condi­
tional on education, may also be relaxed. The effects of own future income 
uncertainty on education choice have been examined by various authors, and 
centre around the important works of Levhari and Weiss (1974), Eaton and 
Rosen (1980) and Kodde (1986). I allow adult income to be a function of ed­
ucation and the stochastic variable that captures the a priori unknown state 
of the world, S : y% =  f ( H \ \ 8). In the first order condition for education, 
this additional source of risk is reflected in the right hand side expectation 
in (2.14)
(p D + wDErll f  (4)] =  ■yE1{U'(4)f '{g(Dl y,5)] (2.14)
It is in general not possible to theoretically determine the response of 
education to an increase in future income risk (see Kodde (1986)). The 
effects depend on the way in which risk is incorporated into the earnings 
function. Whilst the (negative) effects on education of special cases of ad­
ditive and multiplicative forms of risk may be determined, the randomness 
of human capital returns may be modelled within more general frameworks, 
rendering it possible that investment in education may increase in response 
to risk. Thus risk may be either increasing or decreasing in education level 
and extending the model to allow for a stochastic element in adult income 
provides a possible mitigating effect of the negative precautionary savings 
effect, on education.
Evidence as to the plausibility of these two assumptions in the empirical 
setting, is presented in section 2.4.
17In the above, it is assumed for simplicity that transfers are given exogenously by the 
adult in period 2. See Raut and Tran (1998) and Baland and Robinson (2000) for a more 
complete analysis of intergenerational transfers and the effect on child labour.
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Thus the model suggests that if we observe two households at a particular 
point in time with the same average income levels, what is also important 
to observe, is the variability of the income stream across time. This is 
because if one household’s past earnings stream is very stable relative to the 
others, this is likely to have differential impacts on their economic choices. 
The household with the more variable income stream will have a higher 
precautionary savings motive than the former, and as outlined in the model, 
this may have adverse effects on household education choices.
2.3 D ata
The data used in the analysis is the first wave of the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS) data, conducted in 1993. The IFLS is a collaborative effort of 
Lembaga Demografi of the University of Indonesia and RAND. It is an ongo­
ing multi-purpose longitudinal survey providing a broad array of data at the 
individual and household level on fertility, health, education, migration and 
employment. It encompasses over 30,000 individuals in 7,224 households, 
spread across 13 provinces in Indonesia. The individual and household data 
is accompanied by extensive community data that can be linked to indi­
vidual households. This includes detailed information on transportation, 
communications, agriculture and industry, credit opportunities, community 
development activities, and the availability of schools and health facilities. 
This is extremely advantageous given the well-documented importance of 
village characteristics on education choices (which is indeed borne out in 
the analysis below). There is data on a total of 321 communities. However, 
these regions are all quite diverse, encompassing a large array of individuals 
and households, and varying greatly in size, with some even resembling large 
urban sprawls and others resembling close-knit communities.18 In order to 
examine the effects of risk on investment in education, ideally one would like 
to be able to distinguish between villages in which formal insurance mecha­
nisms exist and those in which they do not. The sample could then be split 
on this basis, on the assumption that in the latter, households have more
18There axe on average over 3,000 family heads in urban areas compared to just under 
1,000 in rural areas.
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of a need to self-insure. However, unfortunately comprehensive information 
on the availability of insurance within villages is not observed. Instead, the 
analysis is focused throughout on small rural villages, which axe chosen as 
those rural areas with less than 1,000 households, and represent just under 
29% of the overall IFLS sample. The emphasis on these areas is an attempt 
to restrict the analysis to areas where formal insurance is most likely to be 
thin, and where self-insurance mechanisms are more likely to be reflected in 
observed behaviour.19 In addition, the focus on rural households will most 
likely capture those agents living in more intrinsically risky environments.
Selecting the sample of interest is not wholly innocuous. In the first 
instance, the sample is chosen on the basis of the age range corresponding 
to primary education: children aged 7 to 12. This is because after age 12, 
leaving school is relatively common, and it thus seems reasonable to expect 
education choices amongst the 7 to 12 year old range to be more closely 
driven by severe household economic constraints, with that for the 13-plus 
range to be more culturally acceptable.20 In the second case, I define the 
sample according to their likelihood of working. Surveys by Asra (1993, 
1996) suggests that the work of children under 10 years old is very small 
in Indonesia compared to those aged 10 plus. Indeed in the IFLS, data on 
work activity in the week before the interview is only asked of individuals 
aged 10 plus.21 Amongst 10 to 14 year olds, those observed to be working
19See Besley (1995a, 1995b) for evidence that formal rural credit markets still remain 
highly imperfect in low-income economies.
20Primary education in Indonesia is free, compulsory, and almost universal. School 
enrolment drops for both males and females at the end of primary education (around the 
age of 12). This feature of low continuation from primary to secondary school, with the 
largest loss occurring after the completion of primary school, has been noted before as an 
important failure of the Indonesian education system (see Manning (2000)). Relatively 
high dropout rates from primary school have also been observed, with 20% dropping out 
before completion of grade 6. Efforts to increase the availability of secondary education 
have been significant in recent years, with a current secondary school enrolment rate of 
just under 50%.
21 If the week before the interview is a school holiday, individuals are asked about their 
main activity during term time. This can be work, look for work, housework, school or 
other.
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are indeed full-time child labourers, with only 4.6% of them also attending 
school. Therefore I also carry out the analysis on individuals aged 10-14 
years, who are more likely to be viewed as direct income-generating assets 
to the household, compared to younger persons. The upper cutoff of age 
14 in this instance, is consistent with the ILO definition. In addition in 
Indonesia, the minimum legal working age is 15 years.22
Table 2.1 displays characteristics of households and individuals in small 
rural villages vis-a-vis all other regions (characteristics for households with 
at least one 7-12 year old are very similar and are therefore not reported). 
Notable differences in small rural villages include a substantially higher pro­
portion of households reporting farm ownership and a lower proportion of 
business owners. In addition, banks are less likely to be present in small 
rural areas. This is interesting as it may in some sense represent a proxy for 
borrowing and insurance opportunities, and is reassuring in the sense that 
the analysis is being focused on the areas of interest - where formal credit 
and insurance markets are likely to be thin.
I observe whether the individual is currently attending school, for 1,366 
7 to 12 year olds across 79 villages. For 1,136 10 to 14 year olds, their 
work/schooling status is observed, again across 79 small rural communities. 
Summary statistics in table 2.2 show that approximately 81.2% of this sam­
ple is enrolled in school, with almost 12% either working or looking for work. 
The corresponding school enrolment rate amongst 7-12 year olds is 80.8%.
However, it is likely that risk affects not only the current schooling status 
of the child, but also his accumulated educational attainment. By focusing 
only on current educational status, account is not necessarily taken of all 
past temporary interruptions to schooling, which are likely to be an im­
portant reaction to uncertainty. For this reason, I also focus the empirical 
work on the child’s current years of education, which represents the ac­
cumulated effect of previous education decisions and the current stock of
22The relevant ILO Convention was ratified by Indonesia in 1999.
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human capital of the child. This outcome will capture both those who have 
been permanently withdrawn from education, and those whose progression 
through school has been affected by temporary withdrawals, even if they are 
currently observed to be attending school. The average number of years of 
education for 7 to 12 year olds is 2.7 years, compared to 4.3 years for 10 to 
14 year olds.
2.3.1 M easuring Uncertainty: Idiosyncratic and A ggregate 
Risk
Whilst the theoretical predictions of the model point towards a possible 
channel through which uncertainty will adversely affect investment in edu­
cation, risk in this model is quite broadly defined. A key distinction in the 
empirical measurement of risk, is its decomposition into idiosyncratic and 
aggregate (village-level) components.
Estimating Idiosyncratic Wage Volatility
A key contribution of this chapter is to use past earnings volatility to proxy 
the risk profiles of households and villages. This approach is intuitively 
appealing, as it is based on the assumption that households use past earn­
ings volatility to predict future volatility, which I believe to be a reasonable 
starting point (ideally, one would like to observe the uninsured portion of 
the unanticipated components of earnings variability to obtain an accurate 
representation of the household’s exposure to risk). The data used to mea­
sure household and village level risk, are retrospective earnings and labour 
supply data which are observed for key household members over the previ­
ous five years, 1988 to 1992.23
An immediate issue arises as to whose earnings to measure the variabil­
ity of. If one were to examine the variability of total household earnings,
23From the point of view of isolating unanticipated income changes, consumption data 
would be preferable on two fronts. First, expenditures are likely to provide a more accurate 
picture of economic well-being over the longer term than current income, and second, they 
axe believed to be less prone to measurement error than wealth or income. However, only 
a one-year measure of consumption is observed in the 1993 wave of the IFLS.
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a key concern is that of confounding labour supply responses. The con­
ventional household earnings measure for non self-employed households is 
Y hh =  wmL m +  Wf Lf  +  wcL c where Y hh is total household income, and Wj 
and Li are wages and labour supply for males, females and children respec­
tively (z =  m , / ,  c). If a household has anticipated a bad draw of income, 
this expectation will be reflected in its labour supply, and household in­
come will subsequently comprise earnings that are the result of behaviour 
that has been taken to minimise exposure to, or to reduce the effects of, risk. 
Therefore the volatility of Y hh across time would under-estimate the ex-ante 
uninsurable component of risk. In an attempt to better capture true risk, I 
measure the hourly wage variability of the household head only, on the as­
sumption that the head of the household is the main earner and will always 
want to work, and thus their observed work status at the extensive margin 
is not a response to uncertainty. Hourly wage variability is estimated, due 
to the fact that annual earnings would be contaminated by labour supply 
responses to risk.24
However for self-employed household heads, and particularly for house­
holds with a family enterprise, net profit from the enterprise is reported by 
the head, Y h =  n. Income from the enterprise is attributed to one family 
member (the head), but it is likely to comprise the work contributions of 
family labour, thus contaminating the net profit measure by ex-post labour 
supply adjustments through the inclusion of the opportunity costs of family 
labour. In particular, an observation that a particular household has a rel­
atively smooth income stream, whilst another’s is volatile, may actually be
24 This wage measure is constructed from self-reported retrospective labour supply data. 
Monthly earnings are converted to an hourly wage using data on the number of weeks 
worked per year and the number of hours worked per week. If the head is observed 
to have both a primary and a secondary job, only their primary wage is used in the 
construction of wage variability. This is because secondary jobs are often an important 
risk reduction mechanism. The sample of household heads is restricted to those who are 
currently between the ages of 25 and 65, in an attempt to capture those individuals who 
have most likely been the main household earner for each of the past 5 years. Mean 
individual, household, and community characteristics are very similar in this restricted 
sample, to those in table 2.1.
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due to the availability and use of family labour in the former but not in the 
latter. Indeed, it is plausible that ex-ante risk is the same in both households.
Ideally, if one knew the marginal product of each family member, it would 
be possible to calculate their wage and to net out labour supply responses 
to risk from Y h. Unfortunately data limitations preclude this option. How­
ever, I observe to what extent family versus hired labour is used on the 
enterprise - in particular whether the head is (a) self-employed without help 
(b) self-employed with the help of householders/temporary workers or (c) 
self-employed with the help of regular workers. I exclude individuals whose 
status is reported as (b) from the construction of volatility. The reported 
net profit of the remaining sample of self-employed persons is therefore not 
inclusive of household labour supply, and is also net of wages of employed 
workers. As this sample selection is by no means innocuous, I return to a 
discussion of its importance below.
I observe a maximum of 5 years of retrospective income data across 
822 households that have at least 1 10-14 year old, across 79 small rural 
villages.25 To account for the fact that some component of earnings changes 
are predictable, the hourly wage of the household head is first regressed on 
a set of permanent and predictable indicators of earnings, Xhvt, including 
age, age squared and years of education.
\uWhvt =  PvXhvt +  Pyt +  thvt (2.15)
for h =  1, • ■ • , H; t =  1, • • • , 5; v =  1, • ■ • ,79
where In Whvt is the log of the hourly primary wage of household head h in 
region v at time £, fivt is a village time dummy and ehvt includes both un­
observed and unanticipated individual and village characteristics that affect
251 omit villages in which the total number of wage observations across the entire 5 years 
is less than 25. This is because the resulting volatility measure is likely to be unreliable, 
due to it being based on such a small number of observations. This leads to the loss of 
12 villages. A comparison of the main characteristics of these regions with the remaining 
sample shows that they are marginally more remote in terms of distance to the nearest 
bank and schools. However all other characteristics are very similar across both samples.
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the wage of the head.
By relaxing the constraint that all villages have the same parameter vec­
tor, a 79-equation seemingly unrelated regression model is obtained. The 
parameters (3V and (3vt are thus estimated separately by village using OLS 
on the data pooled over individuals and years.
Prom the estimates of the residual, e ^ i  in (2.15), the coefficient of vari­
ation of exp(ehrf) across years for each household is constructed
CVhv =  sdexp ihZt //*exp (2 .16)
where cvhV is the coefficient of variation for household head (and thus house­
hold) h in village v, sdexp^ t is the standard deviation of e x p e ^  and 
/iexp ~^-t its mean, for each household
exp e ^ l  +  exp e/ 2^ +  exp e/^3 +  exp ej^ 4 +  exp e/^5
/^exp ehvt — ^
for h =  1, • • • , # ,  v =  l , . - .  , V .26
However, household expectations of their earnings are based on more 
information than is observed by the analyst. As a result, e ^ i  will include 
both unpredictable components of the wage (true risk), along with antici­
pated but unobserved components and measurement error. The coefficient 
of variation as estimated in (2.16) will comprise these factors and will thus 
over-estimate wage variability that is due to true risk. In order to smooth 
out this idiosyncratic risk measure, cbhv is regressed on a vector of observable 
household and village characteristics that I assume affect risk
CVhv =  +  TZfivt *h Uhvt (2*17)
where Xv is a vector of time-invariant village dummies, included in order to 
pick up permanent and unobserved village characteristics that persistently
26 In practice, the coefficient of variation is multiplied by 1-^j, where rrih is the number 
of years of missing wage data for household head h. In addition, the top and bottom 1% 
of wage observations are excluded from the calculation of volatility.
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affect idiosyncratic risk and 7 reflects the effect of various household and 
village characteristics, Zhvti °n idiosyncratic risk. The predicted Xv -\-^Zhvt 
from (2.17) is the smoothed component of the unexplained wage volatility 
and is used as the measure of true idiosyncratic risk in the estimations below.
In order to include this measure of risk in the human capital equation, 
the key identifying variables in (2.17) are the number of household shocks 
for each of the years 1988 to 1992. Intuitively, I argue that the only effect 
of household shocks on education, is through the variability they induce on 
earnings. Almost 17% of households reporting at least one form of adverse 
shock in 1992. Data on shocks is collected retrospectively - yearly back 
to 1988, and include both household specific shocks such as serious illness, 
death or unemployment of a householder and economic events such as a fall 
in household income due to falling prices, crop loss or other business loss.27 
Also included in Zhvt are the education level of the head, the occupation 
type of the head, and interactions of enterprise ownership with the size of 
the enterprise. The output from this regression is displayed in table 2.4. The 
key instrument, the number of household shocks from 1988 through 1992, 
is positively and significantly associated with the estimated measure of id­
iosyncratic risk. An interesting finding is that farm ownership, regardless of 
farm size, is associated with significantly lower idiosyncratic risk compared 
to non-ownership of either a farm or a business. This suggests that it is 
individuals who are employed as labourers on another farm or enterprise, 
who face the highest idiosyncratic risk levels.
However, the validity of the instrument rests on the assumption that 
conditional on the variability of labour earnings (idiosyncratic risk) and on 
the current income of the household, past shocks have no independent effect 
on human capital accumulation. In order for this to be a valid identifi­
cation assumption, it is important to control for any other variables that 
may be correlated with past shocks and that are likely to affect education. 
In particular, to the extent that non-labour income adjustments are used
27The retrospective data on shocks displays some recall bias, with the number of re­
ported shocks being higher, the closer it is to the survey year.
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(ex-post) by the household as a means of buffering consumption, the cur­
rent non-labour income of the household is likely to be a function of past 
shocks. As a result, failure to control for the current non-labour income of 
the household in the schooling regressions could lead to biased estimates of 
the effects of idiosyncratic risk on education: non-labour income, itself likely 
to be a function of past shocks, would comprise part of the error term, thus 
rendering the identification assumption invalid and underlining the impor­
tance of controlling for current household non-labour income in the human 
capital equations.28
As discussed above, the exclusion of household heads who axe self-employed 
and who use family labour, on the basis that their reported wage is inclu­
sive of labour contributions of family members, is by no means innocuous. 
They constitute just under 40% of the overall sample. An alternative to 
this strategy would be to measure the volatility of total household income 
as opposed to the hourly wage of the head. In this way, whilst the earnings 
measure for the whole sample would include labour contributions of the en­
tire household and would be comparable across households in this regard, it 
would however under-estimate the raw exposure of households to risk. In­
deed any differences in this measure of risk across households would largely 
reflect the differing abilities of households to cope with risk (for example, 
as reflected in household composition, such as the number of working-age 
males for example or the number of children who can potentially work). 
Thus it seems more reasonable to measure the variability of hourly wages 
of the head and to exclude the sample of self-employed heads with family 
labour. The extent to which this group differs from the remaining sample of 
self-employed heads is clearly of concern, due to possible selection bias. A
28 The sign of the bias would depend on both the impact of non-labour income on 
education and on the correlation between idiosyncratic risk and the error term. If current 
non-labour income is favourable for education, and if there is a positive correlation between 
idiosyncratic risk and current non-labour income (as is likely to be the case if households 
have not depleted their stocks ex-post to buffer consumption), the effects of household- 
level risk on education would be upward-biased. On the other hand, a negative correlation 
between non-labour income and idiosyncratic risk would lead to a downward bias of the 
effects of idiosyncratic risk on education.
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comparison of mean household characteristics of the two groups in table 2.3 
shows that mean characteristics are indeed very similar across both samples, 
with the obvious exception of business and farm ownership. Finally, whilst 
this group is excluded from the wage equation (2.15), in (2.17) I predict 
idiosyncratic risk for the entire sample, including self-employed household 
heads who use family labour (for whom Zhvt is observed). Thus children 
who are from self-employed households with family labour, are included in 
estimated regressions for measuring the effect of risk on schooling. This 
further alleviates any concerns about sample selection bias.29
Estimating Aggregate Village Wage Volatility
Allowing the village-specific time dummies to vary across villages separates 
out the aggregate component of income, and the coefficient of variation of 
exp /3vt from (2.15) across 1988 to 1992 is computed for each of the 79 villages 
as follows
=  sd exp & y/W ,. (2-18)
where cvv is the estimated coefficient of variation of village v and is the mea­
sure of aggregate risk, sdexp^ t is the standard deviation of exp (3vt across 
the 5 years for village v, and ^ exppvt is its mean.
Before turning to the results, the extent to which this estimated ag­
gregate risk measure reflects pervasive risk within a particular village, is 
important to consider. This is particularly so as it is constructed using 
retrospective labour supply and earnings data, and thus the reliability of 
the reported data must be considered. To begin with, if there are concerns 
about the recall nature of the data, it is likely that even if the precise de­
tails on past labour supply and income are misreported, it seems reasonable 
to expect households to recall whether they have had smooth or volatile 
past incomes, and to report such fluctuations accordingly. This volatility 
will be captured in the data. In addition, if the aggregate risk measure
29In table 2.10 I present evidence on the sensitivity of results to the exclusion of this 
sample of heads. I thus re-estimate (2.15) on the entire sample of household heads to see 
how the results are affected. I return to this below.
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is truly capturing village-wide uncertainty, it is informative to examine its 
correlation with salient village characteristics.30 Table 2.5 presents results 
from an OLS regression of the estimate of village risk on a range of village 
characteristics, and provides some indication as to the correlations between 
aggregate risk and the characteristics listed in the table. It is reassuring to 
note that the observed correlations largely conform with expectations. In 
particular, even after controlling for village wealth, aggregate risk is higher 
on average in villages in which there is no formal access to credit. This is 
consistent with these villages being less well developed and therefore likely 
to be more susceptible to pervasive shocks. In addition, as expected, aggre­
gate risk is positively correlated with the proportion of farming households 
in the village. Given that farming households tend to have more volatile 
income streams, this again conforms to priors. Further, the coefficient on 
the number of adverse shocks in the village over the past 5 years, and the 
amount of rainfall in 1991 /  1992, are of the expected sign, although not sta­
tistically different from zero at conventional levels. Risk is lower in villages 
with hilly rather than flat land, which is somewhat counter-intuitive (it is 
not significant at the 5% level however). However in general, this evidence is 
reassuring in terms of being largely consistent with expectations regarding 
aggregate risk and village characteristics.
2.4 R esults
The equation that forms the basis of the regressions for estimating the effect 
of risk on investment in education is
$ivt ~  ^0 CVhv OC2CVy “I" Oi^Xiyi -|- T/ivt (2.19)
where SiVt is a measure of human capital of child i in village v at time 
t (1993), cvhv is the estimated idiosyncratic risk of the household in which 
person i lives, cvv is the aggregate risk of the village in which individual i 
resides, X ivt includes individual, household and village characteristics that 
affect the schooling of the child, and rjivt includes unobserved individual
301 thank Timothy Besley for this suggestion.
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and village characteristics that affect the measure of human capital of in­
dividual i in period t and that I assume are uncorrelated with the regressors.
In equation (2.19), aq represents the effect of idiosyncratic risk on child 
schooling, and 0:2 yields the effect of aggregate village risk on education. As 
discussed in section 2.3, I consider two different measures of Sivt'. the cur­
rent schooling status of the child and their accumulated years of education. 
In each of tables 2.6 to 2.10, equation (2.19) is estimated across different 
sub-samples.31 In each of the specifications, the following variables are also 
controlled for: age and gender of the child, gender of the household head, re­
ligion of the household, missing parent, unschooled parents, household size, 
log of household expenditure, mean income of the head, log value of liquid 
assets, farm ownership, business ownership, number of primary, junior and 
senior high schools in the area, distance to the nearest school, presence of 
bank in the area, log of village expenditure, village size, and average village 
level wages for males, females and children. The effects of these charac­
teristics on education choices are remarkably consistent across samples. To 
briefly summarise them, I find that the most notable factors having an ad­
verse effect on education (whether on the probability of attending school 
or on accumulated years of education) include having a higher number of 
younger siblings, unschooled parents, living farther from a bank and living 
in a village with a relatively lower number of junior high schools. The log 
of household expenditure has a strong positive effect in all specifications.32
2.4.1 Effects o f R isk on Hum an Capital
I now turn to the effects of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk variables on 
investment in education. To begin with, marginal effects from a probit esti­
mation as to whether the child is currently in school, are presented in table
31 Note that the p-value for the joint significance of the key instruments in the first-stage 
regression is less than 0.04 across all sub-samples, indicating that the instruments have 
predictive power for the idiosyncratic measure of risk. Note also that standard errors on 
the risk coefficients have been adjusted for the first-stage prediction.
32 These axe in line with previous findings in this literature (see for example Grootaert 
(1999)) and are available upon request.
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2.6, separately for 7 to 12 and 10 to 14 year olds. This first set of results 
shows that for both 7-12 and 10-14 year olds, idiosyncratic risk has a neg­
ative but insignificant effect on the probability that the child is currently 
enrolled in school. The effect of aggregate risk in both samples is also in­
significant (especially so for the older age group). However, as discussed in 
section 2.3, the dependent variable in this case is not wholly informative as 
to the current stock of human capital of the child, or as to whether the child 
has been working in the past. In particular, the current activity of the child 
gives no insight as to exactly when the child was withdrawn from school, and 
thus to what extent human capital accumulation has been affected. A more 
direct measure of investment in human capital of the child is gleaned by 
examining accumulated years of education. This captures past temporary 
(and permanent) interruptions to schooling.33 For this reason, from hereon 
I focus on the effects of risk on this measure of human capital.
In table 2.7, the results for both the 7-12 and 10-14 year old samples 
provide strong evidence that aggregate risk has a negative and significant 
effect on the accumulated years of education of the child. On the other 
hand, the effects of idiosyncratic risk axe not statistically different from zero 
for either sub-sample. The results are consistent with children being used as 
insurance in response to aggregate village risk, and with idiosyncratic risk 
being diversified away without the use of children, in line with previous find­
ings that aggregate risk is more difficult to insure against than idiosyncratic 
risk. This is a key finding, and its implications are extremely important 
for understanding factors in education - and possibly child labour - choices 
in LDCs. Below, I probe this result further to assess its robustness across 
different subsamples.
33If the individual is observed to have repeated a year of school, this is not counted 
as an extra year of education. Thus the years of education variable captures any delays 
in the education process through having to repeat, through late enrolment, or through 
withdrawal for one year (or more). It does not directly pick up seasonal interruptions to 
schooling, except through seasonal interruptions leading to the child having to repeat a 
year of schooling.
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Whilst defining the samples on the basis of primary school age and (child) 
working age is intuitively appealing, it is also of interest to examine the ef­
fects of risk across other refined age ranges. For example, one might expect 
the effects of risk to be lower for the < 10 age range, due to the fact that 
work is relatively uncommon at this age. By a similar argument, it is also 
reasonable to expect risk to have less of an effect on 15-17 year olds, amongst 
whom work is relatively more common. I examine the effects of risk on years 
of education separately for age groups 7-9, 10-12, 13-14 and 15-17. Results 
in table 2.8 show that most of the adverse effect of aggregate risk is for 
the 10-12 year old range. This is in line with expectations. After age 12, 
it is much more common for individuals to be withdrawn from school; be­
fore age 10, it is extremely rare for children to work. Thus the 10-12 year 
old group comprises individuals who are likely to be most sensitive to eco­
nomic constraints, and this is indeed borne out in the analysis in table 2.8. 
Throughout, the effects of idiosyncratic risk axe not statistically different 
from zero.
In an attempt to capture those villages in which consumption smoothing 
is limited by borrowing constraints, the sample is further restricted to small 
rural villages that do not have access to credit. Credit represents access 
to some type of formal credit, whether it is for consumption or investment 
purposes. From table 2.9 we see that in villages without any access to credit, 
the pattern is the same as for the overall sample, with idiosyncratic volatility 
having a negative but insignificant effect on years of education. Despite the 
decrease in sample sizes, a comparison of tables 2.7 and 2.9 is interesting, 
as it shows that the effect of aggregate risk is negative and even stronger 
when the sample of villages is restricted to those without formal credit. This 
pattern of results conforms to children serving as a consumption-smoothing 
device in areas where one might expect household diversification strategies 
to be most important, i.e. areas without any formal credit.34
34Note that a number of other robustness checks have been carried out, including the 
sensitivity of the results to the age cutoff of the household head, and to the precise cutoff 
for village size. The same pattern of results holds.
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Finally, I base the measures of risk on the sample of household heads 
that is inclusive of the self-employed who use family labour. As discussed 
already, I expect this to under-estimate the ex-ante risk facing households 
given that the wages of this group of self-employed will include contributions 
of family labour. In table 2.10, we see that this measure of aggregate risk 
has negative effects across the 7-12 and 10-12 year old samples, which are 
significant at the 10% level. Idiosyncratic risk again has no significant effect. 
Thus from this evidence, it is unlikely that the exclusion of the self-employed 
with family labour from the wage equations, is biasing the estimates of the 
effect of risk on education choices. Whilst this is not the preferred measure 
of risk, I view this analysis as a pointer towards the salient issues involved 
in measuring risk in LDCs, and the importance of ideally having access to 
in-depth labour supply and earnings data for each family member, in order 
to better proxy the ex-ante risk facing households. It is hoped that future 
data collection in LDCs may bear this in mind.35
To conclude, the results axe consistent with children aged 10-plus serving 
as a consumption smoothing device against aggregate but not idiosyncratic 
forms of risk. This result emerges most strongly for the 10 to 12 age group. 
It is in line with previous literature which finds that aggregate village risk is 
more difficult to insure than idiosyncratic risk. To the extent that this lower 
schooling is substituted by work, one can infer risk feeding through to child 
labour, in the form of a possible buffer stock for the parent. However, this is 
not possible to conclude here. Ideally, one would like to observe the child’s 
activity at a number of points in time in order to draw any conclusions 
about the direct effect of risk on child labour. For the moment, one can 
only suggest that the human capital accumulation reductions, with their 
adverse dynamic effects, may be facilitating the occurrence of child labour.
35 Indeed there is already a move towards the more direct collection of data on household 
risk in micro-level surveys.
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2.4.2 R obustness to  A ssum ptions in M odel
In terms of aggregate village risk, as discussed in section 2.2, whilst its neg­
ative effect on education may be the result of inadequate insurance mecha­
nisms, it must also be discussed in the light of two key assumptions in the 
model: the lack of intergenerational transfers from adults to parents, and 
deterministic earnings for the adult, conditional on education. In section
2.2 I outlined how relaxing these assumptions can lead to the effects of risk 
on education becoming ambiguous. It is important to determine to what 
extent these assumptions are plausible in Indonesia, and therefore how they 
may be having a bearing on the empirical results.
In the model of section 2.2, if one permits transfers from the adult to 
the parent in period 2, the pure effect of these future transfers is to increase 
investment in education. This is traded off against the value of current child 
earnings to the adult, as a means of buffer stock accumulation, and the net 
effect of risk is thus ambiguous (see equation (2.13)). The observed response 
of education to risk may thus be the net of these two effects. For aggregate 
risk, it may be the case that the buffer stock motive is taking precedence 
over transfer motives for the parent. However, it may instead be the case 
that intergenerational transfers are unrelated to education in Indonesia, in 
which case the assumption of the model holds and the observed negative 
effect is likely to be untempered by this transfers motive. One test of this 
assumption is to examine whether children with higher education transfer 
more to their parents. I estimate a probit in which the dependent variable is 
equal to one if the parent is a net transfer recipient. Controlling for a range 
of household characteristics, table 2.12 shows that there are no differential 
effects of various education levels of the donor on this dependent variable.36 
Thus this provides evidence that this offsetting force is unlikely to be in 
operation in the sample.
The second testable assumption relates to the fact that if earnings risk
36This is in line with findings by Raut and Tran (1998) and Cameron and Cobb-Clark 
(2001), also using the IFLS data.
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is increasing in education, and if the parent assesses the randomness of the 
future environment for the adult on the basis of their own experiences, in­
vestment in education may decrease in response to parental income risk 
- without having to appeal to an insurance argument. This assumption 
is difficult to test however, as the response of investment in education to 
risk depends on the precise way in which risk interacts with the earnings 
function. With this caveat in mind, one simple way is to test whether the 
measure of idiosyncratic risk is decreasing or increasing in education level. 
If it is decreasing, it is more plausible to expect investment in education to 
be positively affected by risk (in order to minimise the future risk that will 
face the adult), compared to the case in which it is increasing. Thus in the 
former case, the observed adverse response of education to aggregate risk 
may reflect the buffer stock motive outweighing the incorporation of adult 
income risk into parental education choices on the basis of perceived inter­
actions between education and income risk. The coefficients on education 
levels from equation (2.17), shown in table 2.13, indicate that idiosyncratic 
risk is decreasing in education level, being highest for unschooled individ­
uals, and for those with no/primary qualification, relative to more senior 
qualifications. It is therefore plausible that the adverse effects of aggregate 
risk on education are being mitigated by a possible increase in education in 
response to future earnings risk of the adult. If this is indeed happening, it 
in fact strengthens the empirical conclusions.
The same line of thought can be applied to the finding that education 
choices are not affected by idiosyncratic risk. However, it is difficult to 
think why the two assumptions would operate differently on both types of 
risk. Instead, it seems more plausible to us that the effects are being largely 
driven by a lack of insurance markets for aggregate risk, with idiosyncratic 
risk being diversified away through means other than children. In fact, one 
way of coping with risk is by drawing on precautionary savings. In Indone­
sia, jewellery is an important means of saving that is used to buffer against 
adverse events. Table 2.11 provides estimates of the marginal effects of risk 
on the probability that the household currently owns jewellery. The results 
are interesting, providing evidence that in those households in small rural
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villages with at least one 7-12 or 10-14 year old, higher levels of aggregate 
risk increase the probability that the household owns jewellery, suggesting 
that households save more in response to pervasive risk. The effect of id­
iosyncratic risk is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels. 
However these findings are merely suggestive of a plausible range of mecha­
nisms being used by the household to deal with uncertainty. Nonetheless, I 
view them as providing a motivation for further research into the myriad of 
ways that households cope with risk, with important consideration for the 
role of children in this risk-coping portfolio.
Finally, whether the results are due to thin insurance markets for income 
in small rural villages, is also assessed by examining the effects of risk in 
large urban areas. The results in table 2.14 show that none of the risk 
variables are statistically different from zero at conventional levels in these 
areas. On the basis that it is reasonable to expect insurance markets to be 
better-functioning in these areas37, and controlling for a wide range of area 
characteristics, this is consistent with the argument that the negative effect 
of aggregate risk in small rural areas, is largely due to insurance market 
failures.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the effects of uncertainty combined with inadequate insur­
ance and credit markets, on investment in education, have been specifically 
addressed. Parental income risk has been shown, under certain conditions, 
to have an adverse effect on education, with children fulfilling the possible 
role of an insurance mechanism for smoothing consumption.
Empirically capturing the degree of risk facing households is a non-trivial 
task. Households may use many unobserved mechanisms to anticipate fu­
37Apart from formal insurance (and subsequent moral hazard problems), it may also 
be the case that individuals are less susceptible to covariant forms of risk in large urban 
areas, and therefore informal insurance arrangements amongst individuals are more likely 
to be successful.
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ture risk, and the assumption underlying the empirical estimation is that 
past earnings volatility is a useful indicator to the household of persistent 
risk and possible future uncertainty. Using past earnings volatility to con­
struct measures of idiosyncratic and aggregate village risk, is a fundamental 
contribution of this chapter. From estimates of wage volatility at both id­
iosyncratic and aggregate levels, the analysis has pointed towards an adverse 
effect of aggregate uncertainty on child education in small rural villages, 
with idiosyncratic risk having no statistically significant effect on years of 
education. This is suggestive of the use of children to fill possible gaps in 
insurance markets for aggregate risk and is in line with previous findings 
which indicate that aggregate risk is more difficult to insure against than 
idiosyncratic risk. The robustness of this result across different data sets, is 
a topic for future research.
From a policy perspective, it is clear that the interaction of risk and 
lack of insurance markets, may combine to have detrimental effects on the 
education of a child. However, the findings indicate that idiosyncratic risk 
is being diversified by households without having to resort to the labour 
of their children. Whether this is through formal insurance provision or 
through self-insurance in the household/social networks, is not possible to 
gauge from this analysis. Aggregate village risk on the other hand, seems to 
be more difficult to insure against, and this is likely to have serious conse­
quences on child human capital acquisition. Policy must be carefully crafted 
in order that more formal insurance provision does not crowd out insurance 
mechanisms that households already use to deal with idiosyncratic risk. At 
the same time, the costliness of such self-insurance to the household must 
also be considered.
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2.6 Tables
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Table 2.1: Mean Characteristics by Region Type
(i)
Sm all R u ra l 
V illages
< 1,000 households
(2)
All O th e r 
Regions
Urban (all households) 
Rural (>1,000 households)
Age of the child 11.9766 11.9681
(1.4213) (1.4173)
Male child 0.5102 0.4954
(0.5001) (0.5001)
Child is attending school 0.8300 0.8853
(0.3758) (0.3187)
Unschooled mother 0.3214 0.2708
(0.4672) (0.4444)
Unschooled father 0.2928 0.2687
(0.4552) (0.4434)
Household size 6.0996 6.1916
(2.0114) (2.1105)
Farm ownership 0.7247 0.2459
(0.4468) (0.4307)
Business ownership 0.3243 0.4155
(0.4683) (0.4929)
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Table 2.1 contd.
(1) (2)
Number of households in village 551.04
(249.57)
2658.69
(3122.44)
Urban area - 0.7109
(0.4534)
Number of senior high schools 1.4182
(1.1982)
1.6424
(1.0414)
Distance to nearest school (km) 3.8046
(3.1814)
1.4041
(1.4055)
Presence of bank 0.1119
(0.3154)
0.49
(0.50)
JV =  1,136 N  = 2,729
Notes: Sample refers to households with at least one 10 to 14 year old. 
N is the number of children. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2.2: Current Primary Activity of 10-14 Year Olds
Small Rural Villages 
W ork Look for H ousew ork School O th er 
w ork
0.0561 0.0578 0.0272 0.8124 0.0465
(0.2302) (0.2336) (0.1626) (0.3905) (0.2008)
N=l,136
Notes: Other consists of those who axe physically invalid, mentally 
handicapped or suffer other hardships. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Mean Characteristics of Households with Self-Employed Head
W ith Family W ithout Family 
Labour Labour
Age of head 46.17 45.19
(10.65) (10.96)
Male head 0.8942 0.8612
(0.3077) (0.3458)
Years of education of head 4.2478 4.2578
(3.5740) (3.5584)
Liquid asset ownership 0.5160 0.5252
(0.50) (0.4995)
Farm ownership 0.7882 0.6354
(0.4087) (0.4814)
Business ownership 0.3869 0.4708
(0.4872) (0.4993)
Fraction of adults working 0.7353 0.6893
(0.2829) (0.2860)
Household size 4.9992 4.7839
(2.0676) (2.0698)
N=l,190 N=2,161
Standard deviations in parentheses. N is the number of households.
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Table 2.4: Estimates from Equation (2.17)
Small Rural Villages
Idiosyncratic risk
Number of household shocks 1988 to 1992 0.0292*
(0.0144)
0.0152 
(0.0176)
-0.0589*
(0.0269)
- 0 . 1002* *
(0.0262)
-0.0679**
(0.0244)
-0.0023*
(0 .0011)
r 2 = 0.2970 
Number of villages =  79
Notes: Dependent variable is idiosyncratic risk, as estimated in (2.16) from equation 
(2.15). The farm and business dummies may be interpreted relative to non-ownership of 
either a farm or a business. Also include the education and occupation of the household head 
and village dummy variables. ** statistically significant at the 1-percent level; * statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level.
Owns business
Owns small-sized farm
Owns medium-sized farm
Owns large-sized farm
Age of household head
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimates of Aggregate Risk on Village Characteristics
Sm all R u ra l V illages
Log village expenditure -0.0210
(0.0538)
Land type hilly -0.0687
(0.0379)
Soil productivity average /  high 0.0103
(0.0330)
Credit availability -0.0679*
(0.0320)
Presence of cottage industry -0.0019
(0.0361)
Presence of factory 0.0583
(0.0538)
Proportion of hhs in village with farm 0.2021*
(0.0817)
Proportion of hhs in village with business 0.0681
(0.1316)
Average number of village shocks 1988-1992 0.0053
(0.0052)
Average village rainfall 1991-1992 -0.0386
(0.0268)
Village has irrigated ricefields -0.0242
(0.0449)
r 2 =  0.327
osII£
I also include controls for village size and province. N is the number of villages. ** 
statistically significant at the 1-percent level; * statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
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Table 2.6: Probit Estimates - Effects of Risk on School Attendance
Small Rural Villages
Attend school 
(1) (2)
7-12 10-14
Idiosyncratic risk -0.0299 -0.0791
(0.0386) (0.0794)
Aggregate risk -0.0713 0.0117
(0.0473) (0.1013)
r2 =  0.1604 r 2 =  0.2240 
AT =  1,366 AT =  1,136
Number of villages =  79
Notes: Also include standard household, child and village level controls. 
Reference category is not attend school. Standard errors corrected for cluster­
ing at the village level. N is the number of children. ** statistically significant 
at the 1-percent level; * statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
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Table 2.7: OLS Estimates - Effects of Risk on Years of Education
Small Rural Villages
Years of education 
(1) (2)
7-12 10-14
Idiosyncratic risk 0.0240 -0.1358
(0.3055) (0.5534)
Aggregate risk -0.8753* -1.0746*
(0.3461) (0.5044)
r 2 =  0.5207 r 2 =  0.4235 
N  = 1,212 N =  1,026
Number of villages =  79
Notes: Also include standard household, child and village level controls. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. N is the number 
of children. ** statistically significant at the 1-percent level; * statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level.
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Table 2.8: OLS Estimates - Effects of Risk on Years of Education, by Age
(1)
7-9
Sm all R u ra l V illages
Years of education 
(2) (3) 
10-12 13-14
(4)
15-17
Idiosyncratic risk 0.1564 0.0789 -0.1177 -0.4826
(0.3364) (0.4628) (0.8909) (1.0281)
Aggregate risk -0.2734 -1.4546** -0.8214 -0.9136
(0.4815) (0.5073) (0.7508) (0.9038)
r 2 =  0.2652 r 2 =  0.2597 r 2 =  0.2278 r 2 =  0.2649
AT =  565
t-<0II AT =  379 V  =  493
Number of villages =  79
Notes: Also include standard household, child and village level controls. Standard errors 
corrected for clustering at the village level. N is the number of children. ** statistically 
significant at the 1-percent level; * statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
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Table 2.9: OLS Estimates - Effects of Risk on Years of Education
Villages without Credit
Years of education 
(1) (2)
7-12 10-14
Idiosyncratic risk -0.0209 -0.1052
(0.2596) (0.5048)
Aggregate risk -1.4708** -1.5807*
(0.5070) (0.8048)
r 2 =  0.5201 r 2 =  0.4053
AT =  989 AT =  849
Number of villages =  60
Notes: Also include standard household, child and village level controls. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. N is the number 
of children. ** statistically significant at the 1-percent level; * statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level.
Table 2.10: OLS Estimates - Effects of Risk on Years of Education
Sensitivity Analysis 
Small Rural Villages
Years of education 
(1) (2) (3)
7-12 10-14 10-12
Idiosyncratic risk -0.0495 -0.4833 -0.0787
(0.2321) (0.3117) (0.3268)
Aggregate risk -0.9352** -0.4602 -0.9526
(0.3596) (0.4710) (0.5113)
r 2 =  0.4660 r 2 =  0.4054 r 2 =  0.2232
CMtHCMII N  = 1,026 II 05
Number of villages =  79
Notes: Include wages of household heads who employ family labour in 
estimating the wage equations in (2.15). Also include standard household, 
child and village level controls. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the 
village level. N is the number of children. ** statistically significant at the 
1-percent level; * statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
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Table 2.11: Probit Estimates - Effects of Risk on Jewellery Ownership
Sm all R u ra l Villages 
(1) (2) 
Households with 7-12 Households with 10-14 
year olds year olds
Idiosyncratic risk -0.0470 -0.0135
(0.0963) (0.1043)
Village risk 0.1779 0.2259*
(0.1050) (0.1140)
r 2 =  0.0424 r 2 =  0.0501
N  = 935 N  = 799
Notes: Also include standard household, child and village level controls. Standard 
errors corrected for clustering at the village level. N is the number of households. ** 
statistically significant at the 1-percent level; * statistically significant at the 5-percent 
level.
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Table 2.12: Probit Estimates - Effects of Education on Transfers
Sm all R u ra l R egions 
Net transfer recipient 
0.0245 
(0.0238)
-0.0049 
(0.0278)
-0.0156 
(0.0268)
0.0284 
(0.0470)
r 2 =  0.1258
Notes: Also include standard household, individual and village level con­
trols. Omitted category is no education. Standard errors corrected for clus­
tering at the village level. ** statistically significant at the 1 -percent level; * 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
Elementary
Junior High
Senior High
College
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Table 2.13: QLS Estimates - Effects of Education on Idiosyncratic Risk
Small Rural Regions
Idiosyncratic Risk
Highest Education Level
Unschooled 0.1060**
(0.0193)
No Qualification 0.0422*
(0.0159)
Elementary 0.0440**
(0.0148)
Junior High 0.0291
(0.0176)
r 2 =  0.6358
Notes: Also include standard household, individual and village level controls. 
Omitted category is senior high qualification or above. Standard errors corrected 
for clustering at the village level. ** statistically significant at the 1 -percent level; * 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
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Table 2.14: OLS Estimates - Effects of Risk on Years of Education
Large Urban Regions
Years of education 
(1) (2)
7-12 10-14
Idiosyncratic risk -0.5862 -0.3895
(0.4265) (0.4826)
Aggregate risk 0.4750 0.5299
(0.4682) (0.5053)
r 2 =  0.5857 r 2 =  0.5724 
N  = 1,147 N  =  989
Number of villages =  118
Notes: Also include standard household, child and village level controls. 
Standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. N is the number 
of children. ** statistically significant at the 1 -percent level; * statistically 
significant at the 5-percent level.
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2.7 A ppendix
The first order conditions for consumption and education axe respectively
'Hcy : U ‘(ch1h) - P E l U '(4) = 0 
: ^ [ l f  ( 4 ) f ‘(g(Di))) - 0 ( p D + wc1)El U '(4)  =  0
(2.20)
(2.21)
Effect of P a re n ta l Incom e R isk  on D\
, h h „ h h
ODi ~ ^ D i8
\H\35 dS ^
where H  denotes the Hessian, \H\ > 0 due to the second order condition for 
a maximum and
V c{- : [U"(4h) +mu"{4)]dd
* Clcf k :[0{pD + w i)E lU''(4)]dd
hh1
hh
9 l**l : - f ) E 1[ U ' ' ( 4 M - t ) ] d 6  
* Dls : ~0(PD + u f tE i  [ V ' i £ M  ~  {)]<«
where I have substituted 5y% +  0 for parental period 2 income and am evalu­
ating the derivative keeping the mean of parental period 2 income constant.
dDi.
35
0(pD + w pE xlf 'j ,* )  Pip0  +  w D E ^ l f ' j ^  -  Q]
w
= f}(pD + wt)u"(^Etlu"(4M  -  {)] (2.22)
Risk aversion implies that U"(d{h) < 0. The sign of E\\U" — £)] is
determined below for all values of yj-
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y2 > f
Under the assumption that risk aversion is decreasing in c%
_ u M < ( _ v M )  i{ vp > < (2 23)
u'(4) -  (  u '(4 ) ) s (223)
^ ( 4 ) ( ^ - 0 >  0 if V2 >(. (2-24) 
Multiply (2.23) by (2.24)
^  u  ( 4 M  ~  £) ^  — ^ — [/'(c|) ^ ^  (^2) (2/2— £)
Take expected values on both sides
=» E i tu " (<$)(£ - « ) ] > - ( -  w ^ )  ~  01 (2-25)
To prove that LHS > 0, it is sufficient to show that RHS > 0. This amounts 
to showing that Ei[U* (c%)(y2 — 0 ] < 0
Since U" ((%) < 0,
( u ' ( 4 ) )  if yf >
Also,
y ? - £ > 0 i f y ? > £
=► -  €) <  (C^(^))€(*^ -  0
Take expected values
=> E t i u ' i ^ M  -  0 ] <  ( i f  ( % ) ) & { & - $  = 0 
= > ^ [U " (c S ) ( !^ -0  ] > 0  from (2.25)
=> (pD +  w\)U'\<*h)El [U‘'{<>)(& - ? ) ]  < 0
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$ < £ , \
Because risk aversion is decreasing in Cj, it must be that
Also
^ ' ( 4 ) ( y § - 0 < o i f ^ < |  
Multiply (2.26) by (2.27)
=> u " (4 M  - 0 >  -  0
=► -  0 ] > ( f ^ )  .Ei[i7'(4)(p§ -  0 ]
To prove that LHS > 0, it is sufficient to show that RHS > 
be shown that E \[U (c^Xy^ — 0 ] ^  0
u'(4)>  ( t ^ ) )  *!/?<«
Also
y § - ^ < 0 i f y f < C
= * -^ '(c ? )(^ -« )< (^ '(c ? ))£ (y ? -C )
Take expected values
=* E ^ U '(% )(£ -  0 ] < (U, (4 ) k E i ( y p2 - f l = 0
= > ^ [ l / #(c;)(i5 - 0 ] > 0  from (2.28)
=* (3(pD +  w\)U" ( ^ E W "  (<*)(£ -  0 ] < 0
=* dDi/dd  < 0 in (2.22)
(2.26)
(2.27)
(2.28)
0. So it must
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Chapter 3
Sibling Composition, 
Education Costs and Child 
Activity in Mexico
3.1 Introduction
Whilst the previous chapter explicitly focused on the effects of risk and un­
certainty on education and work choices for children, the analysis did not 
consider within-household interactions in the allocation of resources across 
children. However, the widely observed overall differential levels of invest­
ment in the education of males and females in less developed economies, 
clearly indicate unequal investment into the education of children within 
the household and are the end result of a highly complex intra-household 
decision-making process.1 For a number of possible reasons, the structure of 
the family is relevant to such decisions. Even if parents are equally altruis­
tic towards their children, if they seek to maximise family income, they will 
make investments in each child efficiently, investing more in the education
xSee Schultz (1993) for evidence that females axe less well educated than males in 
developing economies; indeed of children not in school in less developed economies in 
2003, females comprise two-thirds - see www.worldrevolution.org. Of course the within- 
household inequalities are most likely not confined to between-gender. One can also think 
of birth-order differences for example, although gender inequalities axe most easily de­
tectable in macro-level statistics.
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of children yielding the highest expected returns.2 However, the presence 
of resource and credit constraints is the most likely explanation for differ­
ential investment within the family. This is because when the household 
is not able to perfectly smooth inter-temporal consumption, or to borrow 
against the future human capital of children, current income matters for 
education and parents can no longer invest optimally in the education of 
their children, being forced instead to ration resources between them. This 
may push siblings into competition with each other for scarce resources and 
as family size increases, current household resources are diluted even further 
amongst children.3 Sibling structure thus becomes an important factor in 
choices and even conditional on the sibling set, birth order will be relevant 
in the presence of credit constraints. This is because the variation in family 
income across the lifecycle will occur at different stages in the education cy­
cles of children and will be more favourable for some children than for others.
The empirical evidence on the relationship between the number of chil­
dren in the household and human capital investment points, with few excep­
tions, towards a negative association.4 A priori however, the relationship 
between household size and education is ambiguous. Whilst larger house­
holds face a greater division of resources, the productive capacity of some 
children may actually be beneficial for the education of others in the house­
hold. The likelihood of a particular child being used by the parent to allevi­
ate resource constraints depends on the age and gender of that child, along 
with those of his siblings. For example, females tend to have a comparative 
advantage in home production, with males more likely to provide help on 
the household farm or to engage in market work.5 Very young children, 
on the other hand, are likely to represent a pure drain on resources. Older 
children may thus free up resources for younger children, or may actually 
add to total household income, thus improving opportunities for later-born 
children. Apart from this, different children have different perceived and
2  Equity can then be achieved through transfers within the family.
3Strauss and Thomas (1995) refer to this as ‘resource crowding’.
4See for example Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), Parish and Willis (1993) and Ahn et 
al (1998). Kaestner (1997), however, finds no effect.
5See Strauss and Thomas (1995) and Edmonds (2002).
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actual costs of and benefits from education, which will thus affect their 
levels of education. Therefore apart from actual household size, the gen­
der and the relative age composition of the family are critical factors in 
the education decision-making process. Parish and Willis (1993) find that 
whilst having more siblings is associated with less education for both males 
and females in Taiwan, the association varies depending on the composition 
of siblings. They find that more younger siblings of the same gender ad­
versely affect the educational attainment of both males and females, whilst 
opposite-sex siblings are generally neutral to one’s educational attainment. 
On the other hand, older brothers reduce the educational attainment only 
of males, whilst older sisters are associated with more education for both 
males and females, thus suggesting that older sisters may serve to alleviate 
the resource constraints on the family. Patrinos and Psacharopoulos (1997) 
also provide some evidence that older children may work to provide for their 
younger siblings.6 The evidence on birth-order effects on education is in­
conclusive, with some studies finding that last-born children receive more 
education than earlier-born siblings, consistent with older children freeing 
up resources for younger siblings, or with parental income being higher at 
later stages in the lifecycle.7 Gomes (1984) and Behrman and Taubman 
(1986), however, point to the favouring of the eldest child with educational 
resources, regardless of family size, consistent with the parent wishing to 
obtain income returns at the earliest possible date.
In this chapter, I examine associations between sibling structure, as cat­
egorised by age and gender, and discrete indicators of activities of children, 
using data on rural Mexico. Throughout, I take the number of siblings as 
exogenous. Apart from controlling for the composition of siblings, I also in­
vestigate the effect of the child wage on the economic activity and whether 
its effect varies by sibling composition. Despite the fact that this is the
6The effect of siblings on other human capital outcomes apart from education, such as 
child health, has also been widely examined. Garg and Morduch (1998), for example, find 
that sibling sex composition matters importantly in explaining child health outcomes in 
poor economies.
7See for example Ejrnaes and Portner (2002) and Emerson and Souza (2002).
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largest opportunity cost of education in LDCs, there is a noticeable gap in 
the literature as to its empirical importance for observed choices.8 Some 
exceptions include Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977), Rosenzweig (1982) and 
Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), all of whom find that increases in child wages 
negatively affect school attendance. It is plausible that the responsiveness 
of a particular child to changes in the child wage, is a function of the struc­
ture of the sibling set. The main channel through which this may operate 
is via the demands placed by siblings on household resources, which are a 
function of such factors as whether or not they work (or are of - subjec­
tively defined - ‘working-age’), their education status and the propensity of 
parents to invest in their human capital. However, it is not clear a priori 
how the wage elasticity of a particular child will be affected, and this will 
largely be determined by the influence of the above factors. For example, 
the higher are the demands that other siblings place on resources (whether 
for pure consumption or for education), the more sensitive one might ex­
pect a given child to be to the wage, whilst if siblings in fact contribute to 
household resources, a given child’s wage elasticity may be lower. To my 
knowledge, this is one of the first studies to explicitly examine whether sib­
ling structure does indeed have a bearing on the responsiveness of the child 
to the wage. Another feature of the chapter is to allow for an unobserved 
household-specific component (representing parental preferences for exam­
ple) to decisions across children within the same household, which is seldom 
considered in the empirical work in this area, which generally condition on 
observable characteristics only.9
To briefly preview the main results, I find that having a large number 
of siblings is associated with lower educational attainment of children. Fe­
males, especially of relatively young ages, generally tend to stay at home the 
more siblings they have, whilst males axe equally likely to work or to look for
8Apart from poor quality wage data, the limited analysis of wage effects is also due to 
the endogeneity of wages, being only observed for children who choose to work. Indeed a 
recent analysis by Hazaxika and Bedi (2003) on the effect of school costs on child schooling 
in rural Pakistan, ignores the opportunity costs of school.
9A recent exception is Deb and Rosati (2002).
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work. Very young siblings and older brothers axe the most detrimental for 
education. In many instances, there are important wage interactions, with 
larger changes in participation in various activities in response to changes 
in the wage, the greater the number of siblings.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In section 3.2, I outline a simple static 
discrete-choice model to show how the effect of the child wage on investment 
in education may vary by sibling composition and in section 3.3, I discuss 
the methodological application of this model. Section 3.4 describes the data 
used in the analysis, which spans seven states in marginalised villages in rural 
Mexico. Section 3.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 3.6 
concludes and considers some future research topics in this area, along with 
discussing the possible effectiveness of a variety of policies relating to the 
encouragement of participation in education and the eventual eradication of 
child labour in LDCs.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In order to show how the wage elasticity may vary by household composi­
tion, I consider a simple static discrete-choice model in which the choice set 
for children consists of school (S) and work (W). I consider two households, 
which vary only in the number of children present. I show how allowing for 
current parental income to affect choices implies different effects of the wage 
on choices in each household.10
To set up the model, I assume that if child i works, (s)he contributes 
W{ (the child wage) to household income; the direct cost of schooling is 
Pi and the discrete gain in human capital as a result of schooling is Hi, 
which equals 0 if in work and 1 if in school (I represent these values by 
and H f  respectively). Household utility depends on both household 
consumption and the final stock of human capital of the child(ren). I assume
1 0  As discussed already, current income may matter due to the parent not being able or 
not wanting to borrow to invest in human capital, due to the fact that human capital is 
poor collateral or because the parent is unable to enforce future transfers from the child.
69
that the parent is the decision-maker, who is rational in the sense of making 
choices that maximise perceived household utility subject to the relevant 
constraints.11 Due to errors in the maximisation as a result of imperfect 
perception and optimisation, as well as the inability of the parent to precisely 
measure all of the relevant variables, utility is assumed to be a random 
function. The two households that I consider are one in which there is only 
one child, the other in which there are two children.
3.2.1 Households w ith  one child
Consider first the case in which there is only one child in the household. Uj 
is an underlying latent variable denoting the level of utility for household h 
associated with the child being in activity j .12
U- = Vj(Cj,H{) +  €j for j  = S ,W  (3.1)
where Cj is household consumption, which varies across alternatives due to 
the fact that if the child works he contributes w\ to income and therefore 
consumption, whilst if he goes to school the cost is p\\ H{ is the human 
capital level of the child in activity j  and tj is a residual that captures un­
observed variations in tastes and in the attributes of alternatives, along with 
errors in the perception and optimisation by the parent.
I approximate Vj in (3.1) using a form that is linear in the parameters
Vj = aj Cj +  aiH{  for j  = S ,W  (3.2)
where
Cj =  Y -  l .( j  =  S)pi +  1 .(j =  W > i  (3.3)
1 1  As in chapter 2 , this assumes the existence of a household utility function rather than 
a weighted average of utility functions of the two parents, and enables me to abstract from 
bargaining between parents that may arise due to different preferences across parents.
12As the household (parent) is the decision-making unit, implicitly all variables are 
subscripted by h. This indexing is omitted for ease of notation. I also suppress the 
conditioning on a range of observable household, individual and village characteristics 
and introduce it further below.
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where Y  denotes the exogenous earnings of the parent, whom I assume al­
ways works.
The probability of observing a particular choice, j , for the child is denoted 
by Pj (the superscript denotes the number of siblings of the child). This 
choice will be observed if it yields the maximum utility to the parent across 
all possible choices
pj> = Pr(Uj > Up)
= P r (€? < Vj ~  Vj> +  €j)
ev’
V j j '
&
under the assumption that the residuals are independently and identically 
distributed with type 1 extreme value distribution.13 Prom this, the proba­
bility of observing the child in school, P j, may be written as
w  =  *) =  (3-4)
where from (3.2) and (3.3)
Vs = as (Y - Pl) + a iH?
V\y = Ovv (y  + wi) + «1 h \v
Therefore (3.4) can be written more fully as
eas (Y- p i )+ ai H f
P r(j  =  S) = e a s ( Y - Pl)+a i H? e a w ( Y + ,w i ) + a i H ^
I  _|_ ea w ( Y + w i ) + a i H ^ - a s ( Y - p i ) - a i H f (3.5)
The marginal effect of the own child wage on the probability of school at­
tendance is obtained by differentiating (3.5) with respect to w\
13 See McFadden (1974).
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dPr(j = S) - a w (eaw Y^+w^ +aiH^ ~ as Y^~p^ ~ aiHi)
dw\ ^  +  ea\v(Y+wi)+aiH^-as(Y-pi)-aiHf
= - a w P $ ( l - P $ )  (3.6)
which is always negative.14
3.2.2 Households w ith  two children
Consider now a household with two children. In this case, one may think of 
the pair of activities of the two children as the choice variable. There are 
four such pairs. Ujk is an underlying latent variable denoting the level of 
utility for household h associated with child 1 being in activity j  and child 
2 in activity k
u;k =  Vjk(Cjk,H{,H^) +  (jk for j  =  S,W, k =  S ,W  (3.7)
where Cjk is household consumption, whose value is again a function of the 
set of activities of the two children; H{, H$ are the human capital levels 
of child 1 and 2 respectively and £jk is a residual that captures unobserved 
variations in tastes and in the characteristics of alternatives and errors in 
the optimisation by the parent.
I approximate Vjk in (3.7) using a form that is linear in the parameters
vjk = pjkc jk + fr H l  + lhH% for j, k = S ,W  (3.8)
where
Cjk =  Y -  1 .(j =  S)pi + l.(j =  W)Wl -  l.(fc = S)p2 +  l.(fc = W)w2
(3.9)
where Y  denotes the exogenous earnings of the parent.
14Note also that the derivative is largest when P5  =  1  — Pg, which occurs when P 5  =  ^, 
and becomes smaller as P 5  approaches zero or one.
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The probability of observing a particular set of choices {j , fc} for the two 
children is denoted by Pjk. This pair of choices will be observed if it yields 
the maximum utility to the parent across all possible pairs of choices
Pjk =  Pr(u;k > U*,kt) 
=  Pr(Cj'k' < Vjk -  Vj'k> +  Cjk)
ev-
X j ' # e V*'
again under the assumption that the residuals are independently and iden­
tically distributed with type 1 extreme value distribution. From this, the 
probability of observing child 1 in school, (again, the superscript denotes 
the number of siblings of the child), may be written as
Pr(j = S) = Pss + Psw
evSs +  evSw
eYss +  eYws +  qVsw 4- qVWw
where
Vss = Pss(Y - P i - P 2) +  A  i f f  +  f t  i f f  
Vsw =  Psw(Y -  pi +  tot) + f t  i f f  +  fcH ?  
Vws = Pws(Y +  » i -  pt) + P iHf  +  f t f l f  
Vww = Pww(Y +  wi + wt) + PiH™ + f t i f ^
Therefore (3.10) can be written more fully as
Pr(j = S) =[ePss(Y~Pl~P2}+PlHi +P2H* + ePsw(Y~Pl+W2^ 0lHi +02H™') /
^ePss(Y-Pl-P2)+0lHf!+/?2 -fff _|_ ePsw(Y-pi+W2)+0lHf+02H1Y _|_ 
ePws(Y+‘U}l~P2)+PlH^r+02H^ ePww(y+Wl+W2)+PlHY +P2HIY 'j
= N /D  (3.11)
The marginal effect of the own child wage on the probability of school at­
tendance is
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dP rjj S) _  _ jy  ^pw s e^/3Ws(Y+m-p2)+0iH^ + P2H2 _^j_
Pww (el3ww(Y+Wl+W2')+l3lH™+&Ha|r)] / D 2
= —Ps [PwsPws +  Pww Pww] (3-12)
In this model, allowing the coefficients on household consumption (i.e. 
household income) to vary across activities, renders sibling composition rel­
evant for choices for the following reason. The imposition of common coef­
ficients on household consumption implies that investment in education is 
independent of current family income and household structure. This can be 
seen by comparing the probabilities of school enrolment in the two house­
holds, (3.5) and (3.11), which are the same in both households and are invari­
ant to changes in the value of Y  if as  =  a w  = Pss = Psw — Pws = P w w -15 
However, in the more plausible case in which liquidity constraints exist, 
current household income will affect education choices. I incorporate this 
by allowing the parameters on consumption in each choice to be different. 
Changing the value of Y  in this case not only changes (3.5) and (3.11), but 
also affects them differently in different household types.
In order to compare the wage elasticities in the one-child and two-child 
households, I compare expressions (3.6) and (3.12) under the assumptions 
that
Pss =  &s , Pww  =  aw, Pws =  Psw, « i = Pi = P2
W \ = W 2 =  w ,  P i  =  P2 =  P
The first two equalities imply that the utility from consumption is the same 
in each household, conditional on all children in the household either being
15Indeed they only change in response to changes in the parameters or school costs, 
but are always equal across household types. This is the standard pure investment model 
of schooling in which there are no liquidity constraints and income does not matter for 
education, with parents investing in each child’s schooling until the expected marginal 
returns are equal to the marginal costs.
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in work or in school and controlling for family size. The assumption that 
Pws  =  Psw  means that in a two-child household in which only one child 
works, the parent attains the same utility from consumption regardless of 
which child is contributing to income. Assuming that a i  =  /?i =  P2 is 
equivalent to saying that a unit of human capital is valued equally by the 
parent regardless of which child it accumulates to, and that human capital 
is valued equally across both households. The assumption that the wages 
and direct costs of education are the same across all children is relevant in 
the case in which the children within the household are of similar ages. I 
also assume that
as  > aw
Pss > Psw > Pww
This is akin to assuming that if the parent were somehow to face the same 
consumption value for each possible activity or set of activities, then the 
utility from sending the child to school is higher than the utility from sending 
the child to work, due to the accumulation of human capital in school and 
not in work. In the two-child household, the option of having one child in 
school and one in work is also preferred to having both in work, and less 
preferred to having both in school, again due to the value the parent places 
on human capital accumulation.16 Under these assumptions
<r 3P ls
dw dw
As the changes in the choice probabilities must sum to zero when an exoge­
nous variable changes, it follows that
-J>Pw
dw dw
This simple static model points towards the wage having a more adverse 
effect on education, and a correspondingly more positive effect on work 
participation, in large households compared to its effect in small households. 
The model has been developed in order to focus specifically on a comparison 
of the wage elasticities of children from different household sizes, which
16See for example Train (1986).
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is the empirical focal point of this chapter. Whilst we have seen that it 
is theoretically plausible to expect the wage elasticity to be increasing in 
sibling size, there are however, other sibling-related factors that are not 
accounted for and that are likely to be important channels through which 
sibling size and structure are relevant to the wage elasticity. In particular, 
the activities of other siblings are likely to be important. For example, 
conditional on sibling size and structure, if many of the siblings are working 
and contributing to household income, it is intuitively plausible to expect the 
wage elasticity of a particular child to be different to the case in which many 
of the siblings are in school.17 The extension of the model to incorporate a 
more complete analysis of the interactions between siblings and child wages, 
will be an important extension of this work.
3.3 Estim ation M ethodology
In the two-child case outlined above, the set of activities of children in the 
household is the dependent variable. In a conditional logit model, this would 
mean that there are four outcomes to consider and therefore four dependent 
variables in the estimation. Were I to extend it to a three-child household, 
there would be eight possible combinations of activities, and so on, with the 
number of dependent variables proliferating rapidly. In a multinomial logit 
model on the other hand, in which the choice variable is the activity of one 
child only, there are only as many dependent variables as there are choices 
for the child, and in this sense the complexity of the estimation is reduced.18 
Therefore, I consider the choice variable to be the activity of one child only.
irNote also that we have not distinguished between income and substitution effects 
of the wage. Indeed, structural modelling of child labour supply is an important future 
research agenda.
1SA further complication in the conditional logit model is that for the two-child house­
hold, for example, it would necessitate having access to the values of the wages and the 
costs of schooling for both children under all four sets of activities: SS, SW, WS and WW. 
Whilst it is plausible to assume that the spot wage in the market is the same for a child, 
regardless of the activity of the other child, this is not necessarily the case for children 
working on the family enterprise. The child wage in this case is the marginal product of 
the child, which may vary for a child depending on whether the other child is in work or 
in school, and strong assumptions would need to be made in order to impute it.
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I classify the number of siblings in the household into distinct groups on 
the basis of the age and gender of the siblings, and allow for the effect of 
the wage to vary by sibling composition, through interacting the wage with 
the number of siblings in each group. Under the above theoretical model, I 
expect the effect of the wage on the activity of the child, to be increasing 
in the number of siblings. The essential difference is that the independent 
variables are no longer choice-specific, whilst the parameters axe. The model 
is therefore estimated using a multinomial logit.19
In the empirical estimation, the choice set of the parent in household h 
(h = 1, ■ • • , H) for child i consists of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
categories: full- and part-time school (S), full-time work (W), and some 
other non-school activity, such as housework or looking for work (O).20 I 
denote the activity of child i in household h as I condition the analysis 
on a vector of observed child, household and locality characteristics, Xihv, 
that I expect to be relevant factors in the decision. In addition, I allow for 
a common unobserved household-level component to choices across children 
within the same household. One can think of this as representing underlying 
parental preferences, or unobserved differences in the costs of and returns to 
education across households, that may affect the maximisation of household 
welfare and therefore observed choices.21 I approximate the latent utility to 
household h from activity k for child i by
Uihk =  71 kWiv +  729kn9h +  X) 739k (Wiv * ngh) +  74kX ihv +  €ihk (3.13)
9 9
where the child wage Wiv, depends on the village in which he lives - 1 return to 
this below - ngh represents the number of siblings in the household in group 
g and W{v * ngh denotes interactions between the child wage and the number 
of group g siblings in the household. To allow for a common household-level 
unobserved component, I assume that the random component of utility is
19See Amemiya (1981) for a thorough review of the multinomial logit model.
20Three activities can readily be incorporated into the theoretical model, but the ex­
panded choice set would yield no new insights of particular relevance here.
2 1  Ignoring such unobserved heterogeneity in nonlinear models may lead to biased pa­
rameter estimates. This is along the lines of Deb and Rosati (2002).
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characterised by a one-factor structure
tihk — Cihk
where Ah is an unobserved latent factor representing household preferences, 
for example, and Cihk is a random component to choices. I assume that
• A ssum ption  1 The random variable Ah is independent of Cihk V i ,h ,k ,  
and all Ah and Cihk are independent across households and individuals.
• A ssum ption  2 The term Cihk is an extreme value random variable and 
is independent of all other Ci',h",k"' except for i =  i', h = h", k = k,n.
The probability that child i in household h is observed in activity k is there­
fore
P^iyih — k\Wiv,Tlghi Xihv, Xh) =
exp[jikwiv +  I 2gkngh +  E g  73gfc(^it; * righ) +  lAkXjhv +  foA/J 
Efc' exP h lk>wiv +  E g l 2gk,ngh +  E g 73gk, {wiv * ngh) +  7ik,X ihv +  fa'^h]
(3.14)
for all k and k
The joint probabihty of children’s activities in household h is the product 
of (3.14) over all children in the household
nh r /  \  i-(yih=k)-
k  = | |  {P^il/ih   k\W{V) 7lgh, Xtfty, Xfi) j
i=l *■ k '  '
(3.15)
where nh denotes the number of children in the household. As A^  is 
unobserved, it is integrated out of (3.15). To avoid any potential bias arising 
from the incorrect specification of a functional form for /(A^), I model it non- 
parametrically by assuming that it has discrete support and that households 
can be described by a finite number, M, of latent types, with proportions 7rm 
of each type. One may think of the discrete distribution as an approximation 
to some underlying continuous density (although it is also intuitive to think
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of the underlying population as being divided into M  discrete groups).22 
The contribution of household h to the log likelihood function is therefore
M  n h _
L h  =  log( E^ncri \Pr{lJih  — k\Wiv , Ugh, X ih y ,  Xfr — f'Vn)] ) )
m = 1 1=1  k
(3.16)
and the sample log likelihood is the sum of (3.16) across all households in
TT
the sample, L  =  l2h=i Lh•
The above exposition takes the values of each of the conditioning vari­
ables as known. However, the child wage is clearly observed for working 
children only, in which case it is endogenous for this sub-sample.23 I obtain 
an estimate of the available wage for each child in the sample from the wages 
of working children, by regressing the observed child wages on the age and 
gender of the entire sample of children, along with the average adult agri­
cultural wage in the village and state dummy variables. I therefore estimate 
the following equation by OLS
Wiv = $0 +  OlDs +  02%iv +  @zAv +  I'iv (3-17)
where W{v is the wage of child i in village v, Ds is a vector of state dummies, 
ZiV is a vector of child characteristics (age, age squared and gender), A v is the 
average agricultural adult wage in the village, which is the within-village av­
erage of the wages of household heads who report working in agriculture, and 
Viv is a random error term affecting wages, with E(Z{V, Viv) =  E (A V, Viv) =  0 
for all i,v. The predicted Wiv from (3.17) is the estimate of the potential 
child wage. The key identifying assumption is that the average agricultural 
adult wage in the village affects the activity of the child only through its 
effect on the child wage. This is confirmed by very low partial r 2’s from 
regressions of the main activity of the child on the instrument, after con-
22See Heckman and Singer (1985).
23In any case, interest centres on the effect of the wage at the extensive rather than at 
the intensive margin. See Bhalotra (2000) who uses a selection procedure to correct for 
the endogeneity of the wage and to examine the responsiveness of work hours of working 
children to the wage.
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trolling for all other exogenous variables, including average village wealth.24 
The results from this regression axe displayed in table 3.1, for both 8 to 12 
year olds and 13 to 17 year olds. Whilst the predictive power of the instru­
ment is confirmed - the child wage is closely related to the adult agricultural 
wage, being on average between 60 to 72 per cent of the adult agricultural 
wage - this is also suggestive that the child and the adult labour markets 
are closely linked and for reasons discussed above, leads to concerns about 
the exclusion restriction assumption. Future work will address this issue 
further.
3.4 Data
I estimate the model using cross-sectional socio-economic census data that 
was collected across marginalised rural areas throughout Mexico between 
1996 and 1999. This survey - the Survey of Household Socio-Economic 
Characteristics (Encuesta de Caracteristicas Socioeconomicas de los Hoga- 
res, ENCASEH) - was conducted with a view to aiding in the targeting of 
marginalised localities and households that would be eligible for the imple­
mentation of a welfare programme, Progresa, that was introduced in selected 
villages across seven states in rural Mexico in 1998. The data contains a 
cross-section of information on a large variety of individual and household 
characteristics and is supplemented by locality data that can be matched to 
households. To make the sample sizes manageable, I restrict the analysis 
to the seven states in which Progresa was subsequently (selectively) imple­
24The theoretical validity of this instrument is, however, questionable on the basis that 
factors that affect the adult labour market are also likely to directly affect the child labour 
market, apart from their indirect impact through their effect on the child wage. To the 
extent that the adult wage proxies for such factors, it may therefore be expected to have 
a direct impact on the activity of the child. The importance of such factors is likely to 
depend on the degree of substitutability in production in adult and child labour markets 
(see for example Basu and Van (1998)). Failure to adequately control for common labour 
market factors in the child activity regressions may render the exclusion restriction invalid, 
with the coefficient on the predicted child wage comprising both the effects of the wage 
and of other labour market influences that are common to both children and adults. To 
the extent that such labour market factors axe difficult to observe and to control for, this 
is of some concern here.
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mented. This data covers just over 1.5 million 8 to 17 year olds across just 
over 1 million households in approximately 13,000 rural villages.25
I consider the activities of 8-12, 13-14 and 15-17 year olds, separately by 
gender. These age ranges broadly correspond to primary, post-primary and 
secondary school ages.26 Access to primary education in Mexico is universal, 
as seen in the high net primary enrolment ratio of 103% in 2000-2001.27 The 
net secondary enrolment ratio in 2000-2001 was 60%. The economic activity 
of children may be any one of full-time school, full-time work (either formal 
market work or work on the family enterprise), part-time school (which in­
cludes part-time work), or some other activity. Table 3.2 shows the main 
activity of the child, by age group and gender. Until age 12, full-time school 
enrolment is approximately 88% for both males and females, full-time work 
participation is extremely low at between 0.8% and 1.6%, and participation 
in other activities is slightly higher for females than for males, at 8.8%. Full­
time school enrolment drops considerably after age 12, for both males and 
females, with an even sharper drop after age 14.28 At the same time, the 
proportions in full-time work increase, more noticeably for males. The pro­
portions in the other category increase slightly for males, and much more 
so for females, suggesting that this activity for females largely comprises 
housework.29 Males are more likely to be in part-time school throughout, 
although the proportions are generally low, at between 2.5% and 6.8%. A 
closer look at the activities by age and gender in table 3.3 shows that by age 
17, 52% of females report other as their main activity, compared to 22% re­
25 Whilst ideally I would like to consider the activities of 5-7 year olds as well, information 
on work participation is only collected for children aged 8 plus.
26 After age 17, the proportion enrolled in school is approximately 2% for females and 
4% for males across all of Mexico.
27This is the proportion of the population of the official age for primary education, 
according to national regulations, that is actually enrolled in primary school. See the 
Human Development Report 2003: www.hdr.undp.org.
28 This was the primary motivation behind the Progresa intervention in Mexico - to 
provide financial incentives at the point in the education cycle at which individuals were 
at a high risk of dropping out, in the transition from primary to secondary school.
29This is consistent with many studies on gender time allocation in LDCs. See for 
example, Pitt and Rosenzweig (1990) and references therein.
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porting full-time work and 23% reporting full-time school. For males on the 
other hand, 57% are in full-time work by age 17 compared to 17% in other. 
The precise activities of males in the other category are unclear. They may 
consist of looking for work and leisure/idleness. However, the proportions 
in this activity are quite substantial by age 17, and given that the sample 
consists of individuals living in the poorest marginalised communities in ru­
ral Mexico, the extent of leisure is likely to be very low. I therefore consider 
the other category for males to comprise a substantial number of children 
who are looking for work.30
In the empirical analysis, as the proportions in part-time school are rel­
atively low and also relatively stable throughout, I combine the full- and 
part-time school categories (FS and PS) and examine the determinants of 
full-/part-time school (S), full-time work (W) and other (O). For 8 to 12 
year olds, due to fact that the proportions in full-time work are extremely 
low, I consider only two possible choices: school (full- or part-time) and 
other (which includes full-time work).
A key focus of this analysis is the relationship between the number of 
siblings and the economic activities of children. As can be seen in table 
3.4, the percentage of the sample residing in large households is substantial. 
Approximately 27% of 8 to 12 year olds and 30% of 13 to 17 year olds have 
five or more siblings. This is useful for the analysis insofar as it allows me to 
examine differences in economic activities at low and high numbers of sib­
lings, without having to rely on out-of-sample estimates and a corresponding 
compromise in precision.
A list and description of the variables used in the analysis, disaggregated
30 In terms of providing informal evidence that the other category consists largely of 
males looking for work, it should be noted that males in both the other and work categories 
axe more likely to have less well-educated parents compared to those in school (the mean 
parental years of education are 2.3, 2.1 and 3.2 respectively). Further, males reporting 
other as their main activity, are ten percentage points less likely than those in work to live 
in households that own land, thus suggesting that access to work may be more difficult 
for them and job search may subsequently be higher.
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according to whether they pertain to the individual, the household or the 
locality, is provided in table 3.5.31 I control for characteristics of the house­
hold head, including age, gender, years of education and work status. Other 
household level variables include the presence of parents in the household, 
ownership of the house and the number of adults present. Locality-level 
characteristics include the proportion working in agriculture, the proportion 
owning land, literacy and fertility rates, the proportion of females working, 
the average village income and its cross-sectional coefficient of variation.
In tables 3.6 and 3.7, I compare the characteristics of individuals across 
the three activities, for females and males respectively. To briefly sum­
marise them, the average age of the full-time male worker is 15.4 years, 
compared to 11.4 for males in full-time school. For the male sample, the 
age of the household head is lower in households with full-time child workers 
and years of education of the household head are also lower. The proportion 
of household heads in agriculture is higher in households with a full-time 
child worker, as is land ownership. The locality characteristics are broadly 
similar across activities. The patterns for females are similar, although fe­
male full-time workers are not noticeably more likely than non-workers to 
live in agricultural/land-owning households, suggesting that it is males who 
are more likely to help out on the family farm.
3.5 R esults
I estimate (3.16) separately by gender within each age group.32 After some 
experimentation, I find that the model with three points of support fits
31 Unfortunately, the quality of data on school characteristics at the village level is poor 
and cannot be used.
32Note that nh, in (3.16) will refer to the total number of children in the household, within 
the sub-sample of interest. Likelihood ratio tests that make pairwise comparisons by 
gender, between the estimates within each age group, indicate highly significant structural 
differences in activities between the genders and strongly reject the pooling of males and 
females. Note that in the estimation, the coefficients in the other category are normalised 
to 0 for identification. The coefficient on the factor loading in school, <(>s, is normalised 
to 1 in order to identify <f>w and the points of support, rm.
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the data best.33 Due to the non-linearity of the multinomial logit model, 
the marginal effect of a variable on the choice probabilities depends on the 
full pattern of coefficient estimates, and neither sign nor magnitude can be 
directly deduced from the estimates. I use the coefficient estimates to derive 
the marginal probabilities for each explanatory variable. The marginal effect 
of a regressor X m on the probability of choice j  is
d P  K
~fyy~ ~  Pjlfijm ~  ^  PfcPkm]
m k=l
where Pj is the probability of choice j , (3jm is the multinomial logit coeffi­
cient for variable m  in state j  and K  is the total number of choices.34
Tables 3.8, 3.10, 3.12, 3.14 and 3.16 display the marginal effects of the 
main parameters of interest - the sibling groups, the child wage, and in­
teractions between them - for all six subgroups.35 The interpretation of 
the interactions is complicated by the fact that they are both continuous 
variables. To simplify interpretation and to gain some intuition as to their 
magnitudes, for each sub-sample I simulate the proportions in each of the 
activities at two values of the child wage - the 25th and 75th percentiles - 
and four values of the number of siblings per group - 0, 1, 2 and 3. These
33I compare models with one, two and three points of support on the basis of the 
Bayesian Information Criterion. Three points of support yields the best fit for all sub­
samples. The values of the log likelihood functions change very little when I increase the 
number of points of support to four.
34 Standard errors of the marginal effects are constructed by calculating the marginal 
effects for each of 500 parameter vectors drawn from a multivariate normal distribution 
with mean given by the point estimates of the parameters and covariance matrix given by 
the sandwich estimate. The standard deviations of the sample of marginal effects are the 
estimates of the standard errors.
35The reported standard errors have been adjusted for the fact that the child wage is 
predicted. The sign and significance of the remaining variables, which are included as 
controls, axe broadly in line with previous findings in the literature. To summarise them, 
household-level variables that are generally favourable for school enrolment include the 
presence of more adults in the household, having a more educated household head, the 
presence of a mother or both parents in the household, land ownership, full ownership 
of the house and an agricultural head who owns land. Negative household-level factors 
include the head working in agriculture as a labourer and having a father but no mother 
present in the household.
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values are chosen to represent the width of the distributions of the wage and 
sibling composition. As mentioned already, the large number of observa­
tions is advantageous in the sense that I observe a non-negligible number of 
children with the maximum number of siblings (three) in a particular group 
and therefore the estimates that I obtain do not rely on out-of-sample pre­
dictions. This is however not the case for the 13 to 14 year old sibling age 
range, for whom only a very small proportion of each of the sub-samples has 
three such siblings. In interpreting the estimates for these it should therefore 
be borne in mind that they may be less precise due to out-of-sample pre­
dictions. I set the remainder of the variables not involved in the particular 
interaction to their mean values. The predicted proportions in each of the 
activities are displayed in the tables immediately after the marginal effects, 
for each sub-sample.
In order to elucidate the main patterns for the reader, I confine com­
parisons in the forthcoming sections, to the two extremes of the sibling 
distribution, rather than making comparisons across all four values (which 
may be seen in the tables referred to above). First, in order to highlight the 
relationship between the number of siblings and participation in each of the 
activities, I display the difference in participation in each of the activities 
across 0 and 3 siblings. Comparisons are made separately at low and high 
child wages, which provides insight into whether the relationship between 
the number of siblings and economic activities varies according to the value 
of the child wage. I therefore evaluate Pr(yih =  j \ng = 3, wp) — Pr(yih =  
j \n g = 0, wp), where yih denotes the activity of individual i in household /i, 
ng denotes the number of siblings in group g and p =  l,h, where Wh is the 
75th percentile child wage and it;/ is the 2hth percentile wage. These figures 
are reported in the upper panel of each of the tables that follow. Second, in 
order to directly focus on whether the wage elasticities vary with the number 
of siblings, I compare the change in the proportions in each of the activities 
with respect to the wage, across different sibling sizes. I therefore calculate 
Pr{yih =  j \ng =  r, Wh) -  Pr{yih =  j \ng =  r,u;/), for r  =  0,3. These figures 
are presented in the lower panel of each table.36
36 Note that in all of the below, unless otherwise stated, all differences are significant at
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8-12 Y ear Olds: Fem ales and  M ales
I begin by discussing the results for 8 to 12 year olds. Marginal effects on 
school participation are displayed for both females and males in table 3.8, 
whilst table 3.9 shows changes in school enrolment in response to sibling 
composition and number, at different wage levels. In the table below, I 
summarise the key findings in the way discussed above.
8-12 Y ear Olds 
Fem ales M ales
Pr(yih =  S\ng =  3, wp) -  Pr(yih =  S\ng =  0,wp)
Siblings
p = l p = h p = I p — h
0 - 4 - 3 - 5 - 3  - 5
5 - 1 2 F 0 1 - 1  -1
M 0 0 - 2  - 2
1 3 -1 4 F 2 2 2 2
M -1 1 -1  0
15+ F 0 0 1 0
M - 3 - 4 - 2  - 4
Pr(yih =  S\ng wh) — Pr(yih =  S\ng,wi)
ng = 0 ng — 3 ng =  0 ng =  3
0 - 4 0 - 2 1 -1
5 - 1 2 F -1 0 0 0
M -1 -1 0 0
1 3 -1 4 F 0 0 1 1
M -1 1 0 1
15+ F -1 -1 1 0
M 0 -1 1 -1
5=full-/ part-time school, n5=number of group g siblings,
jif56 II
i+ M=male, w-=wage, =low, h=high.
There are some noteworthy points in this table (nonetheless the results
conventional levels.
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are less remarkable than for the older age groups, which largely reflects the 
near-universality of primary education in Mexico). In the upper panel, we 
see that there is significantly lower enrolment in school amongst both male 
and female children who have a relatively high number of very young sib­
lings, at both low and high levels of the wage. For males only, having a 
greater number of 5 to 12 year old sisters or brothers is also associated with 
lower school enrolment. Having more sisters aged 13 to 14 is associated with 
more school participation for both males and females, suggesting that hav­
ing such older siblings frees up resources for education - however for females, 
this is insignificant at conventional levels. Sisters aged 15 plus are neutral 
to education, whilst brothers aged 15 plus are associated with significantly 
lower participation in education. This is somewhat surprising, and as we 
will see and discuss below, is borne out across all sub-samples.
As can be seen in the lower panel of the table, the wage elasticities 
are generally low - changes in school participation in response to changing 
the wage from the 75th to the 25th percentile are small - and there is no 
systematic relationship for these subgroups, between the wage elasticities 
and sibling composition.
13-14 Year Olds: Females and Males
I now turn to the findings for male and female 13 to 14 year olds, which 
are summarised in the table below.37 This analysis is more informative 
due to the fact that for the 13-plus age ranges, participation in education 
is substantially lower than for primary-school children and this allows me 
to examine a more disaggregate choice set which includes school, work and
37 As discussed in section 3.4, it is reasonable to expect the other activity to represent 
housework for females and looking for work for males. From hereon, I therefore refer to 
the terms interchangeably.
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other.
13-14 Year Olds 
Females Males
Pr(yih = j\n g = 3,wp) -  Pr(yih = j \n g =  0, wp)
P =  1 P = h p =  l p =  h
j  = S W 0 S W 0 S W 0 5 W O
Siblings
0 - 4 -11 2 9 -13 3 10 - 9 4 5 -11 5 6
5 - 1 2 F - 3 2 1 -5 1 4 - 3 2 1 - 5 2 3
M - 3 1 2 - 6 1 5 - 3 2 1 - 5 3 2
1 3 -1 4 F 6 1 - 7 - 3 4 -1 - 4 0 4 - 7 2 5
M 4 - 1  - 3 0 0 0 - 2 3 - 1 - 4 5 -1
15+ F 2 2 - 4 -1 1 0 1 - 2 1 -1 - 3 4
M - 8 0 8 - 9 0 9 - 4 3 1 - 5 4 1
Pr(yih = j\n g,w h) -  Pr(yih = j\n giwi)
ng =  0 ng 3 ng =  0 nfl =  3
S W 0 S w O S W O S W O
0 - 4 1 0 -1 -1 1 0 - 3 0 3 - 5 1 4
5 - 1 2 F 1 1 - 2 -1 0 1 - 3 1 2 - 5 1 4
M 1 1 - 2 - 2 1 1 - 2 0 2 - 4 1 3
1 3 -1 4 F 1 0 -1 - 8 3 5 - 2 0 2 - 5 2 3
M 1 0 -1 - 3 1 2 - 3 0 3 - 5 2 3
15+ F 1 1 - 2 - 2 0 2 - 3 1 2 - 5 0 5
M 1 0 -1 0 0 0 - 2 0 2 - 3 1 2
5 = full-/part-time school, W = full-time work, 0 =other, ng 
siblings, F=female, M=male, w=wage, Z=low, /i=high.
=number of group g
As can be seen from the above, for 13 to 14 year olds, having more sib­
lings is generally, with only a few exceptions for females, associated with 
significantly lower participation in education. There axe, however, notice­
able differences across sibling types and the lower enrolment in education
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is exacerbated at high values of the child wage. This underlines the impor­
tance of considering interactions between the wage and sibling composition. 
The negative association between participation in education and the number 
of siblings is most pronounced for 0-4 year old siblings. This is intuitively 
reasonable, insofar as they represent a pure drain on household resources 
and are unable to contribute to household income, whilst siblings above this 
age are less disadvantageous in the sense that they are more likely to be 
able to perform some types of (direct and indirect) income-generating tasks. 
Females are more likely to engage in housework at the expense of education, 
the greater the number of very young siblings in the household, suggesting 
that they axe likely to look after young children. Males on the other hand, 
axe equally likely to be drawn from education into work or some other ac­
tivity (look for work), suggesting that they are a more important means of 
directly contributing to household resources than females.
Having relatively more 5 to 12 year old siblings, either male or female, 
is also associated with less paxticipation in education. This conforms to 
expectations, as such siblings are likely to be enrolled in primary school, 
therefore placing more pressure on household resources. Again it appeaxs 
that females are more likely to stay at home, especially at higher values of 
the wage, with males equally likely to be either working or looking for work.
The importance of disaggregating siblings by gender and of allowing for 
their effect to vary across different wages, is borne out for both 13 to 14 
and 15-plus year old siblings. Interestingly, for females who face low wages, 
having more sisters of the same age is associated with higher participation 
in education and less housework. This conforms to expectations in the sense 
that there are more females in the household that may be used to perform 
household chores, thus freeing up resources and enabling some others to 
participate in education. However, the benefit for education disappears at 
high values of the child wage, and indeed in this case, participation in edu­
cation is lower the greater the number of such sisters, whilst full-time work 
participation is noticeably higher. This suggests that the wage incentive for 
work is strong enough to outweigh any potential benefits of having a large
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number of such siblings. For males, at low and even more so at high child 
wages, having more sisters of a close age is associated with lower partici­
pation in education and increased job search. Indeed the higher the wage, 
the higher is participation in full-time work also. The wage interactions are 
also important for 13 to 14 year old brothers. Such siblings are beneficial 
for the education of females at low wages only and have no effect at high 
wages. For males on the other hand, whilst they are generally detrimental to 
participation in education, these associations are not significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels.
Having a large number of older siblings is in general not beneficial for 
the education of 13 to 14 year olds - apart from for females who face low 
wages, for whom having a higher number of older sisters is associated with 
significantly more enrolment in education, but also more participation in 
full-time work - however the magnitudes are low. At high wages, there 
are fewer discernible differences in the activities of females, across different 
numbers of older sisters. For males facing high wages, having older sisters is 
associated with less participation in full-time work and a higher propensity 
to look for work. Having a large number of older brothers is markedly disad­
vantageous for female education, with the reallocation transferring entirely 
to housework. For males, having more older brothers is also associated with 
less participation in education and increased full-time work, although the 
magnitudes are smaller than for females. The findings for older brothers 
are somewhat surprising, particularly so for older males, whom one might 
expect to contribute substantially to household resources and thus to enable 
others to receive more education. The adverse effect of older brothers for 
education is observed for both females and males, so the favouring of boys 
for education due to higher perceived returns is an unlikely explanation. 
However, males tend to participate more in full-time work, the higher the 
number of older brothers they have, suggestive of work complementarities 
between males within the household, or some unobserved parental prefer­
ences for work. Future work will investigate these issues further.
Whilst the importance of the interactions between the wage and sibling
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composition are inherent in the above analysis, the lower panel is more di­
rectly informative as to the own-wage elasticities of the various activities. 
We see that for females, the response of enrolment in education to an in­
crease in the wage is actually positive or zero when the number of siblings 
is low, and negative at a very high number of siblings. Further, the wage 
elasticity appears to be increasing in the number of same-age (and partic­
ularly same-gender) siblings only, and otherwise is relatively invariant to 
sibling size. For males, the wage elasticity of education is negative through­
out and increasing in sibling size, as can be seen from the relatively larger 
changes in participation in activities in response to changes in the wage, at 
higher numbers of siblings. Further, the higher the wage, the higher the job 
search of males, whilst the effect of the wage on participation in full-time 
work is small and insignificant. These findings of wage elasticities that are 
increasing in sibling size are consistent with the model in section 3.2 and 
highlight the potentially important interactions between schooling costs and 
household composition.
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15-17 Year Olds: Females and Males
I now turn to the results for 15-17 year olds, the key points of which are 
summarised below.
15-17 Year Olds 
Females Males
Pr(yih = j\n g =  3, IUp) -  Pr(yih = j \n g =  0, W p )
p = l P = h p = I p = h
j  = S  W 0 S W 0 S w 0 s W 0
Siblings
0 - 4 - 9  4 5 -11 5 6 - 8 6 2 -10 8 2
5 - 1 2 F - 3  4 -1 - 7 5 2 - 2 3 -1 - 5 5 0
M - 3  3 0 -6 3 3 - 1 2 - 1 - 5 5 0
1 3 -1 4 F - 2  8 - 6 - 6 9 - 3 - 4 4 0 - 8 5 3
M 0 1 -1 -5 2 3 -1 3 - 2 - 4 4 0
15+ F 3 6 - 9 - 2 7 - 5 - 2 - 3 5 - 5 -1 6
M - 5  0 5 - 7 1 6 - 3 6 - 3 - 6 7 -1
Pr(y%h = j\n g Wh) -  Pr(yih = j\n g,u>l)
ng = 0 n 9 =  3 ng = 0 ng =  3
S  W 0 S W 0 S W O S W 0
0 - 4 2 - 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 2 2 0
5 - 1 2 F 2 - 2 0 - 2 -1 3 0 0 0 - 3 2 1
M 1 -1 0 - 2 -1 3 0 0 0 - 4 3 1
1 3 -1 4 F 2 -1 -1 - 2 0 2 0 1 - 1 - 4 2 2
M 2 - 2 0 - 3 -1 4 -1 1 0 - 4 2 2
15+ F 1 - 1 0 - 4 0 4 0 0 0 - 3 2 1
M 2 - 2 0 0 -1 1 0 1 - 1 - 3 2 1
«S=full-/part-time school, TY=full-time work, 0 =other, 
siblings, F=female, M=male, iy=wage, Z=low, /i=high.
n9=number of group g
Similarly to the findings for 13 to 14 year olds, having more siblings, 
regardless of their age or gender, is associated with less education for 15 to 
17 year olds. The magnitudes, however, again vary across different sibling
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groups and the associations are generally also stronger at higher wages. The 
main difference between the results for the 13 to 14 and 15 to 17 year old 
children, is that for the latter group, the observed lower participation in 
education feeds through mainly to higher participation in full-time work, 
particularly for males.
In line with the previous results, very young siblings are most disad­
vantageous for participation in education. It is interesting, however, that 
females are now equally likely to be in full-time work or housework, if they 
have a high number of such siblings. Presumably this is because it is easier 
and more acceptable to send older females to full-time work whilst younger 
females are more likely to be engaged in household tasks - as shown in the 
previous results. Males on the other hand, axe more likely to be in full-time 
work at the expense of education, particularly so at high wages.
For females, having a large number of 5 to 12 year old siblings (regardless 
of the gender of such siblings) is mainly associated with more full-time work, 
although when the child wage is high, they also engage in more housework, 
and enrolment in education is noticeably lower. For males, there is again 
more participation in full-time work, the higher the number of such siblings, 
and again more so at high wages, with subsequent adverse implications for 
enrolment in education.
For females, having many 13 to 14 year old sisters is associated with 
lower participation in both education and housework and higher participa­
tion in full-time work, at both low and high wages. This is consistent with 
younger siblings fulfilling household chores and older siblings being displaced 
into formal work instead. For males, having more 13 to 14 year old sisters is 
also mostly associated with increased work participation and at high wages 
it also feeds through to increased job search. For females facing high wages, 
having more brothers aged 13 to 14 is associated with increased work and 
housework, whilst at low wages there are no discernible differences in activ­
ities across differing numbers of such siblings. Males are more likely to be 
observed in full-time work if they have a large number of 13 to 14 year old
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brothers, regardless of the wage they face, although at high wages, educa­
tion is most adversely affected. Again, all of these results point to important 
resource competition within the household, but with such competition being 
an important function of the opportunity costs of school for children.
In terms of siblings of the same age or older, for females there are impor­
tant interactions with the wage. It is somewhat beneficial for education to 
have more older sisters, if the child wage is low. However, the substantially 
lower housework is also associated with higher participation in full-time 
work. At high wages however, the observed limited advantage for education 
disappears and the overall effect is higher work participation. For males on 
the other hand, having more 15 plus year old sisters tends to be associated 
with a higher propensity to be looking for work. Similar to the previous find­
ings for 13 to 14 year olds, same-age and older brothers are again detrimental 
for education. However, even though females engage more in housework as 
a result, these differences are insignificant at conventional levels. Males, on 
the other hand, participate significantly more in full-time work the higher 
the number of such brothers they have, irrespective of the wage. Again this 
is somewhat puzzling, but suggestive of complementarities between the work 
activities of males in the household.
Again, the lower panel of the table gives an indication as to the effect 
of the wage across different sibling compositions. For females with very few 
siblings, enrolment in education is slightly higher at high values of the wage, 
and becomes negative as the number of siblings increases. For males, the 
wage elasticities of all activities are mostly zero when the number of siblings, 
regardless of composition, is very low. At a large number of siblings on the 
other hand, work increases and education decreases in response to increases 
in the available wage, with less discernible impacts on looking for work.
To conclude, whilst previous literature has documented the (generally 
negative) association between the number of siblings and the educational 
attainment of children, the foregoing analysis has pointed to resource com­
petition among siblings within the household importantly varying with the
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opportunity costs of education. In particular, I find that the competition 
across siblings for resources is strongest, the higher the number of relatively 
young and/or relatively old siblings, and is generally more intense at higher 
opportunity costs of school. The strong negative association between the 
number of very young siblings and education is unsurprising, given that 
such children represent a pure drain on resources and do not contribute to 
household income. However, the detrimental nature of older brothers for 
education is surprising, as one may expect such siblings to contribute to (or 
to at least free up) household resources and to thus facilitate the education 
of younger children. There is some evidence that there may be work com­
plementarities between males within the household, as males are more likely 
to be observed in full-time work if they have more older brothers. However, 
this could also indicate unobserved parental preferences for work. Future 
work will investigate these interactions further.
3.6 Conclusion and Policy Appraisal
In this chapter, I have examined the relationship amongst the wage, sib­
ling composition and the economic activities of children in rural Mexico. 
A number of key findings have emerged. Firstly, the association between 
participation in education and the number of siblings is generally negative, 
particularly for very young siblings. Secondly, for males, school participa­
tion of 13 to 14 year olds is decreasing in the child wage, and the association 
is stronger the more siblings the child has, regardless of the ages and genders 
of siblings, with most of this feeding through to increased job search. For 
15 to 17 year old males with a low number of siblings, participation in each 
of the activities is invariant to changes in the wage. However, if the number 
of siblings is relatively high, school participation significantly decreases in 
response to increases in the wage, with most of this decrease feeding through 
to increased full-time work participation. For 13 to 17 year old females with 
relatively few siblings on the other hand, school participation is higher, the 
higher the wage. If the child has a relatively large number of siblings how­
ever, higher wages lead to a decrease in school participation, and there is 
increased participation in housework rather than in full-time work.
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Whilst the associations between sibling composition and the activities 
of children are informative, an interesting extension of this work will be 
to consider how the effect of the wage varies according to the activities of 
other children in the household. This research is a step towards a more com­
plete analysis of intra-household decision-making that will take account of 
the fact that parents make decisions about several children simultaneously, 
with liquidity constraints forcing competition across siblings for scarce re­
sources. One way of gaining new insights into the allocation of resources 
across children, is to use the variation induced by various educational sub­
sidy programmes in Mexico and Colombia, as a means of assessing whether 
subsidies introduce distortions in the allocation of schooling across house­
hold members. The particular feature of the programmes that may be useful 
to exploit is the following: subsidies are payable to the household up to some 
maximum threshold. If the household is ‘technically’ entitled to more than 
this amount, on the basis of the sum of individual entitlements within the 
household, one can examine how households respond to the threshold in 
terms of the allocation of schooling across children. I consider this to be an 
important area of future work.
I wrap up the preceding chapters with a brief appraisal of child labour 
and education policies in LDCs. A key underlying motivation for the forego­
ing analyses of education and work choices, has been to contribute to policy 
design, for which the identification of the key factors in education and work 
choices is central. The analyses have pinpointed the importance of insurance 
market interventions, along with significant variation in the effects of school­
ing costs on the activity of the child, by family composition. Designing the 
best policy response to child labour and under-investment in education, is a 
complex task. There is no single approach that will eradicate the pervasive 
phenomenon. It is widely accepted that a complete ban on child labour is 
a blunt instrument if imperfectly enforced, in the sense of not providing al­
ternatives (such as subsidised education) to compensate for any short-term 
adversities incurred by the household due to the loss in income from chil­
dren working. It may even have the unintended detrimental effect of pushing
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households into deeper poverty and/or of forcing children into hazardous or 
illegal forms of work. The problem is that a complete ban is poorly targeted 
and fails to address the underlying causes of child labour. More effective 
policy approaches recognise that the elimination of child labour will be a 
gradual process and not only provide income-compensated alternatives to 
work, but also establish legal standards and protection for working children. 
The ‘optimal’ policy is likely to comprise many elements, as substantiated 
by the historical decrease in child labour in developed countries, which took 
place under a variety of concurrent factors such as legislative bans, changes 
in compulsory education laws and increasing economic prosperity.
A variety of policies aimed at reducing child labour have been widely 
implemented in recent years. Some directly target education, others focus 
on actual work, and most axe a combination of the two. To begin with, there 
has been a relatively recent move towards directly subsidising education. As 
one of the highest costs of attending school in less developed economies is the 
opportunity cost in the form of foregone wages, means-tested households are 
compensated for the loss in foregone earnings, by receiving subsidies condi­
tional on school attendance. Such programmes are widely observed in many 
Latin American countries. The Progresa programme has been found to be ef­
fective in increasing enrolment in marginalised communities in rural Mexico, 
especially amongst post-primary children.38 Such programmes of course rely 
on the availability of schools (notwithstanding any issues to do with school 
quality - indeed the provision of broad access to education, rather than im­
provements in school quality, is the focus of most policies). A huge deterrent 
to education is the lack of schools in the village, or having to travel far to 
school.39 In addition, more school flexibility (for example, decreased hours
38It has been expanded to urban areas and renamed Opportunidades. See Schultz (2001) 
for evidence as to the effectiveness of Progresa. Other programmes that are currently being 
implemented include Familias en Accion in Colombia, Food For Education in Bangladesh 
and Bolsa Escola in Brazil; along with programmes in Honduras, Nicaragua and Argentina.
39See Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) and Lavy (1996). There is evidence that living 
in close proximity to a secondary school increases the probability that young children 
will attend school, consistent with the notion of primary school serving as a gateway to 
secondary school (Lavy (1996)).
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during harvest time) so that children will not fall behind and subsequently 
drop out of school, is also worth considering in the design of such pro­
grammes. However, the evaluation of these programmes to date says little 
about what has happened to child labour. Whilst participation in education 
has increased, the effects of cheaper schooling on child labour are theoret­
ically ambiguous and depend on the substitutability/complementarity be­
tween child labour and schooling. The increase in participation in schooling 
may come out of leisure time. Ravallion and Wodon (2000) find a signifi­
cant negative effect of a conditional school stipend in rural Bangladesh on 
child labour that is, however, smaller than the strong positive effect on the 
probability of attending school.
A second type of policy of relevance to investment in education is in­
tervention in credit markets. Standard human capital theory predicts that 
an individual will invest in schooling up to the point at which the marginal 
benefit of an additional year of schooling (increased future earnings) equals 
the marginal cost (in terms of foregone earnings). If individuals do not have 
full access to credit markets, they will under-invest in education. Credit 
markets generally do not function well in less developed economies, espe­
cially in rural areas.40 There is thus a role for intervention in credit markets 
in order to make loans available for families to send their children to school. 
However, the provision of repayable loans is likely to have very different ef­
fects on education to the previously discussed policy of making money freely 
available (conditional on attending school). This is because there can be no 
supposition that even if borrowing constraints were relaxed and loans for 
education were made more widely available, parents would borrow to send 
their children to school. Apart from intergenerational commitment prob­
lems in terms of the inability of parents to enforce repayments (transfers) 
from children for past investment in education41, households may simply not 
want to take on extra debt for education if they are myopic and/or focused 
on day to day survival.
40See Besley (1995a, 1995b).
41 See Baland and Robinson (2000).
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As discussed in chapter two, well-functioning insurance markets may 
have positive implications for investment in education. This is because in­
surance may cushion households against falls in consumption due to unex­
pected income falls. Uncertain environments and the absence of insurance, 
may lead households to use the labour of their children to build up buffer 
stocks against unforeseen events. The effects are exacerbated in imperfect 
capital market settings.42 A whole set of policies aimed at developing capital 
markets and at improving risk-coping mechanisms and providing safety nets 
has been recently stressed by the World Bank.43 However, there is a paucity 
of evidence on the effects of insurance market failures on child labour, partly 
due to the difficulty of measuring risk and of observing formal and informal 
insurance mechanisms within villages. In the light of the evidence presented 
in chapter two however, this is an area in which increased understanding 
might very well aid policy.
Fourthly, it is likely that trade policies will have important consequences 
for investment in education and child labour. Many Latin American coun­
tries have recently undergone dramatic processes of trade liberalisation (for 
example, Colombia in 1991-1992). This has led to LDCs increasing spe­
cialisation in the production of labour intensive goods, with a subsequent 
increase in the demand for low-skilled workers. The returns to college ed­
ucation have increased, whilst the returns to secondary education have de­
creased.44 This change in incentives has important implications for invest­
ment in education. In order to realise the high returns to college education, 
indigent families must commit to a very high level of investment in edu­
cation. However, liquidity constraints may generate under-investment in 
education. In addition, the riskiness of the environment means that there is 
generally substantial uncertainty on the part of parents over their ability to 
keep children in school throughout all of primary and secondary levels. Thus
42See Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) and Guarcello et al (2002), who show that credit 
rationing and shocks significantly influence child work and school attendance; see also 
Beegle et al (2003) for evidence of the ex-post use of child labour in response to shocks, 
which is exacerbated in thin credit markets.
43See World Bank (2001) and Holzmann and Jorgensen (2002).
44See Attanasio et al (2003).
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the theoretical effects of altering the returns to education are ambiguous. 
The increase in the relative price of the exported good due to trade liberal­
isation, also has ambiguous predictions for the incidence of child labour.45 
Thus trade sanctions or import tariffs against countries that use child labour 
do not necessarily reduce the incidence of child labour.46
In conclusion, the recognition that policy design will be significantly 
advanced by the continued analysis of micro-level data, is borne out by the 
increased emphasis on the collection of such data for micro-level research, 
across a large number of LDCs. This greatly facilitates more comprehensive 
research into the complex array of factors that underlie child time allocation 
decisions.
45Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) provide evidence that reductions in child labour may in 
fact be increasing in the price of exported goods.
46See the model developed in Ranjan (2001).
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Tables
Table 3.1: Estimates from Equation (3.17)
Log w eekly child wage
8 to  12 13 to  17
y ear olds year olds
Age -0.2417* 0.3688**
(0.1047) (0.0259)
Age squared 0.0152** -0.0101**
(0.0050) (0.0008)
Male 0.1552** 0.1395**
(0.0188) (0.0078)
Proportion of agricultural workers in village 0.2606** 0.1303**
(0.0715) (0.0138)
Proportion female workers aged 18+ in village -1.3075** -0.6260**
(0.1130) (0.0647)
Average village income 0.0302 0.0082
(0.0244) (0.0069)
Log agricultural wage of household heads in village 0.6054** 0.7176**
(0.0406) (0.0137)
Constant 1.6319** -2.2660**
(0.5949) (0.2256)
N 9,364 123,254
R 2 0.18 0.30
Dependent variable is the log of the weekly child wage. Also control for state dummy variables. 
* denotes significance at 5% level or less.
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Table 3.2: Activity by Gender and Age Group
Males
8-12
13-14
15-17
Females
8-12
13-14
15-17
j y  * jyh h ,
413,134 327,341
156,433 149,729
204,939 185,021
399,680 317,646
152,211 145,718
181,409 165,342
Full-time Full-time
school work
0.8776 0.0164
(0.3278) (0.1270)
0.6460 0.1375
(0.4801) (0.3467)
0.3252 0.4354
(0.4651) (0.4965)
0.8840 0.0080
(0.3202) (0.0890)
0.6076 0.0605
(0.4905) (0.2385)
0.3252 0.1722
(0.4529) (0.3673)
Work and Other
School
0.0367 0.0693
(0.1881) (0.2539)
0.0677 0.1489
(0.2514) (0.3594)
0.0600 0.1793
(0.2357) (0.3866)
0.0198 0.0882
(0.1391) (0.2837)
0.0249 0.3070
(0.1539) (0.4657)
0.0227 0.4799
(0.1408) (0.4991)
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Table 3.3: Economic Activity by Age
Females Males
FS w PS o FS w PS o
Age
8 0.91 0.005 0.015 0.07 0.91 0.005 0.02 0.065
9 0.92 0.005 0.015 0.06 0.91 0.005 0.025 0.06
10 0.905 0.005 0.02 0.07 0.89 0.01 0.04 0.06
11 0.89 0.005 0.02 0.085 0.87 0.02 0.05 0.07
12 0.80 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.81 0.04 0.06 0.09
13 0.67 0.04 0.02 0.27 0.71 0.09 0.06 0.14
14 0.55 0.08 0.03 0.35 0.59 0.18 0.07 0.16
15 0.41 0.13 0.02 0.43 0.44 0.31 0.07 0.18
16 0.31 0.18 0.02 0.49 0.31 0.45 0.06 0.19
17 0.23 0.22 0.02 0.52 0.22 0.57 0.05 0.17
FS==full-time school, W=full-time work. PS=part-time school, 0 = other.
Table 3.4: Distribution of Siblings
0
Proportions
8-12 0.0467
13-14 0.0560
15-17 0.0674
Number of siblings 
1 2  3
0.1294 0.1981 0.1991
0.1111 0.1720 0.1917
0.1191 0.1687 0.1806
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4 5 6 +
0.1621 0.1166 0.1480
0.1718 0.1297 0.1676
0.1599 0.1262 0.1782
Table 3.5: List and Description of Variables in the Analysis
Individual
age
age2
gender
predcw
Siblings
sibsO-4
fsibs5-12, msibs5-12
fsibsl3-14, msibsl3-14
fsibsl5plus, msibsl5plus
Household Head
agehead
malehead
yrseduchead
workhead
workincomehead
agrichead
ownland
agricpost
Other Household
moth
fath
mothfath
ownfully
numadults
Child age 
Child age squared 
=1 if male
Potential log child wage
Age 0 to 4 : Number of 
Age 5 to 12: Number of, by gender 
Age 13 to 14: Number of, by gender 
Age 15 plus: Number of, by gender
Age of household head 
=1 if male 
Years of education 
Works full-time 
Income from work 
Works in agriculture 
Owns land
Works in agriculture and owns land
Mother present
Father present
Both parents present
Own house fully
Number of adults in household
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Table 3.5 contd.
Locality
pragricwork Proportion adults working in agriculture
prfemwork Proportion of females aged 18+ working
fertility Ratio of 0-4 year olds to 15-44 year old females
prownland Proportion owning land
prindhead Proportion of indigenous heads
prlit 15-34 Literacy rate amongst 15 to 34 year olds
meanv Mean village wage of heads
vcv Coefficient of variation of income of heads
106
Table 3.6: Mean Characteristics by Activity: Females 8 to 17
s w o
Ind iv idual
age 11.2 (2.44) 15.18 (1.75) 14.09 (2.38)
predcw 4.52 (0.36) 4.84 (0.35) 4.82 (0.36)
Siblings
sibsO-4 0.57 (0.78) 0.49 (0.76) 0.49 (0.76)
sibs5-12 1.49 (1.12) 1.64 (1.33) 1.56 (1.28)
sibsl3-14 0.39 (0.54) 0.45 (0.55) 0.39 (0.54)
sibsl5plus 1.00 (1.24) 1.28 (1.21) 1.24 (1.25)
H ousehold H ead
agehead 44.5 (11.9) 47.9 (11.8) 47.3 (11.5)
malehead 0.90 (0.29) 0.83 (0.36) 0.89 (0.30)
yrseduchead 3.33 (3.05) 2.16 (2.29) 2.30 (2.38)
workhead 0.91 (0.27) 0.88 (0.31) 0.90 (0.29)
agrichead 0.63 (0.48) 0.64 (0.47) 0.67 (0.46)
ownland 0.52 (0.61) 0.58 (0.68) 0.54 (0.62)
agricpost 0.40 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49)
O th e r H ousehold
moth 0.92 (0.26) 0.92 (0.25) 0.91 (0.27)
fath 0.84 (0.35) 0.80 (0.39) 0.84 (0.35)
mothfath 0.83 (0.37) 0.78 (0.41) 0.82 (0.38)
ownfully 0.90 (0.28) 0.92 (0.26) 0.91 (0.27)
numadults 2.68 (1.19) 2.93 (1.32) 2.91 (1.30)
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Table 3.6 contd.
Females 8-17
s W o
Locality
pragricwork 0.70 (0.24 0.71 (0.24) 0.73 (0.22)
prfemwork 0.18 (0.09 0.23 (0.10) 0.17 (0.08)
fertility 0.61 (0.18 0.65 (0.18) 0.62 (0.18)
prownland 0.47 (0.23 0.49 (0.23) 0.47 (0.22)
prindhead 0.25 (0.38 0.31 (0.41) 0.23 (0.37)
prlit 15-34 0.89 (0.09 0.86 (0.12) 0.86 (0.11)
meanv 6.28 (0.83 6.16 (0.84) 6.27 (0.84)
vcv 0.36 (0.06 0.37 (0.06) 0.36 (0.06)
S=full-/part-time school, W=full-time work, 0==other.
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Table 3.7: Mean Characteristics by Activity: Males 8 to 17
s w o
Ind iv idual
age 11.4 (2.5) 15.4 (1.7) 13.4 (2.7)
predcw 4.69 (0.36) 5.03 (0.32) 4.93 (0.38)
Siblings
sibsO-4 0.56 (0.77) 0.44 (0.73) 0.51 (0.77)
sibs5-12 1.47 (1.13) 1.55 (1.33) 1.54 (1.25)
sibsl3-14 0.38 (0.54) 0.44 (0.55) 0.39 (0.54)
sibsl5plus 1.00 (1.23) 1.24 (1.20) 1.20 (1.26)
H ousehold H ead
agehead 44.6 (11.8) 48.5 (11.5) 47.3 (11.6)
malehead 0.90 (0.29) 0.87 (0.33) 0.89 (0.31)
yrseduchead 3.29 (3.02) 2.11 (2.25) 2.32 (2.49)
workhead 0.92 (0.27) 0.88 (0.31) 0.89 (0.31)
agrichead 0.63 (0.48) 0.69 (0.46) 0.64 (0.47)
ownland 0.53 (0.61) 0.59 (0.61) 0.49 (0.63)
agricpost 0.40 (0.49) 0.46 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48)
O th e r H ousehold
moth 0.92 (0.26) 0.91 (0.27) 0.91 (0.27)
fath 0.85 (0.35) 0.83 (0.37) 0.84 (0.36)
mothfath 0.83 (0.36) 0.80 (0.39) 0.81 (0.38)
ownfully 0.90 (0.28) 0.92 (0.26) 0.90 (0.29)
numadults 2.69 (1.19) 2.94 (1.30) 2.84 (1.26)
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Table 3.7 contd.
Males 8-17
s W o
Locality
pragricwork 0.71 (0.24 0.75 (0.22) 0.71 (0.23)
prfemwork 0.18 (0.09 0.19 (0.09) 0.17 (0.09)
fertility 0.61 (0.18 0.64 (0.18) 0.61 (0.18)
prownland 0.48 (0.23 0.49 (0.22) 0.45 (0.22)
prindhead 0.26 (0.38 0.25 (0.38) 0.21 (0.36)
prlit 15-34 0.89 (0.09 0.86 (0.11) 0.86 (0.12)
meanv 6.26 (0.84 6.17 (0.82) 6.35 (0.84)
vcv 0.36 (0.06 0.37 (0.06) 0.36 (0.05)
S=full-/part-time school, W=full-time work, 0==other.
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Table 3.8: Marginal Effects, Female and Male 8-12 Year Olds
SibsO-4
Fsibs5-12
Fsibsl3-14
Fsibsl5plus
Msibs5-12
Msibsl3-14
Msibsl5plus
Wage
Wage*sibs0-4
Wage*Fsibs5-12
Wage*Fsibsl3-14
Wage*Fsibsl5plus
Wage*Msibs5-12
Wage*Msibsl3-14
Wage*Msibsl5plus
N
log L
Fem ales 
School 
0.0212 (0.0072)* 
0.0268 (0.0063)* 
-0.0114 (0.0151) 
0.0150 (0.0078)* 
0.0238 (0.0073)* 
-0.0286 (0.0153)* 
0.0022 (0.0064)
-0.0048 (0.0068) 
-0.0078 (0.0016)* 
-0.0065 (0.0014)* 
0.0038 (0.0034) 
-0.0035 (0.0018)* 
-0.0058 (0.0017)* 
0.0070 (0.0035)* 
-0.0028 (0.0014)*
399,680
-129,954
M ales
School
0.0368 (0.0060)* 
0.0301 (0.0079)* 
0.0029 (0.0155) 
0.0284 (0.0087)* 
0.0139 (0.0084) 
-0.0010 (0.0146) 
0.0211 (0.0083)*
0.0097 (0.0073) 
-0.0108 (0.0013)* 
-0.0076 (0.0017)* 
0.0006 (0.0034) 
-0.0060 (0.0019)* 
-0.0044 (0.0018)* 
-0.0001 (0.0032) 
-0.0066 (0.0018)*
413,134
-140,508
denotes significance at 5%Also control for variables listed in table 3.5. * 
level or less.
I l l
Table 3.9: Participation in Activities: Female and Male 8-12 Year Olds
FEM A LES All
#  siblings 0-4 0 1 2 3
W age 25^ S 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86
75th S 0.89 0.88 0.86 0.84
Females Males
#  siblings 5-12 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th S 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
75th S 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
#  siblings 13-14 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 26th S 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88
75th S 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89
#  siblings 15plus 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th S 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.86
75th S 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.85
M ALES All
#  siblings 0-4 0 1 2 3
W age 25th S 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.85
7bth S 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.84
Females Males
#  siblings 5-12 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age to Oi S 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86
7hth S 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.86
#  siblings 13-14 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th S 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87
75th s 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
#  siblings 15plus 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th s 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86
75 th s 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.85
S=full-/part-time school.
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Table 3.10: Marginal Effects, Female 13-14 Year Olds
School
0.0860 (0.0112)* 
0.1488 (0.0134)* 
0.5546 (0.0707)* 
0.1819 (0.0176)* 
0.2110 (0.0189)* 
0.2628 (0.0368)* 
0.0497 (0.0109)*
Full-time Work
-0.0175 (0.0065)* 
-0.0075 (0.0038)* 
-0.1049 (0.0356)* 
-0.0146 (0.0062)* 
-0.0382 (0.0128)* 
-0.0503 (0.0179)* 
0.0015 (0.0042)
SibsO-4
Fsibs5-12
Fsibsl3-14
Fsibsl5plus
Msibs5-12
Msibsl3-14
Msibsl5plus
Wage
Wage*FsibsO-4
Wage*Fsibs5-12
Wage*Fsibsl3-14
Wage*Fsibsl5plus
Wage*Msibs5-12
Wage*Msibsl3-14
Wage*Msibsl5plus
N
log L
0.0446 (0.0096)* 
-0.0315 (0.0031)* 
-0.0358 (0.0033)* 
-0.1138 (0.0164)* 
-0.0380 (0.0038)* 
-0.0491 (0.0048)* 
-0.0530 (0.0082)* 
-0.0193 (0.0027)*
0.0026 (0.0030) 
0.0065 (0.0023)* 
0.0035 (0.0014)* 
0.0238 (0.0082)* 
0.0046 (0.0018)* 
0.0091 (0.0032)* 
0.0102 (0.0037)* 
0.0006 (0.0009)
152,211
-108,491
Other
-0.0685 (0.0104)* 
-0.1413 (0.0140)* 
-0.4496 (0.0658)* 
-0.1673 (0.0177)* 
-0.1727 (0.0185)* 
-0.2124 (0.0340)* 
-0.0513 (0.0091)*
-0.0473 (0.0078)* 
0.0249 (0.0028)* 
0.0323 (0.0033)* 
0.0900 (0.0151)* 
0.0334 (0.0037)* 
0.0399 (0.0045)* 
0.0428 (0.0075)* 
0.0187 (0.0026)*
Also control for variables listed in table 3.5. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at 5% level or less.
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Table 3.11: Participation in Activities: Female 13-14 Year Olds
All
#  siblings 0-4 0 1 2 3
W age 25th S 0.65 0.61 0.57 0.54
W 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
0 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.40
75th s 0.66 0.61 0.57 0.53
w 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07
0 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.40
Females Males
#  siblings 5-12 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th s 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61
w 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
0 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.34
75th s 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.59
w 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
0 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.35
#  siblings 13-14 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th s 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.67
w 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
0 0.32 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.29
75th s 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
w 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
#  siblings 15plus 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 2bth s 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.60 0.57
w 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.35 0.38
75th s 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.57
w 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38
S=full-/ part-time school, W=full-time work, 0=other/housework.
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Table 3.12: Marginal Effects, Male 13-14 Year Olds
Full-time Work
-0.0585 (0.0176)* 
-0.0412 (0.0131)* 
-0.0955 (0.0375)* 
-0.0756 (0.0204)* 
-0.0395 (0.0142)* 
-0.0561 (0.0439) 
-0.0514 (0.0163)*
Other
-0.0293 (0.0114)* 
-0.0323 (0.0096)* 
-0.0457 (0.0340) 
-0.0468 (0.0118)* 
-0.0496 (0.0134)* 
-0.0324 (0.0341) 
0.0188 (0.0085)*
SibsO-4
Fsibs5-12
Fsibsl3-14
Fsibsl5plus
Msibs5-12
Msibsl3-14
Msibsl5plus
Wage
Wage*SibsO-4
Wage*Fsibs5-12
Wage*Fsibsl3-14
Wage*Fsibsl5plus
Wage*Msibs5-12
Wage*Msibsl3-14
Wage*Msibsl5plus
N
log L
School
0.0879 (0.0217)* 
0.0735 (0.0167)* 
0.1413 (0.0621)* 
0.1224 (0.0231)* 
0.0891 (0.0212)* 
0.0890 (0.0647) 
0.0326 (0.0162)*
-0.1009 (0.0206)* 
-0.0277 (0.0056)* 
-0.0191 (0.0044)* 
-0.0332 (0.0126)* 
-0.0238 (0.0048)* 
-0.0221 (0.0050)* 
-0.0217 (0.0139) 
-0.0116 (0.0039)*
0.0279 (0.0091)* 
0.0173 (0.0048)* 
0.0110 (0.0038)* 
0.0209 (0.0075)* 
0.0127 (0.0041)* 
0.0108 (0.0036)* 
0.0151 (0.0094) 
0.0143 (0.0043)*
156,433
-108,407
0.0730 (0.0186)* 
0.0103 (0.0031)* 
0.0081 (0.0024)* 
0.0123 (0.0070) 
0.0110 (0.0029)* 
0.0112 (0.0032)* 
0.0066 (0.0075) 
-0.0026 (0.0017)
Also control for variables listed in table 3.5. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at 5% level or less.
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Table 3.13: Participation in Activities: Male 13-14 Year Olds
All
#  siblings 0-4 0 1 2 3
Wage 25th S 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.67
W 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15
0 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.18
75th s 0.73 0.69 0.65 0.62
w 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16
0 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22
Females Males
#  siblings 5-12 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Wage 25th s 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72
w 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13
0 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
75th s 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.68
w 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
0 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18
#  siblings 13-14 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Wage 25th s 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.72
w 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15
0 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13
76th s 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.67
w 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.17
0 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16
#  siblings 15plus 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Wage 25th s 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.71
w 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
0 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15
75th s 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.68
w 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.15
0 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
S=full-/part-time school, W=full-time work, 0=other/housework.
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Table 3.14: Marginal Effects, Female 15-17 Year Olds
Full-time Work
-0.0586 (0.0223)* 
-0.0563 (0.0291) 
-0.1012 (0.0273)* 
-0.0533 (0.0504) 
-0.0920 (0.0320)* 
-0.0162 (0.0319) 
-0.0153 (0.0412)
Other
-0.0360 (0.0233) 
-0.1625 (0.0482)* 
-0.1512 (0.0391)* 
-0.2715 (0.0751)* 
-0.1740 (0.0500)* 
-0.2531 (0.0476)* 
0.0051 (0.0653)
SibsO-4
Fsibs5-12
Fsibsl3-14
Fsibsl5plus
Msibs5-12
Msibsl3-14
Msibsl5plus
Wage
Wage*sibs0-4
Wage*Fsibs5-12
Wage*Fsibsl3-14
Wage*Fsibsl5plus
Wage*Msibs5-12
Wage*Msibsl3-14
Wage*Msibsl5plus
N
log L
School
0.0946 (0.0579) 
0.2188 (0.0509)* 
0.2525 (0.0938)* 
0.3249 (0.0663)* 
0.2660 (0.0562)* 
0.2694 (0.0848)* 
0.0101 (0.0268)
0.0661 (0.0204)* 
-0.0311 (0.0108)* 
-0.0493 (0.0081)* 
-0.0561 (0.0176)* 
-0.0651 (0.0114)* 
-0.0585 (0.0092)* 
-0.0568 (0.0166)* 
-0.0089 (0.0055)
-0.0593 (0.0116)* 
0.0177 (0.0070)* 
0.0165 (0.0065)* 
0.0291 (0.0110)* 
0.0170 (0.0073)* 
0.0224 (0.0074)* 
0.0057 (0.0085) 
0.0049 (0.0043)
181,409
-157,201
-0.0068 (0.0182) 
0.0133 (0.0095)* 
0.0327 (0.0076)* 
0.0269 (0.0155) 
0.0481 (0.0100)* 
0.0360 (0.0090)* 
0.0511 (0.0138)* 
0.0040 (0.0050)
Also control for variables listed in table 3.5. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at 5% level or less.
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Table 3.15: Participation in Activities: Female 15-17 Year Olds
All
#  siblings 0-4 0 1 2 3
W age 25th S 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.24
W 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20
0 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.56
7bth S 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.24
w 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.20
0 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.56
Females Males
#  siblings 5-12 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th s 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30
w 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19
0 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
7bth s 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28
w 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18
0 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54
#  siblings 13-14 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th s 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32
w 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18
0 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50
75th s 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.29
w 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17
0 0.51 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54
#  siblings 15plus 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
W age 25th s 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.28
w 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
0 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.55
75th s 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28
w 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16
0 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56
S=full-/ part-time school, W=full-time work, 0=other/housework.
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Table 3.16: Marginal Effects, Male 15-17 Year Olds
SibsO-4
Fsibs5-12
Fsibsl3-14
Fsibsl5plus
Msibs5-12
Msibsl3-14
Msibsl5plus
Wage
Wage*sibs0-4
Wage*Fsibs5-12
Wage*Fsibsl3-14
Wage*Fsibsl5plus
Wage*Msibs5-12
Wage*Msibsl3-14
Wage*Msibsl5plus
School
0.1014 (0.0301)* 
0.2036 (0.0260)* 
0.2175 (0.0381)* 
0.1658 (0.0324)* 
0.2616 (0.0237)* 
0.2659 (0.0340)* 
0.1583 (0.0213)*
-0.0064 (0.0098) 
-0.0303 (0.0057)* 
-0.0448 (0.0042)* 
-0.0488 (0.0072)* 
-0.0339 (0.0057)* 
-0.0553 (0.0041)* 
-0.0556 (0.0065)* 
-0.0375 (0.0040)*
Full-time Work
-0.0967 (0.0305)* 
-0.1725 (0.0227)* 
-0.0899 (0.0379)* 
-0.1577 (0.0273)* 
-0.2017 (0.0226)* 
-0.1459 (0.0347)* 
-0.0919 (0.0248)*
0.0257 (0.0108)* 
0.0290 (0.0059)* 
0.0395 (0.0042)* 
0.0237 (0.0069)* 
0.0286 (0.0053)* 
0.0444 (0.0042)* 
0.0330 (0.0068)* 
0.0264 (0.0049)*
Other
-0.0046 (0.0123) 
-0.0311 (0.0106)* 
-0.1276 (0.0202)* 
-0.0080 (0.0120) 
-0.0599 (0.0127)* 
-0.1199 (0.0189)* 
-0.0663 (0.0114)*
-0.0193 (0.0036)* 
0.0012 (0.0026)* 
0.0052 (0.0023)* 
0.0250 (0.0042)* 
0.0053 (0.0024)* 
0.0109 (0.0027)* 
0.0225 (0.0040)* 
0.0111 (0.0026)*
N 204,939
log L -181,280
Also control for variables listed in table 3.5. Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at 5% level or less.
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Table 3.17: Participation in Activities: Male 15-17 Year Olds
All
#  siblings 0-4 0 1 2 3
Wage 25t/l S 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.30
W 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.49
0 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.21
7bth s 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.28
w 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.51
0 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.21
Females Males
#  siblings 5-12 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Wage 25th s 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37
w 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.45
0 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18
75th s 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.33
w 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.48
0 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
#  siblings 13-14 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Wage 25th s 0.38 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.37
w 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.46
0 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17
75th s 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.33
w 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.48
0 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
#  siblings 15plus 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Wage 25th s 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35
w 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48
0 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.17
75th s 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32
w 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.47 0.50
0 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18
S=full-/part-time school, W=full-time work, 0=other/housework.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of a Conditional 
Education Subsidy on the 
Activities of Young Adults in 
the UK
4.1 Introduction
The sharp decrease in school enrolment at the end of primary education 
observed in Mexico in the previous chapter, is unique to LDCs. In most de­
veloped economies, schooling is mandatory until age 16. Upon completion 
of compulsory education however, there is a noticeable decline in participa­
tion in education, that is disproportionate across income groups. In 2002, 
there was an 82% enrolment rate in England and Wales amongst 16 year 
olds with a parent in a managerial/professional occupation, compared to 
59% amongst individuals with an unskilled manual parent.1 By age 18, the 
corresponding participation rates were 55% and 26%. Further, individuals 
from the top three social classes were almost three times as likely to enter 
higher education compared to those from the bottom three, with partici­
pation rates of 49% and 18% respectively. A variety of factors contribute
xThe overall average participation rate was 71%: a 75% enrolment rate for females and 
a 66% enrolment rate for males.
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to this observed differential investment in education across socio-economic 
groups. In the literature, they are broadly categorised into ‘short-term’ and 
‘long-term’ factors. Short-term factors encompass those that are important 
for education choices relatively late on in the education cycle, such as income 
at the time of making college decisions, whilst long-term factors axe those 
that are relevant from the earliest stages and throughout the entire educa­
tional development of individuals and that contribute to the development 
of cognitive and non-cognitive skills and motivation. Most policies aimed at 
increasing participation in education focus on improving short-term factors, 
insofar as they are relatively easier to target.2 The Education Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA) in the UK is one such example, being a conditional ed­
ucation subsidy, equivalent to a decrease in the cost of schooling for those 
who choose to remain, that was targeted at low-income individuals upon 
completion of post-compulsory education. In this chapter we examine its 
impact on post-compulsory choices between education, work and other ac­
tivities. Whilst the theoretical effect of the EMA on enrolment is positive 
(assuming education is a normal good), it represents just one possible inter­
vention amongst a host of others and indeed we cannot say anything about 
its relative merits vis-a-vis other policies. However, it is useful to consider 
the potential magnitude of the effectiveness of the subsidy, or another way 
of thinking about it, the relative importance of short-term factors for edu­
cation choices. This may be at least partially ascertained from the empirical 
evidence as to the differential importance of long- and short-term factors in 
education choices, a brief overview of which we now turn to.
The short-term explanation for differential investment in education across 
income groups points to low-income families having fewer resources to in­
vest in education, which is relevant in the presence of binding borrowing 
constraints. Proponents of this explanation point to (at least) two pieces 
of indirect evidence of credit constraints, which are by no means uncon-
2 Early intervention in the form of policies to foster cognitive and non-cognitive devel­
opment (ability) is costly, not least of all because of the difficulty in pinpointing the precise 
mechanisms that underlie such development and that must be targeted. See Carneiro and 
Heckman (2003).
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troversial.3 The first is a relatively large response to conditional education 
subsidies for low-income individuals. However, as conditional subsidies de­
crease the relative costs facing individuals, one would expect the privately 
optimal level of schooling to increase even in the absence of liquidity con­
straints. In addition, the precise magnitude of a ‘large’ response is unclear. 
The second piece of evidence is a high income elasticity of education, which 
is however only valid if one controls for all long run factors that axe both 
correlated with income and that affect education choices.4
However, social class differences in the education system are engendered 
from the very earliest years.5 Education decisions from age 16 onwards 
are closely driven by prior choices and investments into human capital. 
Throughout the education cycle, paxents make choices regaxding school qual­
ity and tuition, along with home investments that enhance the transmission 
of education values to children and that affect the effort and time that chil­
dren devote to study. Such factors shape the cognitive and non-cognitive de­
velopment of individuals and therefore affect the stock and quality of human 
capital. Liquidity constraints that axe operative throughout the education 
cycle may affect the affordability of inputs such as, for example, the choice 
of school and extra tuition. A recent array of papers, mostly US-based, 
examines the importance of long-term factors for later education choices 
vis-a-vis short-term credit constraints. Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001) 
find that most of the effect of family income on schooling is due to long- 
run family background effects that produce ability rather than short-term 
liquidity constraints. The importance of family income and other family 
background factors for education choices from age 16 onwards, greatly di­
minishes after controlling for variables that are correlated with wealth and 
that affect education choices, such as ability. Keane and Wolpin (2001) esti­
3It is difficult to find direct evidence as to the importance of liquidity constraints for 
education choices. An ideal experiment would involve randomly and unconditionally allo­
cating money to some individuals, from different backgrounds, at the time of making their 
post-compulsory education decisions. Another useful experiment would involve giving 
money to families at different points in the life-cycle.
4See Cameron and Heckman (1998).
6 See the White Paper (2003).
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mate a structural model of school, work and savings decisions of young males 
in the US and find that a substantial relaxation of borrowing constraints has 
almost no effect on college attendance decisions of youth from low-income 
families and stress the importance of targeting government policies instead 
on the factors that generate unequal outcomes much earlier in the life cycle. 
Kane (1994) finds that most of the increase in the high school graduation 
rate of blacks in the US in recent decades is due to an increase in the aver­
age education of their parents. A number of recent papers use instrumental 
variables to exploit exogenous variation in income.6 Acemoglu and Pischke 
(2000) use changes in income inequality in the US over time to instrument 
parental income and find a positive and significant effect of family income 
on college enrolment decisions. This finding is supported by Blanden et al
(2002), who instrument income using changes in the UK tax system and find 
a significantly positive effect of instrumented income on the post-16 decision 
to stay on in education, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
linked to early childhood and family background.
Therefore, evidence as to the relative importance of long-term and short­
term factors for education is mixed, translating into analogous ambiguity 
about the appropriate policy response. The effectiveness of tuition grants 
is also debated. Keane and Wolpin (2001) find evidence of large effects of 
parental transfers on college attendance, whilst Kane (1994) finds no signifi­
cant effect of tuition grants on college enrolment rates of blacks, thus casting 
doubt on the effectiveness of means-tested financial aid on enrolment. The 
general consensus is that there is a role for both long- and short-term inter­
ventions, but that they must be properly targeted. Carneiro and Heckman
(2003) point out that whilst there is scope for intervention to alleviate short­
term liquidity constraints, this will only go a small way towards narrowing
6This is because estimates of the income elasticity of education may be downward 
biased due to measurement error and transitory movements in income measured at a 
point in time, thus attenuating the effect of income on education. The attenuation bias 
will be exacerbated if other variables correlated with permanent income, such as parental 
education, are included as controls, thus possibly erroneously understating the estimated 
effect of income on education. See Haveman and Wolfe (1995).
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the enrolment gap across income groups. At the same time, early interven­
tions are more costly and more difficult to target, but are likely to have 
larger long-term impacts.
In this chapter we estimate a dynamic discrete-choice model of par­
ticipation in education, work and other activities in the UK and examine 
the effect of a conditional education subsidy, the Education Maintenance 
Allowance (EMA), on these choices. We follow individuals for three years 
after compulsory education, observing their activity at a number of different 
points in time. We allow for a persistent unobserved component to individ­
ual decision-making and a key contribution of the analysis is to account for 
attrition from the sample through time that is possibly non-random in an un­
observed dimension. We also control for a large range of observed long-term 
family background factors, the importance of which was discussed above, so 
as not to confound the effectiveness of the subsidy with such characteristics. 
Simulations from the model indicate that the EMA is effective in increas­
ing participation in post-compulsory education and that there is scope for 
increasing the generosity of the subsidy as a means of further increasing par­
ticipation. The positive effects are specifically on participation in education 
without a job, with negative, but smaller, effects on enrolment in education 
with a job. We also find that accounting for attrition does not make much 
difference to the structural parameter estimates.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the EMA in some 
more detail and the outcome variables of interest. In section 4.3 we out­
line the model used in the estimation. Section 4.4 describes the data used 
in the analysis. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 discuss the results and simulations 
respectively, whilst section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 The Education M aintenance Allowance
The EMA programme was introduced in ten Local Education Authorities 
(LEAs) in England in September 1999, providing a means-tested benefit to 
16-18 year olds remaining in education after the end of compulsory schooling
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(year l l ).7 It was not randomly allocated to LEAs, but was implemented 
fully in certain areas. The subsidy, which consists of weekly payments, a 
retention bonus each term and an achievement bonus at the end of the term, 
may be claimed for up to two years (three years for individuals with spe­
cial needs). The ongoing pilot scheme pertains to two cohorts - those who 
completed compulsory education in 1999 or 2000. Individuals are eligible 
for the full amount of the EMA if their joint parental taxable income is 
below £13,000. This is tapered away linearly such that individuals with 
joint parental income of £30,000 are eligible for the minimum amount of 
£5 per week and individuals whose parents earn more than £30,000 are not 
eligible for any award. The pilot scheme consists of four variants, differing 
in relation to the amounts paid to the student and to whom it is paid (the 
student or the parent). Details are shown in table 4.1.8 We also have data 
on a number of carefully selected control areas which did not receive any 
subsidy. In this chapter, we use data on all pilot and control individuals 
who are fully or partially eligible for the EMA and who finished compulsory 
education at the end of May 1999 (cohort 1), thus conditioning the empirical 
analysis on low-income individuals.9
We observe and model the main activities of individuals within the pilot 
and control LEAs at seven discrete points in time, t =  1, • • • ,7, for three 
years immediately after the completion of compulsory education. Each pe­
riod corresponds to an academic term: we observe an individual’s main 
activity in three terms in each of waves 1 and 2 and in the first term of wave 
3. In waves 1 and 2 the individual’s choice set includes full-time education
7LEAs, of which there axe 154 in England, provide certain planning and support func­
tions which are essential to guarantee adequate school provision within a particular area; 
they also support school improvement especially by helping schools which are under­
achieving, and with regard to special educational needs and school transport.
8We do not directly examine the effectiveness of the achievement and retention bonuses 
in this study. For an analysis of this see Deaxden et al (2003).
9Previous evaluation of this programme, using propensity score matching to compare 
changes in enrolment rates in post-compulsory education amongst eligible pilots and con­
trols after the introduction of the programme, has identified a disproportionate increase 
in post-compulsory education for eligible males, with no statistically significant effect on 
university paxticipation. Attrition is however not modelled. See Deaxden et al (2003).
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(separately classified into with and without a job), full-time work, part-time 
work and unemployment/other. In wave 3 it includes university, other full­
time education (both of which are classified into with and without a job), 
full-time work, part-time work and unemployment/other.10
The overall attrition rate from wave 1 to wave 3 for cohort 1 eligibles is 
42%, approximately half of which has occurred by wave 2. Table 4.2 provides 
a summary of the collection and organisation of the data. It should be noted 
from this that whilst activities in t=2,3 relate to wave 1, they axe collected 
retrospectively in wave 2 and such data are affected by wave 2 attrition; 
similarly for t=5,6 which relate to activities in wave 2, yet axe collected in 
wave 3.
4.3 Estim ation M ethodology
The specification of the econometric model that we estimate is tailored to the 
structure of the data that we have described above. The sequential discrete 
choice model outlined below is related to that of Cameron and Heckman 
(1998, 2001), who highlight the importance of controlling for dynamic selec­
tion so as not to obtain biased parameter estimates. However, we account 
for attrition by modelling the joint probability of both the choice made by 
the individual and of attrition, importantly allowing for attrition to depend 
on the same unobserved factors that may (partially) generate the individual 
choices.11 This is important because attrition that is informative about the 
choices of individuals, in a way that is possibly unobserved by us, will lead 
to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates if ignored. To begin with,
10The part-time work category includes individuals in part-time education. This was 
deemed preferable to including them amongst individuals in full-time education with a job, 
as the group in part-time education is not eligible for any EMA, so this would confound 
two groups. In any case, the numbers of eligible individuals in part-time education is 
extremely low. Note also that the other full-time education category in wave 3 mostly 
comprises individuals who are repeating their A/AS levels.
11 If one does not model attrition, whilst the inclusion of the incomplete information 
on attritors in the estimation improves efficiency, it does not reduce any bias. See Hsiao 
(1986).
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we outline the basic model that does not account for attrition. In section 
4.3.2, the model is extended to account for possible non-random attrition 
from the panel.
4.3.1 Individual Choices
The dependent variable is the main activity of individual i at time t, de­
noted yu- We assume that the individual can choose among K  states in 
each time period, and can move freely across states at each point in time. 
Therefore each of the variables (yu, • • ■ , yir) may take values in {1, • • • ,K } .  
The observed choice is the optimal outcome of an underlying utility max­
imisation by the individual. Let the latent variable V*jt represent the utility 
to individual i from being in state j  at time t. The variation in decisions 
across individuals is due to observable characteristics, including the previous 
choice of the individual, as well as unobserved person-specific effects that 
persist across time, and a random unobserved factor. Assume that V*jt is 
linear and additive in these arguments
K
V*jt =  ^  Skjt.l{yit-i =  &} +  PjtXu +  €ijt (4.1)
k—l
where yu-i  represents the state chosen by the individual in the previous 
time period12, Xu  includes individual, family and area characteristics and 
€{jt is an unobserved factor affecting choices.13 The coefficients 8k jt and /3jt 
represent the effect of the individual’s lagged activity and other observed 
characteristics respectively, on the utility derived from the current activity. 
Explicitly allowing for lagged state dependence in the model, guards against 
overstating the degree of unobserved heterogeneity. The individual will be 
observed to choose state j  if it provides the maximum utility across all 
possible choices
yu = > V'mt} V m ^ j
12Implicit in (4.1) is the assumption that the process follows a first-order Markov process 
i.e. conditional on one’s choice in the previous period, choices in preceding periods axe 
not informative about the current choice of the individual.
13In the empirical analysis, X u  axe the values of the observed individual and area-level 
characteristics at the date of the first interview and axe thus time-invariant. We therefore 
drop the t subscript from hereon.
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The unobserved error term is assumed to follow a one-factor structure14
Cijt  =  Otjt'ni “b  u i j t  ( 4 * 2 )
This allows for one component of the unobserved trait affecting choices, 
Tfi) to be a persistent characteristic of the individual (ability, for example) 
and to have a different effect across choices and in different time periods, as 
captured by the factor loading ctjt- u^t  captures unobserved, random influ­
ences on individual choices. The econometric interpretation of this latent 
factor specification considers r}{ to be an unobserved covariate that affects 
the outcome and that is common to all states and time periods, and the a ’s 
to be the regression coefficients, that vary across states and time periods.
Inserting (4.2) into (4.1), we obtain 
K
Vijt =  ^   ^^kjt‘^-{yit—l =  “b P j t ^ i  *b CXjtTJi +  ^ i j t  (4*3)
k=1
From (4.3), there are three possible sources of persistence (apart from ob­
servable characteristics X{) that affect and therefore the observed choice 
of the individual in each time period: true state dependence as captured by 
the lagged dependent variable y u -1, persistent person-specific (scalar) unob­
served heterogeneity 77* and possible serial correlation in the error term Uijt. 
Clearly, they all have very different policy implications, malting it important 
to distinguish between them .15
We make the following assumptions on the error term
• A ssum ption  1 The random variable rji is independent of u^t V i , j , t, 
and all rji and Uijt are independent across individuals.
• A ssum ption  2 The term u^t is an extreme value random variable and 
is independent of all other Ui>jn)tin except for i = i ' , j  = j", t  = t'".
14See Heckman (1981) for a discussion of one-factor models.
15See Heckman (1991), especially on the necessity of having access to multi-spell data 
to distinguish between them.
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The contribution to the likelihood function of individual i at time t may 
now be written as
D / .. v  \ exP(T,k>i h jM V i t - i  = k )+  pjtXi +  ajtVi) tAA\
Pr[Vit 3 {Vit-li Xi, T)i) ^  7 -j /   i \ , a y  . 4.4)exP\X/k>l 1 — A?) 4* Pj'tX-i +  Oij'tTJi)
for all j  and j '.16
It is clear from (4.4) that the dependence in individual choices across 
time, conditional on observables and on the previous choice of the individ­
ual, is due to the unobserved rji. Therefore, piecewise estimation of each 
period’s sub-likelihood functions could lead to inconsistent parameter es­
timates due to the wrong likelihood being maximised. The problem with
estimating (4.4) in a particular time period is immediately clear due to the
correlation between yu-i  and rji, as yu-i  is itself a function of rji. In addition, 
through time, uncorrected heterogeneity in the form of rji will contaminate 
parameter estimates through a process of dynamic selection, which is likely 
to lead to a different correlation structure between observed characteristics 
and rji as time goes on. In this non-linear setting, we would ideally like to 
condition on rji in order to eliminate person-specific unobservables. However, 
because r/j is unobserved, and due to the non-linearity of the probabilities, 
which precludes first-differencing or mean deviations as a way of purging 
the equation of the individual-specific component, we integrate it out over 
all possible choices across periods 1 to T, to obtain a sequence of choice 
probabilities for a particular individual that is conditional on observables 
only
K  K
=  j \ v i T - 2 , x i , m ) ] U y i T - 1 = j )
Vi j —l j =1
K
■ ■ ■ n i 'M y . i  =  i\X i, Vi)]Um=i)dF(Vi) (4.5)
J = 1
where we have assumed that at the initial stage of the process, Xi±rji 
(Assumption 3), which allows us to integrate with respect to the marginal
/Jn
16See McFadden (1974). As the coefficients in this model axe only estimated up to a 
scale factor, the coefficients for the reference choice, unemployment/other, are set to zero.
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and not the conditional distribution of rji.17 Note also that as we observe 
the choices of individuals from when they complete compulsory education, 
there is no reason for yu to be generated by the same process as yi2, • • • , yiT- 
We assume that yn-Lyio - the individual’s choice in the first observed period 
is independent of his activity in the period before the sampling begins and 
therefore the last probability in (4.5) is not conditioned on yio.18
We impose no distributional assumptions on the persistent unobserved 
factor rji and instead model it using the non-parametric maximum likelihood 
estimator (NPMLE).19 This assumes that whilst endowment heterogeneity 
is unobserved, we know that there axe M  types of individual. Therefore 
F(rji) is modelled as a univariate discrete mixing distribution with a finite 
number of support points M  and unrestricted locations for these support 
points for rji’. the unknown vectors (ri, • • • , t m ) to which the M  unknown 
probabilities (7Ti, • ■ • , ttm) are attached. The likelihood contribution for each 
individual is a finite mixture of the type-specific likelihoods, with the likeli­
hood of each individual’s observed choice sequence weighted by their prob­
ability of being type m .20 The parameters ajt on the unobserved hetero­
17The fixed effects approach, in which no assumptions are made on the relationship of 
the individual-specific effect with the explanatory variables, is the other commonly used 
method of estimating dynamic non-linear models. For a comparison of fixed and random 
effects estimators see Arellano and Honore (2002).
18The initial conditions problem is only relevant when one starts observing individuals 
when the process is already in progress, in which case the first observation is a function 
of the dependent variable in periods before the sample starts, and/or if there is serial 
correlation in the unobserved transitory component (which we assume is not the case - 
see [Assumption 2] - serial correlation only enters through permanent unobserved hetero­
geneity). For a treatment of models with initial conditions problems see Heckman (1981) 
and Wooldridge (2002).
19This strategy is due to Laird (1978). Heckman and Singer (1984) discuss the sensi­
tivity of the structural parameter estimates in such models to the functional form of the 
unobserved heterogeneity.
20 Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the nonparametric estimation method is quite 
successful in terms of structural parameter estimates, but estimated mixing distributions 
may be very inaccurate - see Heckman and Singer (1985). Furthermore, the likelihood can 
be quite ill-conditioned, leading to the existence of a large number of local maxima. In 
the final estimation, we generate several starting values to ensure that the optimisation
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geneity term in (4.4), are loading parameters that are estimated jointly with 
{r*i, * • - , rM, 7Ti, • • • , 7Tm-i}-21 Therefore the sequence of choice probabilities 
for an individual in (4.5) may be written as
M  , r T  , K
n  n  Y[[P r (yit = j\yit-i,Xi,r]i = rm)]L(yit=:/)
171=1 ^ *- t= 2  '  j = 1
K
Y[[Pr(yn  = j\Xi,T]i =  rm)]1^ yil=j)Pr{r]i =  r„
j = l
4.3.2 A ttrition
If the relationship between an individual’s decision to attrit and the main 
activity chosen is purely through observables, we can control for this by 
including the relevant observables in the equation determining the main ac­
tivity. However, the possibility of sample selection bias arises when one 
examines a sub-sample of individuals (non-attritors), and when the unob­
served factors determining inclusion in the sub-sample (the probability of 
not attriting) axe correlated with both the observables and the unobservables 
influencing the primary outcome of interest. If this is the case, the model 
outlined in section 4.3.1 will yield inconsistent estimates of the structural 
parameters of the model, being based on a sub-sample of individuals without 
taking account of the possibility that attrition may be informative on the 
unobserved determinants of individual choices (the rji in the above exposi­
tion). This means that A ssum ption  3 (Xi±.r]i) is likely to be violated for 
the sub-sample of non-attritors, and if this is ignored, we will obtain biased 
and inconsistent estimates of the effects of observables on individual choices.
In order to deal with this, we augment the model presented in section
4.3.1 to model the (unobserved) dependence between individual choices and 
attrition. This has not been addressed in previous evaluations of this pro­
gramme. Whilst the primary reason for this is to correct for the effects of
algorithm converges to the same point.
21 As we leave the mean of rji unrestricted, the structural parameter vector does not 
include an intercept. We normalise the factor loading in full-time education with a job in 
time period one to one, in order to identify the remainder of the factor loadings.
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attrition on estimates of the structural parameters of the model, it will also 
enable us to assess the importance of unobservables for attrition .22 The 
dependence between an individual’s choice and the decision to attrit or not, 
is modelled by allowing for those unobserved persistent factors affecting 
choices, rji, to also affect the probability of attrition. We require exclusion 
restrictions to identify the model, i.e. variables that affect the attrition de­
cision but that have no independent effect on the choice of the individual, 
except through their effect on attrition. In other words, we require vari­
ables Z  that are independent of the error term in the choice equation, i.e.
As discussed already, whilst individual choices are modelled in seven 
time periods, attrition can only take place in wave 2 or wave 3 and therefore 
is only modelled at most twice. Further, as we have seen in table 4.2, for 
individuals who attrit in wave 2, we only observe their activity in one time 
period, t= l .  This is because data on t=2 and t=3 activities in wave 1, are 
collected retrospectively in wave 2. For individuals who attrit in wave 3, we 
observe their activities in t= l ,  • • • ,4. Again, the retrospective collection of 
the data means that information on wave 2 activities in t=5, t =6 is collected 
in wave 3. For individuals who never attrit on the other hand, we observe 
their activity in t= l ,  ■ ■ • ,7. This is relevant for the notation below.
Formally, let Siw be a binary variable taking the value one if individual 
i does not attrit in wave w, for w — 2,3 (by definition, there is no attrition 
in wave 1). This is driven by the individual’s latent propensity not to attrit, 
S*w, which we assume to be a linear and additive function of the individ­
ual’s previous activity, observable characteristics of the individual and their 
environment, as well as unobserved individual traits, which are independent
22 For readings on non-random attrition from panel surveys see Hausman and Wise 
(1979), Heckman (1979), Fitzgerald et al (1998) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1998). All of 
these studies emphasise the fact that the primary goal of accounting for attrition is to 
correct for the effects of attrition on estimates of the structural parameters of the model, 
rather than any inherent interest in attrition per se.
133
by assumption
iw — View ^   ^1 "{Uiw—l — &) +  'Yw^i “1“ Ww Z i  +  Viw (4-7)
fc>l
where yiw- \  is the activity of the individual in the previous wave, X{ are 
time-invariant observed individual, family and area characteristics that af­
fect attrition, and are distinguished from Z*, which are the time-invariant 
instruments that are used for identification - we return to a discussion of 
these in section 4.5. As in section 4.3.1, we assume that the error term may 
be decomposed into a one-factor structure
As can be seen from comparing (4.2) and (4.8), the person-specific perma-
same mixing distribution, with the loading factors differing across both.
The observed survey participation status of the individual in wave w , Siw, 
is a function of his propensity not to attrit. In particular,
=  0 otherwise
As in section 4.3.1, we make the following assumptions on the compo­
nents of the error term
• A ssum ption  4 The random variable rji is independent of V i,w. 
All rji and £iw are independent across individuals.
• A ssum ption  5 The term is an extreme value random variable 
and is independent of all other except for i = i',w  = w".
Under these assumptions, the conditional probability that the individual 
does not attrit from the sample in wave w may be written using a logit 
functional form, in which the dependent variable is 1 for each period someone 
is in the sample, and 0 when (and if) an individual leaves the sample
(4.8)
nent errors affecting choices and attrition are assumed to be drawn from the
Siw =  1 if S*w > 0 , V i, for w =  2,3
Pr(Siw — ]\yiw—I? Xi, Zi, rji) —
1 +  exp(Y,k>l (fikwMv 5
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where as before, rji is integrated out due to the fact that it is not ob­
served.23 The 6W indicate the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for 
attrition. If they are not statistically different from zero, and under the 
random effects and one-factor assumptions, there is no selection on unob­
servables.24 However, a finding that unobserved traits affect both attrition 
and choices, underlines the importance of basing inference about the distri­
bution of yu\Xi, 2/it—i on the joint distribution of (yu, yu- 1 , Zi-
We denote the individual log likelihood contributions by i f ,  where A  is 
the individual’s attrition status which may be any of na (do not attrit), aw3 
(attrit in wave 3) or aw2 (attrit in wave 2). So for example, the likelihood 
contributions for individuals who choose the same activity, k, in each period 
in which they remain in the sample, for each of the three groups are (which 
are detailed in Appendix A)
IT =Pr(Si3 =  1,5x2 =  1, Vi7 =  • • ■ =  yu =  k, Xi, rji = rm)
l{ =Pr(Si3 =  Oj &i2 =  2/i4 =  • • • =  yu — k, X{, Tji =  rm)
lfw 2 —Pr(Si2 = 0,2/ii =  k,Xi,7)i = rm)
The log likelihood function across the whole sample of individuals is the
sum of the individual log likelihood contributions of the three groups of 
individuals
jyna pjaw 3 flaw2
l = i f 1 +  y ,  r *  +  li w2
i= l i= l i= l
4.4 D ata and Descriptives
The individual and family background data used in the analysis is mostly 
based on a face-to-face interview with both the parents and the young adults
23Note that for modelling Si3, the young person’s activity in the previous wave (w=2) 
is observed at three different points, yi2,yi3, y*4 - We condition on the most recent activity, 
yi4 . For modelling Si2, the young person’s activity in the previous wave (w =l) is observed 
at one point, yu .
24 Note that a more general specification would allow the error terms in both equations 
to come from separate mixture distributions, with dependence between them. See Van 
der berg and Lindeboom (1998).
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at the beginning of the school year when the subsidy first became available. 
At this point, a wide range of pre-programme information including fam­
ily composition, parental background and detailed family income data was 
collected. In subsequent waves, the young person was re-interviewed by 
telephone and provided information on their main activity, their updated 
academic achievement, and detailed part-time and full-time work informa­
tion, where applicable. We also observe a host of characteristics on the areas 
in which the individuals reside. This is important because although control 
areas were chosen to be as similar as possible to pilot areas in a wide range 
of observable dimensions, Dearden et al (2003) provide evidence that pilot 
areas are relatively more deprived. A list of the variables used in the anal­
ysis is presented in table 4.3.
The measure of ‘ability’ that we control for is the individual’s English 
and maths GCSE test scores (such tests are administered at the end of 
compulsory schooling). These better capture acquired rather than innate 
ability, i.e. ability that is itself a function of prior education. The precise 
amount of the EMA that one is eligible for, is determined exactly by income: 
the EMA is tapered away linearly as parental income increases. Therefore, 
although the model is able to predict the impact of the EMA programme 
without functional form assumptions as to how income affects participation, 
the impact of changing the EMA depends what we assume about how par­
ticipation varies with income in the first place. We control for income and 
its square, and therefore the effect of changing the EMA is identified on the 
basis of nonlinearities in income.
4.4.1 M ain A ctiv ity
As discussed in section 4.3, the discrete decision period is each term of the 
academic year. Tables 4.4 to 4.7 display the proportions in various activities 
for eligible pilots and controls, both overall and separately by gender, across 
terms in waves 1 to 3. Noteworthy features are the fact that the proportion 
in full-time education with a job is higher in control than in pilot areas, 
throughout each time period in waves 1 and 2. The opposite pattern holds
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for full-time education without a job, in which the participation of pilots is 
consistently higher than that of controls. There are more eligible controls 
than eligible pilots in full-time work and the proportions in part-time work, 
unemployed or doing something else, are extremely similar across pilots and 
controls throughout.
Whilst there are notable gender differences in participation rates in ed­
ucation and work, the pilot-control comparison shows similar patterns for 
both males and females. In particular, participation in education without 
a job is consistently higher in pilot than in control areas, for both males 
and females. However, enrolment in this activity is higher for males than 
for females, in both pilot and control areas. Enrolment in education with 
a job on the other hand, is generally greater in control than in pilot areas 
for both genders, and is higher for females than for males. Full-time work 
participation is higher in control areas for both genders, and is higher for 
males than for females. The differences across pilots and controls in part- 
time work and unemployment/other are very small, for both genders.
Differences in wave 3 activities across pilots and controls are much less 
noticeable. Nonetheless, the proportions in university with a job in pilot 
areas are slightly higher than in control areas, and participation in full-time 
work is higher in control areas.
Transitions across states within waves
The advantage of termly data is that it enables us to capture individuals 
dropping out or interrupting education temporarily, and returning later. Ta­
bles 4.8 and 4.9 present transitions across the five states for all eligible pilots 
and controls, for waves 1 and 2 respectively and give an indication as to the 
extent to which individuals move across states in each wave. It also shows 
the proportion of individuals attriting, by their previous activity. Individu­
als move across states less as the year progresses, i.e. there is more movement 
across states between September and February, than between February and 
May. The majority of the returning to education after a temporary absence
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occurs between September and February of each of waves 1 and 2 (mostly 
the former wave), with very few individuals returning to education from a 
non-education activity between February and May. For example of those 
who did not choose education in September of wave 1 (2,039 individuals), 
11.4% of them have returned to education by February of that wave, and 
37.4% have attrited (thus their activity is not observed); the corresponding 
figures in wave 2 are 4.4% and 28.2% respectively.
It is also instructive to examine the young person’s activity in September 
of wave 3, by their lagged activity (May of wave 2). Table 4.10 shows that 
amongst those in university (with or without a job), just over 2.7% are 
entering from a non-education activity. The corresponding figure for other 
full-time education is unsurprisingly higher at 8.7%, as it includes individuals 
repeating exams. It is worth noting that the relatively high proportion of 
individuals in part-time work who were in full-time education with a job in 
the previous period (44.8%), may be explained by the fact that individuals 
may still have been mahing their choices by the time they were interviewed, 
and the data collected in wave 4 may be more informative in this regard.
4.4.2 Exploratory A nalysis o f A ttrition
As a joint model of the outcome and attrition probabilities is computation­
ally complex, a simple exploratory analysis of attrition from the panel is 
useful, in order to determine the necessity of modelling the attrition process 
itself. Table 4.11 provides a descriptive overview of the types of individual 
who attrit in waves 2 or 3, along with those who do not attrit by wave 3, by 
a range of observable background characteristics. We see that on average, 
those who drop out of the sample are of lower socio-economic background. 
However, the table is only informative on the extent to which observable 
characteristics are associated with attrition. If it is the case that individu­
als from lower socio-economic backgrounds differ in a number of unobserv­
able dimensions to those from higher socio-economic backgrounds, then this 
means that attrition cannot be fully accounted for by observable traits only. 
Further, even though we account for the lagged activity of the individual
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in the modelling of attrition, which is an important factor in the attrition 
process (attrition in waves 2 and 3 tends to be higher for individuals who 
did not stay on in post-compulsory education - perhaps due to individuals 
moving out of home when they start to work - see tables 4.8 and 4.9), it 
is likely that the interviewer in wave 1 has an important impact on future 
attrition, over and above the effects of socio-economic variables and the in­
dividual’s previous activity. We turn to a discussion of the importance of 
interviewers and unobservables in the attrition process, in the next section.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 A ttrition
As discussed in section 4.3.2, modelling the joint processes of attrition and 
activities necessitates access to a variable that affects attrition but that can 
be excluded from the main equation explaining individual choices. The first 
wave of interviews was conducted face-to-face, with subsequent interviews 
carried out over the telephone. Data has been collected on the age and 
experience of interviewers who conducted the interviews in wave 1. We code 
the age of the interviewer into eight mutually exclusive categories as shown 
below.
In s tru m en ts  for A ttr itio n
V ariable Age G roup % of 
In terv iew ers
% indivs s tay  
on in wave 2
% indivs s tay  
on in wave 3 
given th a t  stayed 
on in wave 2
agel < 30 2.8 0.67 0.85
age2 3 1 -4 0 9.5 0.73 0.80
age3 4 1 -4 5 11.5 0.75 0.80
age4 4 6 -5 0 16.4 0.75 0.79
age5 5 1 -5 5 18.9 0.75 0.78
age6 5 6 -6 0 22.0 0.75 0.78
age7 6 1 -6 5 12.1 0.70 0.77
age8 66+ 6.9 0.71 0.75
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Whether one may expect older interviewers to better convey the impor­
tance of survey response, due to their relatively higher level of experience, 
or whether younger interviewers may relate better to the interviewees, it 
seems intuitively reasonable to expect this variable to have an effect on at­
trition, without having any independent effect on the individual’s choice. 
The table above points towards positive associations between very young 
interviewers (below age 30) and relatively older interviewers (above age 61), 
and attrition in wave 2. In wave 3, attrition seems to be higher, the older 
the wave 1 interviewer. Table 4.12 shows the parameter estimates for attri­
tion in waves 2 and 3, estimated from the model with correlated unobserved 
heterogeneity across attrition and individual choices. Interestingly, in the 
causal analysis, the instruments are more relevant for wave 3 than for wave 
2 attrition. In wave 2, the only significant effect is for the youngest category 
of interviewers (< 30), for which there is a positive and significant effect 
on the probability of attriting in wave 2. However, the low proportion of 
interviewers in this age range is of some concern. On the other hand, con­
ditional on not attriting in wave 2, older interviewers (aged 46 plus) have a 
significantly positive effect on the probability of attriting in wave 3.25 The 
evidence therefore points to young people being more responsive, in terms 
of re-interview reliability, to younger interviewers than to older ones. This 
suggests that lower age gaps between interviewers and young people, rather 
than the experience of the interviewer, may be more important to young 
people and may help to reduce attrition.
Observable individual and family characteristics that have positive and 
significant effects on the probability of attriting in wave 2 include being male, 
having more older siblings, and having a father in full-time work. Negative 
predictors of attrition in this wave include having both parents present in 
the household, having a mother in part-time work, having a mother with 
O-level qualifications or higher, having a high maths GCSE score, living in 
a rural area and having stayed on in post-compulsory education in wave 1. 
On the other hand, living in a rural area is positively associated with wave
25Note that after controlling for age of the interviewer, experience has very little effect 
on attrition.
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3 attrition (perhaps suggestive of young people moving away from home to 
further their education) and individuals who are partially eligible for the 
EMA and who live in a pilot areas are also more likely to attrit. Negative 
effects again come from the presence of both parents in the household, in 
addition to having a father in part-time work, having a high English GCSE 
score and having been in any activity other than unemployment/other in 
the previous period.
In terms of the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for attrition, the 
parameters on the unobserved heterogeneity terms are significant in both 
the wave 2 and wave 3 attrition equations. We examine the correlations in 
unobserved preferences for attrition and activities chosen, by comparing the 
loading factors at  and Sw on the unobserved heterogeneity.26 This shows 
that unobserved preferences for education with a job or full-time work, are 
positively correlated with an unobserved tendency to stay on in the sample 
in wave 2. There is on the other hand, a negative correlation between 
unobserved preferences for education without a job or part-time work and 
one’s propensity to stay on in the sample in wave 2. For individuals who 
stay on after wave 2, unobserved preferences for non-university education 
without a job are positively correlated with an unobserved tendency to stay 
on in the sample in wave 3, whilst individuals with unobserved preferences 
for university or other non-university education with a job, or full-time/part- 
time work, axe more likely to attrit in wave 3.
4.5.2 G oodness o f F it
To assess the importance of unobserved heterogeneity and attrition in the 
data, we compare two models, both of which control for unobserved het­
erogeneity. In the first, we allow for attrition to depend on the same un­
observed factors affecting choices, i.e. Sw ^  0 in (4.9). In the second we 
assume that Sw = 0. Under the null hypothesis of unobserved heterogeneity 
having no effect on attrition, parameters from both models axe consistent.
26 The parameter estimates from the model for each time period axe shown in tables 
4.23 to table 4.26 in Appendix B.
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The first criterion that we use to judge which model fits the data better, is 
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). This weighs the trade-off between 
increased information and decreased reliability (due to the number of pa­
rameters increasing) and takes the sample size into account. The model is 
chosen with the largest sample BIC. Comparing rows (1) and (2) in table 
4.13 shows that the model allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity 
in attrition is favoured using this criterion.
A comparison of the parameter estimates from the two models is useful 
in order to see whether controlling for correlated unobserved heterogeneity 
makes much difference to the parameter estimates. The structural parameter 
estimates in the models with and without correlated unobserved heterogene­
ity across the main and attrition equations differ by very little.27 This is an 
important finding, given that these covariate effects are the parameters of 
interest. Thus even though the unobserved heterogeneity terms are signifi­
cantly dependent, the parameter estimates are not very sensitive to this.
We next compare the model that accounts for an unobserved persistent 
component in individual decision-making to one that does not.28 Comparing 
rows (2) and (3) in table 4.13 shows that the former is preferred over a model 
that treats all decisions across time for a given individual as independent of 
each other, conditional on observables. A Wald test of the joint hypothesis 
that all of the parameters relating to unobserved heterogeneity (including 
the attrition unobserved heterogeneity parameters) are zero gives a value 
of 176.09 which is distributed as x 2 with 26 degrees of freedom. The null 
hypothesis of no unobserved heterogeneity is clearly rejected (the critical 
value is x 26 =  38.88). The two points of support indicate the presence of 
two types that differ in some unobserved dimension.29 We return to a more
27These axe not reported to save space and are available upon request.
28 As attrition makes very little difference to the structural estimates, it is valid to 
compare models in which we either control or do not control for attrition. Here the two 
models that we compare both account for attrition that is uncorrelated with unobserved 
heterogeneity.
29 Estimates of the parameters of the model would be inconsistent only if the number of 
types was mis-estimated. Increasing the number of points of support to three led to both
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detailed description of these individual types in section 4.5.3.
As a further assessment of how well the final model that accounts for 
unobserved heterogeneity and correlated attrition fits the data, its estimates 
are used to predict the proportions in each activity across pilots and controls 
in each time period. These predicted proportions are then compared to the 
actual proportions. Table 4.14 shows the actual and predicted differences 
across pilots and controls in the proportions in the various activities. The 
predicted proportions mimic the actual ones very closely, providing addi­
tional evidence that the model fits the data well.
4.5.3 D escriptive A nalysis o f Individual Types
We have so far been discussing the notion of unobserved heterogeneity in 
somewhat impalpable terms. Here we explore unobserved heterogeneity 
somewhat further. Within the random effects framework, each point of sup­
port and associated probability describes a latent class or type of individual, 
which may represent some common preferences or ability, for example. Table 
4.15 shows the percentage point difference in participation in each activity 
between type l ’s and 2’s. It indicates that the split of the sample is on 
the basis of preferences for work, rather than on the basis of preferences for 
education or non-education. Type 1 individuals, constituting approximately 
85% of the sample, have stronger unobserved preferences for education with­
out a job, whilst type 2 individuals are more likely to be observed in either 
education with a job or full-time work.
We can investigate the properties of unobserved heterogeneity further. 
Whilst it is not possible to estimate each individual’s endowment type, we 
can use Bayes rule to estimate posterior type probabilities for each individual 
in the sample conditional on the estimated parameters, the observed choices
the parameters estimates and the value of log likelihood remaining virtually unchanged 
compared to two points of support. Note also that the parameters in terms 2 and 3 in 
each of waves 1 and 2 are constrained to be the same in order to make the model more 
parsimonious. Maximisation is highly time-consuming due to the non-linearity of the 
function and the large number of parameters to be estimated.
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and initial schooling. This allows us to correlate the conditional probabili­
ties with observable factors. This is purely descriptive, but is nonetheless a 
useful specification check as to how intuitively reasonable the ‘types’ are.
We estimate the probability of observing a particular sequence of activ­
ities for each person, S f , where j  may represent any of the sequences listed 
in table 4.16. Due to the number of possible sequences proliferating rapidly, 
we aggregate education with and without jobs into ‘education’, E, and full­
time work, part-time work and unemployment/other into ‘non-education’.30 
So for example, if j  represents the sequence of education in every time pe­
riod, the probability of observing sequence j  for individual i, conditional on 
observables and on being type rm, m = 1,2 is
Pr(S feeee\Xi,r)i =  n )  =  Pr(yn = e,yi2 =  e,yi3 =  e,yi4 =  e,yi5 =  e\Xi,r)i = n )  
Pr(S feeee\Xi,Tji =  r 2) =  Pr(yn = e,yi2 =  e,yi3 =  e,yi4 =  e,yi5 =  e\Xi,rji = r2)
For each individual, we find his/her most probable sequence of activities. 
Denoting this by Pr(S*\Xi, rji =  rm), this is the maximum probability across 
all sequences
Pr(S*\Xi, rji =  ri) =  maxj [Pr(S{\Xi,rji =  n )] across all j  
Pr(S*\Xi, rji = r2) =  maxj [Pr(Sj\Xi, rji = r2)\ across all j
The posterior probability of being in latent class rm, for m  =  1,2, given 
sequence Sf  for individual i is then
7Ti'Pr(Sf\Xi,rji = n )Pr(rji = n \X i ,S*)  = rri.Pr(S}\X,rji =  ri) +  r:2.Pr(S l\Xh rji =  r2)
n - f  i v  _  7r2. P r ( S ; \ X i , r j i  =  r 2) (A
Pr(rji — r2 \ X i , S i ) — P _ / Q * i y  „  „  \ _  n - . / o * i y  „  _  _ \n i - P r { b i |X,rj i  =  r i )  +  7T2-Pr^fy \Xi,rji  =  r 2)
where 7Ti =  Pr(rji =  ri) =  0.85,7r2 =  Pr(rji = r2) = 1 — 7ri =  0.15 are the 
estimated proportions of types 1 and 2 respectively.
30Note that here and in the simulations below, we aggregate data from time periods 2 
and 3 in each of waves 1 and 2.
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Table 4.16 shows the predicted proportions in each of the listed sequences 
of activity in pilot and control areas, separately by type. The proportion of 
pilots that is always in education is around 4 percentage points higher than 
the proportion of controls. In terms of differences across types, type 2’s are 
more likely than type l ’s to remain in education throughout the period, for 
both pilots and controls. This is interesting, as we have seen already that 
type 2’s are also more likely to be in full-time education with a job, with 
type l ’s more likely to be in full-time education without a job. A relatively 
higher proportion of type l ’s compared to 2’s on the other hand stay in 
education for the first two waves and then drop out of education in wave 3. 
Type 2’s axe also slightly more likely to be observed in non-education across 
all periods.
To summarise, type 2’s are more likely to be observed in education 
throughout the whole period. Further, they are also more likely to be ob­
served in full-time education with a job, compared to type l ’s. This may be 
due to unobserved preferences for education with a job or higher ability for 
example (that would render them more likely to stay in education; being of 
high ability is also consistent with their having more time to work part-time 
whilst in school). In table 4.17 we show the results from regressing the prob­
ability that an individual is type 1, as estimated from equation (4.10), on a 
set of observable characteristics. Type 1 individuals are the ‘lower ability’ 
group, in the sense that there is a negative correlation between the probabil­
ity of being type 1 and GCSE test scores. Males are more likely to be type 
1, as are individuals living in rural areas. It is also interesting that having 
a mother with O-levels or higher is positively associated with high-ability. 
Interestingly, there is no significant correlation between living in a pilot area 
and being type 1. This is reassuring, suggesting as it does that pilot and 
control areas are similar in terms of unobserved characteristics.31
Finally, it is worth noting that the existing empirical evidence on the
31 Therefore comparisons across pilots and controls, conditional on observables, are likely 
to provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of the programme. In the programme eval­
uation terminology, the Conditional Independence Assumption is likely to hold.
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links between part-time work and educational attainment is mixed, with 
some studies finding that part-time work in school adversely affects aca­
demic attainment and others finding no significant associations.32 However, 
the evidence here suggests that selection bias may affect any observed as­
sociations, with high-ability individuals more likely to select into part-time 
work whilst in school. The links between family background, ability and 
part-time work in school and the subsequent effects on academic attain­
ment, is an interesting topic for future research.
4.6 Simulations
4.6.1 Post-C om pulsory Second-Level Participation
As the parameter estimates from the estimated model have no direct in­
terpretation, we focus on results from the simulations that are carried out 
using the parameter estimates, which are easily interpretable and can be 
used to answer policy questions of interest. We simulate the impact of a 
number of hypothetical policy decisions, in order to compare the current 
policy package with other alternatives. We set the actual EMA entitlement 
to zero, decrease it by 50%, increase it by 50% and double it, and estimate 
the predicted proportions in the activities in each time period. We report 
unconditional probabilities throughout and all probabilities are calculated 
at the mean value of all other individual, family and area characteristics.33 
Estimates pertain to the sample of eligible individuals only and are based 
on the estimated parameters from the dynamic model controlling for unob­
served heterogeneity and correlated non-random attrition.
Tables 4.18 to 4.20 show the results from these simulations. Each figure 
in the table represents the proportion in the listed state in the simulated 
scenario minus the proportion under the actual scenario. Thus a negative 
number on an activity in the lower-EMA simulations means that the EMA
32 See Singh (1998) and Dustman et al (1996a) respectively.
33Thus for each period, we estimate the probability that the individual is in a partic­
ular state, j ,  over all previous activities, k: Pr(yu  =  j \ X )  = ^2k Pr(ya = j \ y u - i  =  
k ,X ) .P r ( y it- i = k \ X ) .
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has a positive effect on participation in those activities, whilst a negative 
number in the higher-EMA simulations represents activities in which increas­
ing the EMA from its current amount has a negative effect on participation.
In brief, the results show that the EMA has a positive effect on partici­
pation in full-time education without a job and a negative effect on full-time 
education with a job, with an overall positive net effect on education. The 
effects on full-time work are generally negative, particularly in the first wave, 
and the impacts on unemployment/other are also negative. In terms of the 
magnitudes, the largest effects axe on participation in the education cate­
gories. We discuss these more fully below.
Firstly, setting the EMA to zero for all pilots reduces the participation 
rate in education without a job by between 5 and 10 percentage points for all 
terms in waves 1 and 2. At the same time, participation in education with a 
job significantly increases by between 2.5 and 4 percentage points, and the 
(significant) increases in full-time work are between 1.5 and 3 percentage 
points. In the first wave, there is a small negative effect on unemploy­
ment/other, and in term 1 of wave 2, the sign of this effect changes, but 
remains small at 1.1 percentage points. The overall effects of reducing the 
EMA by 50% are similar, but of lower magnitudes. The effect on educa­
tion without a job is to reduce participation by between 3 and 5 percentage 
points, compared to a positive impact on education with a job of between 
1.3 and 2.4 percentage points. The overall effect on participation in educa­
tion is negative.
Increasing the EMA by 50% on the other hand, increases participation 
in education without a job - by a maximum of around 6 percentage points 
for both the latter part of wave 1 and September of wave 2, and by 2 to 3 
percentage points in the other terms of waves 1 and 2. Again, most of this 
increase is drawn from education with a job and full-time work. The net ef­
fect on education is positive. Doubling the EMA leads to similar inferences: 
larger significant increases in the proportions enrolled in education without a 
job, being highest in February/May of wave 1 at 15.5 percentage points, and
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September of wave 2 at 14.1 percentage points. The corresponding decreases 
in participation in education with a job are 4.2 and 4.3 percentage points 
respectively, and in full-time work, 6.4 and 7.0 percentage points. There are 
also decreases in unemployment/other, most notably 3.6 percentage points 
in February/May of wave 1 and 3.5 percentage points in September of wave 
2 .
Therefore the general finding is that the EMA leads to an increase in 
participation in full-time education without a job, which is greater than the 
induced decrease in participation in education with a job. It is not just that 
the EMA induces individuals to shift from education with a job to education 
without a job, but it also draws individuals into education from full-time 
work and other states.
4.6.2 U niversity Participation
As a descriptive tool, comparing enrolment in higher education across pilot 
and control areas, is informative as to the association between the EMA and 
higher education. If the EMA has an effect on university participation, and 
if we are confident that there are no unobservables between pilot and control 
areas differentially affecting stay-on rates, we would expect enrolment rates 
to be higher in pilot than in control areas. However, table 4.20, which shows 
the difference in predicted participation in activities in wave 3 across pilots 
and controls, provides some evidence that the EMA is not associated with 
higher university participation (or with different participation in any other 
activity in fact).
The EMA was designed as a means of encouraging individuals to stay 
on in post-compulsory education and we have seen that it has indeed been 
effective in achieving these objectives. Here we use the estimated model to 
examine the effect on university enrolment, of augmenting the pool of indi­
viduals in term 1 of post-compulsory second-level schooling. This is an inter­
esting policy question in and of itself, in essence addressing the issue of the 
response of university enrolment to an x% increase in the post-compulsory
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education enrolment immediately following year 11. The parameter of inter­
est is therefore w^ere educ\ refers to participation in education in
September 1999. We examine this by increasing the observed participation 
in full-time education in term 1 of the first wave and simulating the effect on 
the predicted proportions in university in the final time period. We assume 
that in order to be in university, the individual must attend education in all 
time periods. So for example, amongst the group of individuals who are not 
in education in term 1 of wave l 34, we shift x% of them into education in 
this period and predict the ‘new’ overall number in education in period 2, 
conditional on having been in education in period 1. We then predict the 
number in education in period 3 conditional on having been in education in 
period 2 (under the new scenario), and so on up to the last time period.
We find that participation in university is not very responsive to increases 
in the pool of term 1, wave 1 school participants. In the table below, we 
see that shifting 10% of individuals who chose not to remain in education in 
term 1 of wave 1, into education in this term (i.e. increasing participation 
by 92 individuals), leads to a 0.007 percentage point increase in observed 
university participation. Therefore, amongst the 92 extra individuals that 
we move into education in the first term of wave 1, the model predicts that 
only 7 of them go on to university in wave 3. This low pattern also holds 
for higher increases in term 1 participation: if we move 460 individuals out 
of work/other and into education in September of 1999, only 34 of them 
continue on to higher education in wave 3. We can conclude from this that 
the EMA induces only a very modest increase in university participation, 
compared to its effect on post-compulsory second-level participation, for 
cohort 1 eligible individuals.
4.6.3 Family Background
In analysing the effect of the EMA, we have controlled throughout for an 
extensive array of family background and other observable characteristics.
34Note that this analysis is carried out on the sample of non-attritors only. Of these, 
917 were not in education in term 1 of wave 1.
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Simulated University Participation
% increase in Number in Percentage
term 1 participation university point increase
amongst non-participants from baseline
0 949 -
10 956 0.007
20 962 0.014
30 970 0.022
50 983 0.036
80 1,002 0.056
Controlling for as many such factors as possible is important, so as not to 
spuriously attribute any observed disproportionate increases in education in 
pilot relative to control areas, to the EMA. In this section, we use a principal 
components analysis to summarise a variety of family background variables 
and to examine the influence of such characteristics on participation in var­
ious activities. This turns out to be an informative way of constructing an 
index to summarise a large set of background variables. We simulate the 
effect of changing the EMA on individuals from two different background 
types, which we refer to as ‘upper’ and ‘lower’, to describe relatively well off 
and relatively less well off households respectively.
We perform a factor analysis on all of the variables used in the estima­
tion, in order to identify the principal components of the data .35 The first 
factor is marked by high loadings on the locality characteristics, whilst the 
second factor is marked by high loadings on the household characteristics. 
Insofar as we are interested in the associations between family background 
characteristics and participation in education and work activities, we use 
the second factor to classify individuals into two groups, on the basis of 
whether they are above or below the median factor score (which is the value 
of individual cases for the factors). The table below shows that individuals
35We extract 14 out of 29 factors, which fully capture 90% of the variation in the 
variables.
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in the upper range (i.e. above the median) are from relatively more affluent 
backgrounds compared to those in the lower range.36
P rincipal C om ponents
B ackground C harac te ris tics
U p p er Lower
Number older siblings 0.98 1.03
Number younger siblings 0.87 1.10
Maths GCSE score 4.17 3.15
English GCSE score 4.57 3.65
Percentage
Both parents present 0.94 0.15
Mother works 0.71 0.48
Father works 0.84 0.03
Mother has O-level or higher 0.48 0.39
Father has O-level or higher 0.57 0.05
Nonwhite 0.10 0.09
Owns house 0.83 0.43
1 or 2 parents in work when born 0.92 0.69
Low income 0.09 0.53
Table 4.21 shows the predicted differences in participation in each of the 
five activities, across the above two groups, for waves 1 and 2. In the first 
column, we compare participation under the current EMA package. In the 
second and third columns, we simulate changes in participation for the two 
groups under two new scenarios, in which we set the EMA to zero and dou­
ble the generosity of the subsidy. This is useful in order to ascertain which 
household types may be more or less sensitive to changes in the EMA.
36It should be noted that Cameron and Heckman (1998) examine the importance of fam­
ily and individual variables for education outcomes for blacks and whites, by decomposing 
the schooling gaps across the two groups into the contribution made by each explanatory 
variable, thus allowing one to assess the importance of each variable for education. In this 
analysis, we instead construct an index to summarise family background characteristics 
and assess the importance of this index for education and work choices.
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Under the actual programme, we see that the two most notable differ­
ences in participation across the two groups, are in education with a job and 
unemployment. Individuals from relatively well off backgrounds participate 
more in education with a job, with participation approximately 6 percentage 
points higher on average for this group in each time period. At the same 
time, such individuals are less likely to be unemployed, but the differences 
between the groups are lower at between 2 and 5 percentage points. These 
findings are interesting, as previous literature has suggested that individu­
als from relatively more affluent backgrounds engage more in part-time work 
whilst in school, which has been partly attributed to their having parents 
with better connections to the workplace which may be beneficial in terms 
of finding employment.37 It is also notable that individuals from less well off 
backgrounds tend to participate more in education without a job compared 
to those from the other group.
We next examine the effects on participation in the two groups when we 
set the EMA entitlement to zero. Column (2) in the table shows the results 
from this simulation. The two groups respond in fairly similar ways. Both 
decrease participation in education without a job in every time period, and 
participation in education with work increases. However, similar to the sim­
ulations in section 4.6.1, the overall effect on education seems to be negative 
for both groups. Participation in each of the other activities changes only 
very slightly.
When the EMA generosity is doubled, the net effect on education is 
positive for both groups.38 Individuals from upper backgrounds increase 
participation in education without a job by between 5 and 13 percentage 
points, which exceeds the decrease in education with a job of around 4 per­
37See for example Dustman et al (1996b).
38Note that a doubling of the EMA entitlement represents a much larger increase for 
individuals in the ‘lower’ category, as they are more likely to be eligible for the full EMA 
entitlement, whereas individuals in the ‘upper’ category are more likely to be on the taper. 
Therefore, we are in some sense intermingling the effects of differential increases in the 
EMA by group, with family background effects.
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centage points. Unemployment decreases from the latter part of wave 1 
onwards. For lower-background individuals, doubling their EMA entitle­
ment is even more effective for education, with participation in education 
without a job increasing substantially by between 7-16 percentage points. 
Again, from terms 2/3 of wave 1, most of these individuals are drawn from 
full-time work and unemployment. There a modest decrease in education 
with a job of between 1 and 4.5 percentage points.
Finally in wave 3, we use the model to predict participation in each of the 
seven activities, including higher education. We see that individuals from 
relatively less well off backgrounds are less likely to participate in higher 
education, are more likely to be in other full-time education (particularly 
without a job) and are also more likely to be unemployed.
To summarise, these findings reveal differential patterns of activity be­
tween individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds. In particular, 
individuals from relatively less well off backgrounds are less likely to engage 
in work whilst in school, but enrolment in post-compulsory second-level ed­
ucation is fairly similar across the two groups. Further, university enrolment 
is lower amongst individuals from relatively less well off backgrounds. How­
ever, the findings do not reveal any substantial differences in responsiveness 
to the subsidy across the two groups of individual.
4.7 Conclusion
Previous evaluation of the EMA has shown that it has a positive and sig­
nificant effect on education enrolment for the first two waves, with no dis­
cernible impact in the third wave. This analysis, using a dynamic discrete 
choice model controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and allowing for at­
trition to be non-random in an unobserved dimension, also bears out these 
findings. The EMA increases participation in education without a job and 
increasing the generosity of the EMA would augment such participation 
even further. This suggests that the EMA may be leading individuals who 
choose to remain in education, to participate less in part-time work and in
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this sense, the subsidy may represent a substitute for part-time wages. The 
positive effect is partly at the expense of participation in education with 
a job. However, the overall net effect on participation in post-compulsory 
second-level education is positive. A complete understanding of the costs 
and benefits for individuals of switching from education with a job into ed­
ucation without a job, requires further analysis. Indeed the effects of work 
whilst in school on educational attainment are still widely debated. Future 
work will investigate these interactions. After its withdrawal in wave 3, it 
does not have any discernible impact on participation in higher education. 
Another important finding of this work is that controlling for attrition has 
no fundamental effect on the structural parameter estimates. This suggests 
that the effects of attrition may be accounted for by controlling for observ­
able characteristics alone.
In terms of future work, more waves of data will enable us to examine 
longer term effects of the subsidy, including participation in, and attachment 
to, higher education. We will also examine the effects of having a part-time 
job whilst in full-time post-compulsory education on academic performance, 
along with issues to do with gender differences in various aspects of the 
programme.
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: The Four EMA Variants
Variant Maximum weekly Weekly payment Termly Retention Achievement
bonus £
50 
50 
50 
140
EMA award £ paid to bonus £
1 30 Young person 50
2 40 Young person 50
3 30 Parent 50
4 30 Young person 80
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Table 4.2: Data Summary
Year Activity in 
month
Wave data 
collected
Sample size Outcome
1999 September 1 jy n o  _|_ jyatw3 _|_ jyaw 2 2/1
2000 February 2 jy n a  _|_ jyaw 3 2/2
2000 May 2 jy n a  _|_ pfaw 3 2/3
2000 September 2 j y n a  ^yato3 2/4
2001 February 3 j y  no V5
2001 May 3 jy n a 2/6
2001 September 3 j y  no 2/7
N na =number of individuals who do not attrit, N aw3 =number of individuals who attrit
in wave 3, N aw2 =number of individuals who attrit in wave 2.
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Table 4.3: List of Variables
Variable
Male male
Number of older siblings siboldno
Number of younger siblings sibyngno
GCSE maths score mathsscore
GCSE English score engscore
Dummy for missing GCSE maths score zmathsscore
Dummy for missing GCSE English score zengscore
Nonwhite nonwhite
In education previous period educl
In work previous period workl
Person had serious illness between 0 and 1 years old illOl 
1 or 2 parents in work when born parwork
Mother and father figure present mothfath
Father figure present fathfig
Mother in full or part time work mothwk
Father in full or part time work fathwk
Mother has O levels or higher mthq
Father has O levels or higher fthq
Dummy for father variables missing zfathvar
Family income fims
Family income squared fim2s
Family receives means-tested benefit lowinc
Owner occupier ownocc
Lives in rural area rural
EMA entitlement (=0 for controls) emaest
Health, Deprivation and Disability health
Education, Skills and Training educatio
Housing housing
Geographical Access to services access
Percentage not going to university pcnotuni
Percentage not staying on post-16 pcnotsta
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Table 4.4: Participation in Activities, Cohort 1 Waves 1 and 2
Eligibles
EJ ENJ FTW PTW UEO
1999/2000
September
P=4,543
C=2,744
0.24 (0.43) 
0.30 (0.46)
0.50 (0.50) 
0.40 (0.49)
0.12 (0.33) 
0.14 (0.35)
0.03 (0.18) 
0.05 (0.21)
0.11 (0.31) 
0.12 (0.32)
February
P=3,338
C=2,049
0.32 (0.47) 
0.39 (0.49)
0.45 (0.50) 
0.33 (0.47)
0.14 (0.35) 
0.18 (0.39)
0.03 (0.17) 
0.03 (0.18)
0.06 (0.23) 
0.06 (0.25)
May
P=3,338
C=2,049
0.34 (0.47) 
0.40 (0.49)
0.39 (0.49) 
0.28 (0.45)
0.17 (0.37) 
0.22 (0.41)
0.03 (0.17) 
0.04 (0.20)
0.07 (0.25) 
0.07 (0.25)
2000/2001
September
P=3,338
C=2,049
0.34 (0.47) 
0.40 (0.49)
0.33 (0.47) 
0.21 (0.41)
0.20 (0.40) 
0.26 (0.44)
0.04 (0.19) 
0.04 (0.19)
0.09 (0.29) 
0.09 (0.29)
February
P=2,582
C=l,628
0.37 (0.48) 
0.41 (0.49)
0.31 (0.46) 
0.21 (0.40)
0.21 (0.41) 
0.27 (0.44)
0.04 (0.19) 
0.04 (0.20)
0.07 (0.26) 
0.07 (0.26)
May
P=2,582
C=l,628
0.37 (0.48) 
0.39 (0.49)
0.28 (0.45) 
0.20 (0.40)
0.24 (0.43) 
0.28 (0.45)
0.04 (0.20) 
0.05 (0.22)
0.07 (0.26) 
0.07 (0.26)
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full-
time work, PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other; P=pilots, C=controls.
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Table 4.5: Male Participation in Activities, Cohort 1 Waves 1 and 2
Eligible Males
EJ ENJ FTW  PTW UEO
1999/2000
September
P=2,270
C=l,352
0.19 (0.39) 
0.24 (0.42)
0.50 (0.50) 
0.40 (0.48)
0.15 (0.19) 
0.19 (0.39)
0.04 (0.36) 
0.05 (0.22)
0.12 (0.33) 
0.13 (0.33)
February
P=l,629
C=988
0.27 (0.44) 
0.33 (0.47)
0.48 (0.50) 
0.34 (0.48)
0.17 (0.38) 
0.23 (0.42)
0.03 (0.16) 
0.03 (0.17)
0.06 (0.23) 
0.07 (0.25)
May
P=l,629
C=988
0.28 (0.45) 
0.32 (0.47)
0.42 (0.49) 
0.31 (0.46)
0.21 (0.41) 
0.27 (0.44)
0.02 (0.15) 
0.03 (0.18)
0.06 (0.24) 
0.07 (0.26)
2000/2001
September
P=l,629
C=988
0.29 (0.45) 
0.32 (0.47)
0.35 (0.48) 
0.24 (0.43)
0.24 (0.43) 
0.30 (0.46)
0.03 (0.18) 
0.03 (0.18)
0.09 (0.28) 
0.10 (0.30)
February 
P = 1,245 
C=781
0.33 (0.47) 
0.33 (0.47)
0.32 (0.47) 
0.24 (0.43)
0.25 (0.43) 
0.33 (0.47)
0.03 (0.16) 
0.03 (0.18)
0.07 (0.26) 
0.07 (0.26)
May
P=l,245
C=781
0.33 (0.47) 
0.32 (0.47)
0.30 (0.46) 
0.23 (0.42)
0.27 (0.44) 
0.34 (0.47)
0.03 (0.17) 
0.04 (0.19)
0.07 (0.25) 
0.08 (0.27)
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full-
time work, PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other; P=pilots, C=controls.
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Table 4.6: Female Paxticipation in Activities, Cohort 1 Waves 1 and 2
E J
Eligible Fem ales 
E N J F T W  P T W UEO
1999/2000
September
P=2,273
C=l,392
0.29 (0.45) 
0.36 (0.48)
0.49 (0.50) 
0.40 (0.49)
0.10 (0.30) 
0.09 (0.29)
0.03 (0.16) 
0.04 (0.20)
0.10 (0.30) 
0.11 (0.31)
February
P=l,709
C=l,061
0.37 (0.48) 
0.45 (0.50)
0.42 (0.49) 
0.31 (0.47)
0.12 (0.32) 
0.14 (0.35)
0.03 (0.18) 
0.04 (0.19)
0.06 (0.23) 
0.06 (0.24)
May
P=l,709
C=l,061
0.40 (0.49) 
0.47 (0.50)
0.37 (0.48) 
0.25 (0.44)
0.13 (0.33) 
0.17 (0.37)
0.04 (0.19) 
0.05 (0.22)
0.07 (0.26) 
0.06 (0.24)
2000/2001
September
P=l,709
C=l,061
0.39 (0.49) 
0.48 (0.50)
0.32 (0.47) 
0.19 (0.390)
0.16 (0.37) 
0.21 (0.41)
0.04 (0.20) 
0.04 (0.20)
0.09 (0.29) 
0.08 (0.27)
February
P=l,337
C=847
0.40 (0.49) 
0.48 (0.50)
0.29 (0.46) 
0.17 (0.38)
0.18 (0.39) 
0.22 (0.41)
0.05 (0.21) 
0.05 (0.22)
0.08 (0.27) 
0.07 (0.26)
May
P=l,337
C=847
0.40 (0.49) 
0.46 (0.50)
0.26 (0.44) 
0.18 (0.38)
0.21 (0.41) 
0.23 (0.42)
0.05 (0.23) 
0.06 (0.24)
0.08 (0.27) 
0.07 (0.25)
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full- 
time work, PTW=paxt-time work, UEO=unemployment/other; P=pilots, C=controls.
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Table 4.7: Participation in Activities, Cohort 1 Wave 3
All
Eligibles
Males Females
2001/2002
September
UJ
P 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.27) 0.11 (0.32)
C 0.08 (0.26) 0.06 (0.24) 0.09 (0.29)
UNJ
P 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.35)
C 0.13 (0.33) 0.11 (0.31) 0.15 (0.35)
OEJ
P 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31) 0.12 (0.32)
C 0.13 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34)
OENJ
P 0.09 (0.29) 0.11 (0.32) 0.07 (0.26)
C 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.29) 0.05 (0.21)
FTW
P 0.35 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47)
C 0.39 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48)
PTW
P 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.25) 0.11 (0.31)
C 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.25) 0.12 (0.32)
UEO
P 0.12 (0.32) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32)
c 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35) 0.11 (0.31)
p 2,582 1,245 1,337
c 1,628 781 847
UJ=university with a job, UN J=uni versity without a
OEJ=other full-time education with a job, OENJ=other full-time ed­
ucation without a job, FTW=full-time work, PTW=p art-time work,
UEO=unemployment/other; P=pilots, C=controls.
Table 4.8: Transitions, Cohort 1 Wave 1, Eligible Pilots and Controls
T e rm l -► Term 2
N um ber in  listed  s ta te , 
-► T erm  3
wave 1
EJ 1,907 -► ej 1,189 ->ej 1106 enj 32 ftw 27 ptw 19 ueo 5
enj 232 —►ej 44 enj 176 ftw 4 ptw 2 ueo 6
ftw 68 -►ej 0 enj 0 ftw 63 ptw 1 ueo 4
ptw 25 -►ej 2 enj 0 ftw 3 ptw 18 ueo 2
ueo 15 
att 378
-►ej 2 
(19.8 %)
enj 0 ftw 4 ptw 2 ueo 7
ENJ 3,341 -> ej 579 —»ej 509 enj 39 ftw 16 ptw 10 ueo 5
enj 1,813 —►ej 158 enj 1590 ftw 27 ptw 5 ueo 33
ftw 85 -►ej 1 enj 0 ftw 82 ptw 0 ueo 2
ptw 37 -►ej 0 enj 1 ftw 4 ptw 28 ueo 4
ueo 67 
att 760
—►ej 0 
(22.7 %)
enj 1 ftw 7 ptw 2 ueo 57
FTW 948 -> ej 19 -►ej 15 enj 0 ftw 2 ptw 0 ueo 2
enj 33 —►ej 3 enj 26 ftw 2 ptw 0 ueo 2
ftw 486 -►ej 2 enj 3 ftw 465 ptw 4 ueo 12
ptw 26 -►ej 0 enj 0 ftw 8 ptw 16 ueo 2
ueo 39 
att 345
-►ej 0 
(36.4 %)
enj 0 ftw 11 ptw 3 ueo 25
PTW  278 -► ej 45 —>ej 39 enj 0 ftw 5 ptw 1 ueo 0
enj 20 —►ej 3 enj 13 ftw 0 ptw 3 ueo 1
ftw 77 -►ej 0 enj 1 ftw 73 ptw 2 ueo 1
ptw 36 -►ej 1 enj 2 ftw 4 ptw 29 ueo 0
ueo 22 
a tt 78
-►ej 0 
(28.1 %)
enj 1 ftw 6 ptw 1 ueo 14
ej 38 —►ej 34 enj 2 ftw 1 ptw 1 ueo 0
enj 77 -►ej 6 enj 64 ftw 4 ptw 0 ueo 3
ftw 134 -►ej 1 enj 0 ftw 124 ptw 0 ueo 9
ptw 47 -►ej 0 enj 0 ftw 8 ptw 33 ueo 6
ueo 178 -►ej 0 enj 2 ftw 24 ptw 8 ueo 144
att 339 (41.7 %)
iV2=5,387 iV3= 5,387
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Table 4.9: Transitions, Cohort 1 Wave 2, Eligible Pilots and Controls
N u m ber in  listed  s ta te , wave 2
Lag T e rm l -► Term 2 -> Term  3
ej 1,566 ej 1,350 -►ej 1,225 enj 61 ftw 35 ptw 24 ueo 5
enj 321 enj 174 —>-ej 46 enj 119 ftw 7 ptw 0 ueo 2
ftw 40 EJ 1,957 ftw 68 —►ej 2 enj 0 ftw 66 ptw 0 ueo 0
ptw 20 ptw 30 —►ej 3 enj 0 ftw 7 ptw 20 ueo 0
ueo 10 ueo 12 
att 323
—>ej 1 
(16.5 %)
enj 0 ftw 3 ptw 2 ueo 6
ej 148 ej 220 -*ej 179 enj 24 ftw 2 ptw 10 ueo 5
enj 1,318 enj 918 -►ej 85 enj 801 ftw 11 ptw 6 ueo 15
ftw 28 ENJ 1,546 -> ftw 32 -►ej 1 enj 3 ftw 25 ptw 2 ueo 1
ptw 8 ptw 9 —►ej 0 enj 2 ftw 1 ptw 5 ueo 1
ueo 44 ueo 44 
att 323
-►ej 0 
(20.9 %)
enj 2 ftw 5 ptw 3 ueo 34
ej 146 ej 11 -►ej 7 enj 0 ftw 4 ptw 0 ueo 0
enj 103 ej 10 —►ej 1 enj 6 ftw 3 ptw 0 ueo 0
ftw 828 FTW 1,200 -► ftw 754 -►ej 1 enj 2 ftw 724 ptw 2 ueo 25
ptw 49 ptw 31 -►ej 2 enj 0 ftw 4 ptw 22 ueo 3
ueo 74 ueo 74 
att 320
-►ej 0 
(26.7 %)
enj 1 ftw 22 ptw 4 ueo 47
ej 43 ej 8 —►ej 7 enj 1 ftw 0 ptw 0 ueo 0
enj 32 enj 10 -►ej 0 enj 9 ftw 0 ptw 0 ueo 1
ftw 15 PTW 201 -> ftw 44 —►ej 0 enj 0 ftw 38 ptw 2 ueo 4
ptw 87 ptw 63 -►ej 2 enj 1 ftw 5 ptw 52 ueo 3
ueo 24 ueo 27 
att 49
-►ej 0 
(24.4 %)
enj 0 ftw 6 ptw 2 ueo 19
ej 43 ej 24 -►ej 22 enj 2 ftw 0 ptw 0 ueo 0
enj 117 enj 20 —►ej 3 enj 13 ftw 1 ptw 2 ueo 1
ftw 94 UEO 483 -> ftw 95 -►ej 1 enj 0 ftw 81 ptw 3 ueo 10
ptw 20 ptw 28 -►ej 1 enj 2 ftw 7 ptw 15 ueo 3
ueo 209 ueo 153 
att 163
-►ej 0 
(33.7 %)
enj 1 ftw 15 ptw 14 ueo 123
N4 = 5,387 N5=4,209
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JV6=4,209
Table 4.10: Transitions, Cohort 1 Wave 3, Eligible Pilots and Controls 
N u m ber in  listed  s ta te , wave 3
Lag T e rm l Lag T e rm l
ej 295 ej 356
enj 62 enj 168
ftw 8 UJ 372 ftw 895 FTW 1,527
ptw 6 ptw 49
ueo 1 ueo 59
ej 271 ej 171
enj 295 enj 66
ftw 6 UNJ 577 ftw 21 PTW  382
ptw 2 ptw 89
ueo 3 ueo 35
ej 387 ej 61
enj 73 enj 121
ftw 26 OEJ 497 ftw 110 UEO 505
ptw 8 ptw 30
ueo 3 ueo 183
ej 48
enj 265
ftw 7 OENJ 350
ptw 6
ueo 24
N 7 =  4,210
UJ=university with a job, UNJ=university without a job, OEJ=other 
full-time education with a job, OENJ=other full-time education without a 
job, FTW=full-time work, PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other; 
P=pilots, C=controls.
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Table 4.11: Cross-tabulations of Characteristics and Attrition, Cohort 1
Eligibles
A ttr i tio n  S ta tu s Do no t a t t r i t A ttr i t  wave 2 A ttr i t  wave 3
Number of observations 4,210 1,900 1,178
Variable
Male 0.4812 0.5289 0.5025
Number of older siblings 0.9423 1.1126 1.0110
Number of younger siblings 0.9373 1.0516 1.0951
GCSE maths score 4.0708 2.9932 3.5119
GCSE English score 4.5064 3.4479 3.9771
Non-white 0.0796 0.1111 0.1104
Young person ill b/w  0 and 1 0.2207 0.2353 0.2326
1 or 2 parents in work when born 0.8527 0.7400 0.8014
Mother and father figure present 0.6261 0.4342 0.5441
Father figure present 0.7722 0.6184 0.6952
Mother in full or part time work 0.6606 0.4995 0.5620
Father in full or part time work 0.5083 0.3416 0.4244
Mother has 0  levels or higher 0.4879 0.3559 0 4261
Father has 0  levels or higher 0.3734 0.2168 0.3073
Father variables missing 0.3686 0.5316 0.4312
Income is > £13,000 per annum 0.4658 0.3168 0.3829
Family receives means-tested benefit 0.2480 0.4011 0.3472
Owner occupier 0.7157 0.4895 0.6188
Lives in rural area 0.2993 0.2153 0.2717
Lives in pilot area 0.6133 0.6342 0.6418
Lives in pilot area and eligible for taper 0.2789 0.1958 0.2436
Health, Deprivation and Disability 0.8314 0.9823 0.9124
Education, Skills and Training 0.5959 0.8353 0.6657
Housing Index 0.3276 0.5408 0.3952
Geographical Access to services -0.3182 -0.4622 -0.3462
Percentage not going to university 88.47 89.61 88.83
Percentage not staying on post-16 66.29 67.99 66.83
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Table 4.12: Attrition Parameters, Waves 2 and 3
N ot a t t r i t  wave 2 N o t a t t r i t  wave 3
male -0.13 (0.06)* 0.06 (0.12)
siboldno -0.06 (0.02)* 0.07 (0.05)
sibyngno 0.00 (0.03) -0.04 (0.05)
mothfath 0.43 (0.11)* 0.66 (0.22)*
mothftwk 0.08 (0.08) 0.09 (0.17)
mothptwk 0.22 (0.07)* 0.23 (0.15)
fathftwk -0.21 (0.10) 0.31 (0.19)
fathptwk -0.16 (0.19) 1.55 (0.61)*
mthq 0.12 (0.06)* 0.07 (0.13)
fthq 0.13 (0.08) 0.17 (0.16)
fathfig 0.10 (0.09) 0.82 (0.19)*
zfathvar -0.11 (0.10) 1.27 (0.20)*
lowinc -0.09 (0.07) 0.28 (0.16)
rural 0.20 (0.07)* -0.36 (0.13)*
pilot -0.08 (0.07) 0.13 (0.15)
taper 0.12 (0.10) 0.41 (0.21)*
ema tap 0.07 (0.12) -0.58 (0.25)*
mathsscore 0.08 (0.02)* -0.03 (0.05)
engscore 0.05 (0.03) 0.20 (0.06)*
eductl/4 0.30 (0.09)* 0.90 (0.20)*
worktl/4 -0.04 (0.10) 0.46 (0.21)*
In terv iew er Age
agel -0.40 (0.19)* -0.17 (0.28)
age2 0.07 (0.13) -0.24 (0.14)
age3 0.18 (0.12) -0.22 (0.14)
age4 0.11 (0.12) -0.61 (0.10)*
age5 0.06 (0.11) -0.95 (0.19)*
age6 0.15 (0.11) -1.01 (0.23)*
age7 -0.11 (0.12) -0.49 (0.11)*
sw -0.03 (0.01)* 0.50 (0.15)*
We also control for ethnicity and missing maths and English GCSE
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. Points of support rji =
0.41(0.17), 7 7 2 =  0.09(0.04). * denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
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Table 4.13: Model Selection
(1) C o rre la ted  A ttritio n , U nobserved H eterogeneity  
log L -39779.8
Number of parameters, k 762
Sample size, n 26,484
BIC -82930.0
(2) U n co rre la ted  A ttr itio n , U nobserved H eterogeneity  
log L -41434.3
Number of parameters, k 760
Sample size, n 26,484
BIC -86230.0
(3) U n co rre la ted  A ttritio n , No U nobserved H eterogeneity  
log L -42989.5
Number of parameters, k 736
Sample size, n 26,484
BIC -89234.3
BIC= 2*logL(6p] X )  — k*log(n),  where logL is the negative of the maximised 
log likelihood, 6P are the parameters estimated in the pth model, k  is the number 
of unspecified parameters in the pth model, and n  is the number of observations.
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Table 4.14: Comparison of Actual and Predicted Proportions
A ctual P red ic ted
Percentage of Pilots- Percentage of Piiots- 
Percentage of Controls Percentage of Controls
Sept 99
EJ -0.0636 -0.0486
ENJ 0.1000 0.0892
FTW -0.0157 -0.0127
PTW -0.0142 -0.0160
UEO -0.0063 -0.0118
F eb /M ay  00
EJ -0.0624 -0.0586
ENJ 0.1175 0.1181
FTW -0.0438 -0.0438
PTW -0.0082 -0.0102
UEO -0.0029 -0.0054
Sept 00
EJ -0.0635 -0.0725
ENJ 0.1173 0.1459
FTW -0.0524 -0.0590
PTW -0.0004 -0.0062
UEO -0.0010 -0.0080
F eb /M ay  01
EJ -0.0319 -0.0370
ENJ 0.0890 0.0962
FTW -0.0509 -0.0512
PTW -0.0066 -0.0096
UEO 0.0004 0.0017
Sept 01
UJ -0.0425 0.0097
UNJ -0.0032 0.0123
OEJ -0.0037 -0.0024
OENJ 0.0208 0.0230
FTW 0.0171 -0.0377
PTW i o o m 00 -0.0033
UEO 0.0233 -0.0017
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full- 
time work, PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other, UJ=university with a job, 
UNJ=university without a job, OEJ=other full-time education with a job, OENJ=other 
full-time education without a iob.
Table 4.15: Difference in Participation in Activities across Types
Type 1 - Type 2 
Sept99 Feb/MayOO SeptOO Feb/MayOl SeptOl
EJ -0.2481 -0.2685 -0.4377 -0.2587 -0.1811
ENJ 0.4564 0.2887 0.4935 0.2644 0.0896
FTW  -0.1142 -0.0528 -0.1255 -0.0426 0.2759
PTW  0.0009 0.0223 0.0444 0.0233 -0.0211
UEO -0.0950 0.0103 0.0252 0.0135 -0.0306
UJ . . . .  -0.1048
UNJ . . . .  -0.0277
Number Type 1 6,194 4,579 4,579 3,578 3,578
Number Type 2 1,093 808 808 631 631
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full- 
time work, PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other. EJ and ENJ in Sept 01 include 
repeat A/AS levels as well as third-level colleges. Number of type l ’s and 2’s are estimated from 
the model. Percentage point differences in unconditional probabilities are reported:
y :  [Pr(yit = k \yu- i  = j ,X,rj i  = r i) .Pr(y it- i  = j\X,rji  =  n ) ] -
3
^ 2  [P r (y“ = k \yn- i  = i,X,7]i = r2).Pr(yi t -i  = jlX^rji = r2)]
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Table 4.16: Predicted Sequences of Choices
Pilots Controls
Type 1
EMA Effect
Pilots Controls
Type 2
EMA Effect
Tj Tj Pj Tj Tj 0.2278 0.1875 0.0403 0.2956 0.2775 0.0181
E E E E N 0.2714 0.2381 0.0333 0.1003 0.0973 0.0030
E E E N N 0.0784 0.0679 0.0105 0.0416 0.0412 0.0004
E E N N N 0.0489 0.0582 -0.0093 0.0401 0.0406 -0.0005
E N N N N 0.0936 0.1278 -0.0342 0.0706 0.0884 -0.0178
N N N N N 0.0276 0.0482 -0.0206 0.0841 0.1103 -0.0262
N E E E E 0.0173 0.0163 0.0010 0.0720 0.0670 0.0050
N N E E E 0.0016 0.0018 -0.0002 0.0072 0.0075 -0.0003
N N N E E 0.0009 0.0013 -0.0004 0.0067 0.0061 0.0006
N N N N E 0.0017 0.0024 -0.0007 0.0108 0.0129 -0.0021
N N E E N 0.0031 0.0035 -0.0004 0.0048 0.0045 0.0003
N E N N N 0.0102 0.0158 -0.0056 0.0317 0.0323 -0.0006
N E E N N 0.0121 0.0140 -0.0019 0.0223 0.0247 -0.0024
O T H E R 0.1792 0.1897 -0.0105 0.1774 0.1572 0.0202
‘E’ includes education with and without a job, ‘N’ includes full-time and part-time work and 
unemployment/other. The ‘OTHER’ path includes all paths not otherwise listed. Sample of non- 
attritors only.
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Table 4.17: Relationship of Type to Family Background Characteristics
Type 1
Male 0.0060 (0.0012)*
Number older siblings 0.0010 (0.0005)*
Mother in full or part time work 0.0036 (0.0014)*
Father in full or part time work 0.0030 (0.0019)
Mother has 0  levels or higher -0.0045 (0.0012)*
Father has 0  levels or higher 0.0005 (0.0015)
Father figure present 0.0018 (0.0021)
Lives in rural area 0.0048 (0.0013)*
Had serious illness between 0 and 1 years old -0.0028 (0.0014)*
Family income -0.0036 (0.0019)
Family income squared 0.0006 (0.0005)
Nonwhite 0.0111 (0.0023)*
GCSE maths score -0.0043 (0.0005)*
GCSE English score -0.0041 (0.0006)*
Pilot 0.0014 (0.0011)
Proportion of type 1 85%
N 4,209
R 2 0.2690
The table reports the coefficients on the listed variables in a regression in which 
the dependent variable is probability of being type 1. Standard errors in parentheses.
* denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
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Table 4.18: Change the EMA Generosity, Wave 1
Simulation 
No EMA
S ept  99
A in proportions: simulated less actual 
EJ ENJ FTW  PTW  UEO
0.0259
(0.0055)*
-0.0673
(0.0093)*
0.0150
(0.0036)*
0.0098
(0 .0021)*
0.0168
(0 .0020)*
F e b /M ay 00 0.0395
(0 .0120)*
-0.0704
(0.0145)*
0.0214
(0.0056)*
0.0044
(0.0039)
0.0050
(0.0023)*
Decrease EMA by 50%
S ept  99 0.0129
(0.0025)*
-0.0306
(0.0043)*
0.0071
(0.0017)*
-0.0039
(0.0009)*
0.0061
(0.0009)*
F e b /M ay 00 0.0209
(0.0054)*
-0.0391
(0.0072)*
0.0143
(0.0072)*
0.0016
(0.0045)
0.0020
(0.0014)
Increase EMA by 50%
Se pt  99 - 0.0121
(0 .0021)
0.0282
(0.0037)*
-0.0066
(0.0014)*
0.0045
(0.0006)*
-0.0055
(0.0007)*
F e b /M ay 00 -0.0205
(0.0063)*
0.0615
(0 .0122)*
-0.0271
(0.0090)*
-0.0039
(0.0059)
-0.0099
(0.0029)*
Double EMA
S ept  99 -0.0235
(0.0039)*
0.0541
(0.0067)*
-0.0126
(0.0025)*
-0.0074
(0 .0011)*
-0.0104
(0.0013)*
F e b /M ay 00 -0.0424 0.1553 -0.0646 -0.0120 -0.0362
(0.0121)* (0.0264)* (0.0160)* (0.0109) (0.0056)*
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full-time 
work, PTW=paxt-time work, UEO=unemployment/other. Standard errors in parentheses are es­
timated using 500 random draws from the normal distribution of estimated parameters. * denotes 
significance at the 5% level or less.
Table 4.19: Change the EMA Generosity, Wave 2
Simulation 
No EMA
Se pt  00
A in proportions: simulated less actual 
EJ ENJ FTW  PTW  UEO
0.0602
(0.0074)*
-0.0943
(0.0152)*
0.0291
(0.0079)*
-0.0056 -0.0107
(0.0060) (0.0060)*
F e b /M ay 01 0.0427 -0.0500
(0.0144)* (0.0156)*
0.0087 -0.0009 -0.0004
(0.0072) (0.0057) (0.0024)
Decrease EMA by 50%
Se pt  00 0.0277
(0.0034)*
-0.0486
(0.0086)*
0.0194
(0.0048)*
-0.0044
(0.0039)
0.0059
(0.0034)
F e b /M ay 01 0.0240
(0.0075)*
-0.0277
(0.0084)*
0.0058
(0.0052)
- 0.0010
(0.0042)
- 0.0011
(0.0017)
Increase EMA by 50%
Se pt  00 -0.0239
(0.0023)
0.0630
(0.0127)*
-0.0315
(0.0058)*
0.0063
(0.0069)
-0.0139
(0.0051)*
F e b / M a y  01 -0.0240
(0.0072)*
0.0311
(0.0104)*
-0.0107 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0092) (0.0078) (0.0036)
Double EMA
Se pt  00 -0.0439
(0.0035)*
0.1415
(0.0266)*
-0.0703 0.0082 -0.0355
(0.0094)* (0.0167) (0.0087)*
F e b /M ay 01 -0.0476
(0.0136)*
0.0745
(0.0289)*
-0.0288
(0.0218)
0.0035
(0 .0201)
-0.0016
(0.0104)
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full-time 
work, PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other. Standard errors in parentheses axe es­
timated using 500 random draws from the normal distribution of estimated parameters. * denotes 
significance at the 5% level or less.
Table 4.20: Difference in Activity across Pilots and Controls, Wave 3
A in proportions: pilot less control
UJ UNJ OEJ OENJ FTW  PTW  UEO
S e p t  01 0.0077 0.0088 -0.0109 0.0142 -0.0136 -0.0046 -0.0016
(0.0050) (0.0094) (0.0084) (0.0112) (0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0058)
UJ=university with a job, UNJ=university without a job, OEJ=other full-time education with 
a job, OENJ=other full-time education without a job, FTW=full-time work, PTW=part-time work, 
UEO=unemployment/other. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated using 500 random draws 
from the normal distribution of estimated parameters. * denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
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Table 4.21: Activities under Various EMA Generosities, by Background, Waves 1 and 2
EMA Actual (1) No Ema (2) Double (3)
Group Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower
Activity 
Sept 99
EJ 0.2646 0.2089 0.2924 0.2329 0.2397 0.1876
ENJ 0.5350 0.5211 0.4884 0.4530 0.5847 0.5896
FTW 0.1238 0.1286 0.1364 0.1456 0.1300 0.1369
PTW 0.0277 0.0377 0.0349 0.0500 0.0311 0.0435
UEO 0.0489 0.1037 0.0577 0.1283 0.0531 0.1156
Feb/M ay 00 
EJ 0.3315 0.2713 0.3705 0.3114 0.2900 0.2311
ENJ 0.3534 0.3798 0.2890 0.3021 0.4867 0.5439
FTW 0.2096 0.1945 0.2287 0.2186 0.1527 0.1313
PTW 0.0385 0.0529 0.0415 0.0589 0.0279 0.0363
UEO 0.0687 0.1014 0.0700 0.1087 0.0424 0.0572
SeptOO
EJ 0.2826 0.2349 0.3424 0.2956 0.2346 0.1893
ENJ 0.3613 0.3917 0.2737 0.2894 0.4865 0.5437
FTW 0.2120 0.1903 0.2380 0.2230 0.1527 0.1223
PTW 0.0519 0.0579 0.0505 0.0564 0.0630 0.0693
UEO 0.0883 0.1204 0.0953 0.1353 0.0629 0.0752
Feb/M ay 01 
EJ 0.3837 0.3202 0.4242 0.3659 0.3409 0.2752
ENJ 0.1974 0.2387 0.1512 0.1833 0.2668 0.3195
FTW 0.2890 0.2772 0.2964 0.2877 0.2619 0.2432
PTW 0.0495 0.0623 0.0486 0.0616 0.0519 0.0648
UEO 0.0803 0.1016 0.0795 0.1013 0.0783 0.0971
EJ=full-time education with a job, ENJ=full-time education without a job, FTW=full-time work,
PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other.
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Table 4.22: Activities in Wave 3, by Background
Actual EMA
Group Upper Lower
Activity
Sept 01
UJ 0.0596 0.0385
UNJ 0.1231 0.0752
OEJ 0.0728 0.0867
OENJ 0.0859 0.1417
FTW 0.4664 0.4332
PTW 0.1066 0.1090
UEO 0.0852 0.1154
UJ=university with a job, UNJ=university without a job, OEJ=other full­
time education with a job, OENJ=other full-time education without a job, 
FTW=full-time work, PTW=part-time work, UEO=unemployment/other.
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4.9 A ppendix A
Let S{w =  1 if individual i does not attrit in wave w, for w =  2,3. Further 
=  1 = »  Si2 = 1. The individual contributions to the log likelihood 
function that jointly models attrition and the main choice of the individual 
are derived under the assumptions that
yit±Z i\X i,yit- i ,S i3 =  1 V i, for £ =  5,6,7
yit± Z i\X i,y it- i,S i2 = 1 V i , for £ =  2,3,4
yn±Z i\X i V i
2/i2j Vil |Xj, Vi4 V ®
V i ,  V £ > 2 ,  V 2 < f c < £  (4.11)
We show the actual log likelihood contributions for three groups of indi­
vidual: those who do not attrit, those who attrit in wave 3 and those who 
attrit in wave 2, under the structure of our data (see table 4.2). For the 
exposition, we assume that the individual chooses the same activity in all 
time periods. For simplicity we omit the i subscripts.
1. Individuals who have not attrited by the end of wave 3
jna  _  =  — 1, yn =  ■ • • =  yij =  k\Xi, Zi) =
M  ,
log ^ 2  7Tm ( Pr(yi7 =  %*6 =  k, Si3 =  1,X*,rji =  r m).
771=1 '
Pr(yi6 =  k\yi5 =  k, 5*3 =  l tXi,rn =  r m).
Pr(yi5 =  k\yi4 =  k, 5*3 =  1, X*, rji =  rm).
P r {Si3 =  1 |j/i4  =  *Si2 =  l j  Xj, Zi,T)i =  r m ) .
P r(y i4 =  % j3 =  A;, 5*2 =  1, Xj, rji =  rm).
TV(yi3 =  fc|2/i2 =  Si2 =  1, Xj, rji = rm).
Pr(yi2 = k\yn = k , 5*2 =  1, X*, rji =  r m).
Pr(Si2 =  1 |2/*i =  Aj,X*,Z*,77* =  r m).
Pi'ivn = k\Xi, rji =  rm)^ (4.12)
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2. Individuals who attrit in wave 3 conditional on not attriting in wave 2
iaw3 = pr(5.3 = QSi2 = l i m  =  ...=m =  fc|Xj) Zt) =
M  ,
log ^2  I Pr(S& =  0|2/i4 =  k,Si2 =  l,Xi,Zi,r)i = rm).
m= 1 '
Pr(yi4 =  k\ya =  k , 5*2 =  1, W = rm).
Pr(yi3 = k\yi2 = k ,S i2 =  1, ^ , 7?* =  r m).
Pr(yi2 = k\yn =  fc, ^2 =  1, X^ rji -  r m).
Pr{Si2 == l |y ii  =  k,Xi,Zi,r)i =  rm).
P r(y a  =  =  rm)^ (4.13)
3. Individuals who attrit in wave 2
l™2 = Pr(Si2 = 0,yn = k\Xi,Zi) =
M  ,
log ^2 Km(Pr(Si2 = 0|2/ii =  k^X^Zi.rji =  rm).Pr(yn =  A:|Xi,r/j =  rm) 
m = l  '
(4.14)
The functional forms for the choice probabilities are given by equation (4.4) 
and for the attrition probabilities by equation (4.9) in the text.
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4.10 Appendix B
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Table 4.23: Parameter Estimates September 1999
Variables
male
siboldno
sibyngno
mothfath
mothwk
fathwk
mthq
fthq
fathfig
zfathvar
lowinc
rural
illOl
parwork
ownocc
fims
fim2s
emaest
nonwhite
mathsscore
engscore
zmathsscore
zengscore
health
educatio
housing
access
pcnotuni
pcnotsta
otj\
EJ
-0.55 (0.09)* 
-0.02 (0.04) 
0.04 (0.04) 
-0.18 (0.17) 
0.61 (0.11)* 
-0.03 (0.15) 
0.35 (0.10)* 
0.24 (0.12)* 
0.05 (0.14) 
-0.34 (0.15)* 
-0.14 (0.12) 
0.82 (0.12)* 
0.36 (0.10)* 
0.21 (0.11)* 
0.41 (0.11)* 
0.26 (0.11)* 
-0.08 (0.04)* 
0.23 (0.17) 
-0.40 (0.18)* 
0.19 (0.04)* 
0.44 (0.04)* 
-0.63 (0.26)* 
0.55 (0.27)* 
-0.26 (0.08)* 
0.21 (0.06)* 
-0.01 (0.06) 
-0.15 (0.07)* 
-3.76 (0.27)*
1.38 (0.24)*
1.0 (0)
ENJ
-0.09 (0.08) 
0.00 (0.04) 
-0.03 (0.04) 
0.06 (0.16) 
0.16 (0.10) 
-0.24 (0.14) 
0.29 (0.10)* 
0.35 (0.12)* 
-0.27 (0.13)* 
-0.44 (0.14)* 
0.07 (0.11) 
0.37 (0.12)* 
0.26 (0.10)* 
0.06 (0.10) 
0.42 (0.10)* 
0.04 (0.10) 
-0.02 (0.03)
1.52 (0.19)* 
0.71 (0.15)* 
0.16 (0.04)* 
0.36 (0.04)* 
-0.47 (0.22)* 
0.42 (0.23) 
0.18 (0.08)* 
0.14 (0.06)* 
-0.08 (0.06) 
0.11 (0.07) 
-3.40 (0.29)* 
0.59 (0.20)*
6.94 (2.79)*
FTW
0.32 (0.09)* 
-0.02 (0.04) 
0.13 (0.04)* 
0.00 (0.17) 
0.34 (0.11)* 
0.15 (0.15) 
0.02 (0.10) 
0.23 (0.13) 
0.17 (0.14) 
0.08 (0.15) 
-0.33 (0.12)* 
0.11 (0.13) 
0.05 (0.11) 
0.01 (0.11) 
0.04 (0.11) 
0.32 (0.11)* 
-0.06 (0.04) 
0.13 (0.18) 
-0.82 (0.19)* 
-0.04 (0.04) 
0.00 (0.04) 
-0.55 (0.21)* 
-0.48 (0.22)* 
-0.17 (0.08)* 
0.13 (0.07) 
0.13 (0.07) 
0.15 (0.08) 
-1.17 (0.18)*
1.19 (0.22)* 
-0.033 (0.05)
PTW
0.07 (0.13) 
0.01 (0.06) 
-0.02 (0.06) 
-0.52 (0.23)* 
0.61 (0.16)* 
0.60 (0.22)* 
0.22 (0.15) 
-0.04 (0.18) 
0.29 (0.18) 
-0.05 (0.21) 
0.19 (0.16) 
0.89 (0.17)* 
-0.01 (0.15) 
-0.02 (0.15) 
-0.02 (0.16) 
0.35 (0.16)* 
-0.18 (0.08)* 
-0.02 (0.21) 
-0.51 (0.28) 
0.05 (0.06) 
0.03 (0.06) 
0.20 (0.31) 
-0.80 (0.33)* 
-0.18 (0.10) 
0.34 (0.08)* 
-0.10 (0.10) 
-0.18 (0.11) 
-4.72 (0.42)* 
2.18 (0.37)*
3.20 (1.15)*
Standard errors in parentheses. Points of support rji =  0.41(0.17), 772 =
0.09(0.04). * denotes significance at the 59 |^vel or less.
Table 4.24: Parameter Estimates February/May 2000
Variables
male
siboldno
sibyngno
mothfath
mothwk
fathwk
mthq
fthq
fathfig
zfathvar
lowinc
rural
illOl
parwork
ownocc
fims
fim2s
emaest
nonwhite
mathsscore
engscore
zmathsscore
zengscore
educ lag
work lag
health
educatio
housing
access
pcnotuni
pcnotsta
CLjV
EJ
-0.04 (0.10) 
-0.11 (0.05)* 
-0.03 (0.05) 
-0.12 (0.18) 
0.76 (0.11)* 
0.08 (0.15) 
-0.06 (0.11) 
-0.01 (0.13) 
0.17 (0.16) 
0.04 (0.15) 
-0.10 (0.13) 
0.33 (0.14)* 
-0.07 (0.11) 
0.31 (0.12)* 
0.59 (0.12)* 
0.26 (0.13)* 
-0.07 (0.03)* 
0.00 (0.28) 
-0.18 (0.21) 
0.23 (0.04)* 
0.24 (0.05)* 
0.33 (0.26) 
-0.29 (0.28)
4.65 (0.18)*
1.40 (0.20)* 
-0.31 (0.10)* 
0.04 (0.08) 
0.29 (0.08)* 
-0.04 (0.09) 
-5.19 (0.41)* 
1.23 (0.29)* 
-3.43 (1.43)*
ENJ
0.42 (0.10)* 
-0.09 (0.04)* 
-0.09 (0.05) 
0.19 (0.17) 
0.24 (0.11)* 
-0.09 (0.15) 
-0.01 (0.11) 
-0.05 (0.13) 
-0.05 (0.16) 
-0.17 (0.14) 
0.06 (0.13) 
-0.01 (0.14) 
-0.07 (0.11) 
0.07 (0.11) 
0.37 (0.12)* 
0.24 (0.13) 
-0.09 (0.04)* 
1.49 (0.28)* 
0.77 (0.20)* 
0.20 (0.04)* 
0.16 (0.05)* 
0.59 (0.24)* 
-0.06 (0.25)
4.48 (0.14)* 
0.91 (0.18)* 
0.07 (0.10) 
0.05 (0.08) 
0.21 (0.08)* 
0.16 (0.09) 
-4.81 (0.37)* 
0.12 (0.25) 
2.26 fg]94)*
FTW
0.39 (0.10)* 
0.03 (0.04) 
0.01 (0.05) 
-0.37 (0.17)* 
0.67 (0.12)* 
0.40 (0.15)* 
-0.25 (0.11)* 
-0.09 (0.14) 
0.33 (0.16)* 
0.16 (0.16) 
0.08 (0.13) 
-0.02 (0.16) 
0.02 (0.11) 
0.22 (0.12) 
0.32 (0.12)* 
0.50 (0.18)* 
-0.13 (0.07) 
-0.65 (0.26)* 
-0.23 (0.22) 
0.10 (0.05)* 
0.00 (0.05) 
-0.16 (0.23) 
-0.26 (0.25) 
1.02 (0.13)* 
3.08 (0.13)* 
-0.24 (0.10)* 
-0.24 (0.08)* 
0.49 (0.09)* 
-0.01 (0.09) 
-2.72 (0.36)*
1.52 (0.36)* 
-2.12 (0.83)*
PTW
-0.23 (0.13) 
-0.05 (0.06) 
-0.15 (0.06)* 
-0.36 (0.23) 
0.37 (0.15)* 
0.51 (0.19)* 
0.02 (0.14) 
-0.31 (0.18) 
-0.14 (0.19) 
-0.36 (0.20) 
0.31 (0.17) 
0.37 (0.19)* 
-0.21 (0.15) 
0.03 (0.15) 
0.03 (0.15) 
0.77 (0.23)* 
-0.38 (0.10)* 
-0.23 (0.32) 
0.44 (0.27) 
-0.04 (0.06) 
0.10 (0.07) 
-0.02 (0.31) 
-0.17 (0.33)
1.40 (0.19)*
2.47 (0.18)* 
-0.29 (0.13)* 
-0.07 (0.10) 
0.27 (0.11)* 
-0.07 (0.12) 
-4.22 (0.51)*
2.51 (0.46)* 
0.92 (0.38)*
Standard errors in parentheses. Points of support 7 71 =  0.41(0.17), 7 7 2 =  
0.09(0.04). * denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
Table 4.25: Parameter Estimates September 2000
Variables
male
siboldno
sibyngno
mothfath
mothwk
fathwk
mthq
fthq
fathfig
zfathvar
lowinc
rural
illOl
par work
ownocc
fims
fim2s
emaest
nonwhite
mathsscore
engscore
zmathsscore
zengscore
educ lag
work lag
health
educatio
housing
access
pcnotuni
pcnotsta
«j3
EJ
-0.43 (0.13)* 
-0.11 (0.06) 
-0.05 (0.06) 
-0.11 (0.26) 
0.38 (0.15)* 
0.16 (0.20) 
0.41 (0.14)* 
0.02 (0.18) 
-0.09 (0.20) 
-0.09 (0.23) 
-0.36 (0.17)* 
0.37 (0.17)* 
0.01 (0.15) 
0.17 (0.17) 
0.52 (0.16)* 
-0.29 (0.16) 
0.10 (0.06) 
-1.31 (0.34)* 
-0.48 (0.25) 
0.22 (0.06)* 
0.25 (0.06)* 
0.32 (0.39) 
-0.41 (0.41)
4.52 (0.27)*
1.79 (0.29)* 
-0.16 (0.12) 
0.12 (0.09) 
0.14 (0.10) 
-0.15 (0.10) 
-2.70 (0.47)* 
-0.72 (0.40) 
-6.65 (2.76)*
ENJ
0.20 (0.13) 
-0.05 (0.05) 
-0.14 (0.06)* 
0.39 (0.25) 
-0.41 (0.16)* 
0.06 (0.20) 
0.43 (0.14)* 
-0.01 (0.18) 
-0.26 (0.21) 
-0.01 (0.23) 
0.20 (0.17) 
-0.04 (0.18) 
-0.10 (0.15) 
-0.12 (0.17) 
0.11 (0.16) 
-0.12 (0.15) 
0.01 (0.06)
1.73 (0.36)* 
0.78 (0.24)* 
0.18 (0.06)* 
0.27 (0.06)* 
0.81 (0.35)* 
0.33 (0.36)
3.11 (0.19)* 
0.07 (0.24) 
0.42 (0.12) 
0.08 (0.09) 
0.00 (0.10) 
0.06 (0.11) 
-5.31 (0.53)* 
-1.41 (0.40)* 
6.58 |g 272)*
FTW
0.06 (0.12) 
-0.08 (0.05) 
0.01 (0.05) 
0.23 (0.24) 
0.35 (0.15)* 
0.05 (0.20) 
0.27 (0.14)* 
0.05 (0.18) 
0.24 (0.19) 
0.30 (0.21) 
-0.34 (0.16)* 
-0.04 (0.16) 
0.04 (0.14) 
0.16 (0.15) 
0.30 (0.15)* 
-0.04 (0.16) 
0.05 (0.07) 
-0.81 (0.29)* 
-0.57 (0.25)* 
0.02 (0.05) 
-0.10 (0.06) 
-0.26 (0.30) 
-0.61 (0.32) 
1.25 (0.16)*
2.93 (0.17)* 
-0.06 (0.11) 
-0.07 (0.09) 
0.17 (0.10) 
0.04 (0.10) 
0.39 (0.28) 
-0.76 (0.28)* 
-4.38 (1.78)*
PTW
-0.25 (0.17) 
-0.06 (0.07) 
-0.06 (0.08) 
0.04 (0.32) 
0.14 (0.20) 
0.38 (0.27) 
0.43 (0.18)* 
-0.07 (0.23) 
-0.05 (0.26) 
0.11 (0.28) 
-0.11 (0.22) 
0.74 (0.21)* 
-0.02 (0.19) 
-0.15 (0.21) 
0.05 (0.20) 
-0.17 (0.18) 
0.09 (0.06) 
0.66 (0.35) 
0.08 (0.33) 
-0.21 (0.07)* 
0.11 (0.08) 
-0.48 (0.40) 
0.13 (0.42)
1.14 (0.20)*
1.94 (0.22)* 
0.16 (0.14) 
-0.03 (0.11) 
-0.12 (0.13) 
-0.26 (0.13)* 
-2.70 (0.46)* 
-0.39 (0.36)
1.72 (0.68)*
Standard errors in parentheses. Points of support rji =  0.41(0.17), 7 7 2 =  
0.09(0.04). * denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
Table 4.26: Parameter Estimates February/May 2001
Variables
male
siboldno
sibyngno
mothfath
mothwk
fathwk
mthq
fthq
fathfig
zfathvar
lowinc
rural
illOl
parwork
ownocc
fims
fim2s
emaest
nonwhite
mathsscore
engscore
zmathsscore
zengscore
educ lag
work lag
health
educatio
housing
access
pcnotuni
pcnotsta
EJ
0.03 (0.13) 
-0.17 (0.06)* 
0.10 (0.06) 
0.04 (0.24) 
0.64 (0.15)* 
0.17 (0.19) 
-0.03 (0.14) 
0.32 (0.17) 
-0.61 (0.19)* 
-0.06 (0.21) 
0.26 (0.17) 
0.87 (0.19)* 
0.18 (0.15) 
0.17 (0.17) 
0.61 (0.16)* 
0.24 (0.15) 
-0.07 (0.04) 
-0.49 (0.32) 
-0.21 (0.27) 
0.17 (0.06)* 
0.40 (0.06)* 
0.32 (0.39) 
0.26 (0.41)
5.74 (0.22)* 
0.79 (0.26)* 
-0.34 (0.13)* 
0.15 (0.10) 
0.14 (0.11) 
-0.22 (0.11)* 
-9.18 (0.71)*
4.91 (0.75)* 
-2.63 (1.20)*
ENJ
0.40 (0.13)* 
-0.16 (0.06)* 
0.00 (0.06) 
0.53 (0.25)* 
-0.07 (0.15) 
-0.17 (0.19) 
0.06 (0.14) 
0.28 (0.17) 
-0.88 (0.20)* 
-0.15 (0.21) 
0.17 (0.17) 
0.71 (0.19)* 
0.02 (0.15) 
0.10 (0.17) 
0.26 (0.16) 
0.15 (0.16) 
-0.07 (0.04) 
0.91 (0.35)* 
0.85 (0.27)* 
0.20 (0.06)* 
0.38 (0.07)* 
0.87 (0.37)* 
1.30 (0.39)*
6.39 (0.27)*
1.76 (0.31)* 
-0.05 (0.14) 
0.13 (0.10) 
0.15 (0.11) 
-0.02 (0.12) 
-10.80 (0.75)*
4.00 (0.76)* 
2 .97^16)*
FTW
0.33 (0.12)* 
-0.08 (0.05) 
0.17 (0.05)* 
-0.20 (0.21) 
0.53 (0.14)* 
0.05 (0.17) 
-0.25 (0.13)* 
0.08 (0.15) 
-0.42 (0.17)* 
-0.25 (0.20) 
-0.29 (0.16) 
0.46 (0.18)* 
-0.02 (0.13) 
0.40 (0.14)* 
0.10 (0.14) 
0.01 (0.17) 
-0.06 (0.05) 
-0.34 (0.32) 
-0.05 (0.25) 
0.05 (0.05) 
0.16 (0.06)* 
-0.32 (0.30) 
0.02 (0.32)
1.73 (0.17)*
3.75 (0.14)* 
-0.32 (0.12)* 
0.00 (0.09) 
0.19 (0.10) 
-0.02 (0.11) 
-3.39 (0.57)*
2.49 (0.60)* 
-1.63 (0.71)*
PTW
-0.42 (0.14)* 
-0.07 (0.06) 
0.02 (0.07) 
-0.34 (0.25) 
0.17 (0.17) 
0.26 (0.22) 
-0.02 (0.16) 
0.19 (0.19) 
-0.86 (0.22)* 
-0.54 (0.23)* 
0.10 (0.19) 
0.71 (0.21)* 
-0.14 (0.16) 
-0.02 (0.17) 
0.11 (0.17) 
0.63 (0.24)* 
-0.24 (0.10)* 
-0.03 (0.42) 
-0.03 (0.33) 
-0.16 (0.06)* 
0.31 (0.07)* 
-0.22 (0.37) 
0.54 (0.42)
2.22 (0.22)*
2.93 (0.20)* 
-0.37 (0.15)* 
0.21 (0.11)* 
-0.06 (0.13) 
-0.19 (0.13) 
-4.86 (0.69)*
2.77 (0.66)* 
0.78 (0.28)*a j4
Standard errors in parentheses. Points of support rji =  0.41(0.17), r)2 =  
0.09(0.04). * denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
Table 4.27: Parameter Estimates September 2001
male
siboldno
sibyngno
mothfath
mothwk
fathwk
mthq
fthq
fathfig
zfathvar
lowinc
rural
illOl
parwork
ownocc
fims
fim2s
emaest
nonwhite
mathsscore
engscore
zmathsscore
zengscore
educ lag
work lag
health
educatio
housing
access
pcnotuni
pcnotsta
OCj5
U J 
-0.37 (0.16)* 
-0.28 (0.08)* 
0.01 (0.08) 
-0.11 (0.34) 
0.28 (0.19) 
0.24 (0.25) 
-0.09 (0.17) 
-0.30 (0.19) 
-0.21 (0.28) 
-0.18 (0.31) 
0.14 (0.23) 
-0.97 (0.21)* 
0.24 (0.18) 
0.43 (0.23) 
0.75 (0.21)* 
-0.38 (0.22) 
0.21 (0.08)* 
0.74 (0.41) 
0.14 (0.31) 
0.30 (0.07)* 
0.49 (0.08)* 
1.16 (0.68) 
0.03 (0.78)
3.14 (0.39)* 
0.86 (0.42)* 
0.03 (0.15) 
0.21 (0.12) 
0.09 (0.13) 
0.07 (0.13) 
-6.68 (0.67)* 
0.40 (0.41) 
-5.07 (2.13)*
U N J 
-0.23 (0.14) 
-0.24 (0.07)* 
0.01 (0.07) 
0.20 (0.31) 
0.21 (0.18) 
-0.13 (0.22) 
-0.16 (0.16) 
0.02 (0.18) 
-0.14 (0.26) 
0.18 (0.27) 
0.00 (0.21) 
-0.28 (0.18) 
-0.12 (0.17) 
0.66 (0.22)* 
0.67 (0.19)* 
-0.45 (0.20)* 
0.19 (0.08)* 
0.50 (0.41) 
0.59 (0.27)* 
0.49 (0.07)* 
0.49 (0.08)* 
0.51 (0.70)
1.79 (0.66)*
3.14 (0.36)* 
0.16 (0.41) 
0.32 (0.13)* 
0.10 (0.11) 
0.24 (0.12)* 
0.12 (0.12) 
-10.26 (0.75)* 
2.07 (0.55)* 
-1.59 (0.69)*
O E J
-0.12 (0.14) 
-0.14 (0.07)* 
0.12 (0.07) 
-0.21 (0.29) 
0.44 (0.17)* 
0.13 (0.23) 
-0.18 (0.15) 
-0.18 (0.18) 
0.12 (0.24) 
0.27 (0.27) 
0.15 (0.20) 
-0.33 (0.18) 
0.19 (0.16) 
0.45 (0.20)* 
0.58 (0.18)* 
0.03 (0.24) 
0.01 (0.11) 
-0.35 (0.37) 
-0.35 (0.29) 
-0.12 (0.06) 
-0.04 (0.07) 
-0.69 (0.48) 
-1.57 (0.50)*
4.91 (0.45)*
2.40 (0.47)* 
-0.08 (0.14) 
0.23 (0.10) 
0.05 (0.12) 
0.04 (0.12) 
-4.03 (0.63)* 
0.82 (0.36)* 
-4.53 (1.84)*
O E N J
0.40 (0.16)* 
-0.07 (0.07) 
0.09 (0.07) 
-0.01 (0.31) 
-0.02 (0.19) 
-0.23 (0.24) 
-0.04 (0.17) 
0.22 (0 .20) 
-0.79 (0.27)* 
-0.44 (0.29) 
0.32 (0.21) 
0.27 (0.21) 
-0.07 (0.19) 
0.63 (0.21)* 
0.56 (0.19)* 
-0.71 (0.22)* 
0.26 (0.08)* 
0.46 (0.42) 
0.50 (0.28) 
-0.17 (0.07)* 
-0.14 (0.08) 
0.45 (0.40) 
-1.64 (0.45)* 
2.68 (0.24)* 
-0.30 (0.32) 
0.13 (0.16) 
0.23 (0.12) 
0.08 (0.13) 
-0.11 (0.13) 
-5.04 (0.64)*
2.11 (0.57)*
4.66 (2.04)*
Standard errors in parentheses. Poinl$4>f support rji — 0.41(0.17), 772 =  0.09(0.04).
denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
Table 4.26 contd.
male
siboldno
sibyngno
mothfath
mothwk
fathwk
mthq
fthq
fathfig
zfathvar
lowinc
rural
illOl
parwork
ownocc
fims
fim2s
emaest
nonwhite
mathsscore
engscore
zmathsscore
zengscore
educ lag
work lag
health
educatio
housing
access
pcnotuni
pcnotsta
&j5
F T W
-0.04 (0.12) 
-0.12 (0.05)* 
0.06 (0.06) 
-0.15 (0.23) 
0.50 (0.14)* 
0.26 (0.18) 
-0.22 (0.13) 
-0.20 (0.15) 
0.11 (0.19) 
0.22 (0.21) 
0.00 (0.16) 
-0.22 (0.15) 
0.04 (0.13) 
0.37 (0.15)* 
0.52 (0.14)* 
-0.10 (0.21) 
0.04 (0.09) 
0.11 (0.31) 
-0.68 (0.24)* 
0.00 (0.05) 
0.11 (0.06) 
0.03 (0.31) 
-0.53 (0.33)
1.78 (0.19)*
2.73 (0.18)* 
-0.27 (0.11)* 
-0.03 (0.09) 
0.19 (0.10) 
0.04 (0.10) 
-1.62 (0.41)* 
0.95 (0.39)* 
-3.80 (1.58)*
P T W
-0.59 (0.14)* 
-0.14 (0.06)* 
0.07 (0.07) 
0.32 (0.30) 
0.37 (0.17)* 
-0.05 (0.22) 
-0.08 (0.15) 
0.18 (0.19) 
-0.23 (0.24) 
0.37 (0.26) 
0.13 (0.20) 
0.11 (0.18) 
-0.06 (0.17) 
0.48 (0.20)* 
0.47 (0.18)* 
-0.51 (0.21)* 
0.18 (0.09)* 
0.16 (0.41) 
-0.62 (0.31)* 
-0.04 (0.06) 
0.15 (0.07)* 
0.15 (0.43) 
-0.49 (0.46)
1.48 (0.21)*
1.22 (0.21)* 
-0.04 (0.13) 
0.02 (0.11) 
0.09 (0.13) 
-0.22 (0.12) 
-1.81 (0.46)* 
-0.60 (0.35) 
-1.49 (0.61)*
Standard errors in parentheses. Points^^upport 771 =  0.41(0.17),
772 =  0.09(0.04). * denotes significance at the 5% level or less.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, I have examined a variety of aspects of education and work 
choices in both developing and developed economies. Each of the analyses 
has focused on different factors affecting such decisions, whilst controlling for 
as many other factors as possible that have in some sense been peripheral to 
the particular analysis. Despite considering choices across two distinct types 
of economic environment, the set of conditioning variables in each analysis 
widely overlapped. However, whilst some variables - such as gender, age and 
parental education - were universally important for choices, notable differ­
ences emerged across economies, reflecting fundamental differences between 
low- and high-income settings.
The importance of risk and uncertainty for human capital accumula­
tion was assessed using measures of idiosyncratic and aggregate village-level 
risk based on a time series of wage data in Indonesia. Results pointed to 
an adverse effect of aggregate village-level risk on the accumulated years 
of schooling of children, with important implications for the perpetuation 
of persistent poverty in low-income countries due to the lack of adequate 
insurance markets.
The analysis of the relationship between sibling structure, the child wage 
and interactions thereof, and education and work choices, was examined in 
rural Mexico, a country in which large household sizes are observed and
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drop-out rates from school upon completion of primary education are high. 
This pointed to the importance of considering interactions between the num­
ber of siblings and the child wage, in analysing their effect on child activities. 
The results revealed larger changes in participation in activities in response 
to changes in the wage, the higher the number of siblings.
In the UK on the other hand, such factors as village risk and child labour 
were less relevant for observed choices. Instead, the analysis focused on the 
effectiveness of a conditional education subsidy on post-compulsory second- 
level education and work choices and subsequent university enrolment. The 
programme was found to have been effective in increasing post-compulsory 
second-level enrolment in education, specifically in education without a job, 
but had no subsequent effect on university attendance.
An important theme throughout the analyses of less developed economies, 
has been the importance of child labour and the subsequent effect on human 
capital accumulation. Our understanding of the underlying causes of child 
labour has been greatly enhanced in recent years, particularly due the in­
creased availability of large scale micro data sets, which has greatly advanced 
research in this area. However, it is still very much an area of research in 
which there are many gaps in our knowledge, and as such is an area with 
enormous potential for development. Below, I outline what I consider to be 
important directions for future research.
To begin with, I refer again to a central theme of this thesis, which con­
cerns the interactions between risk and education choices. The propensity of 
households to withdraw children from school in response to negative shocks 
to income, is informative on the existence of liquidity constraints in such 
economies. However, in chapter two, I found evidence of incomplete insur­
ance and credit markets having important implications for education, even in 
the absence of actual shocks. Importantly, persistent (perceived and actual) 
risk and uncertainty at the village-level feeds through to education choices 
of households, suggesting that deep-rooted uncertainty and risk, which are 
difficult to observe (and thus to target), affect the accumulation of human
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capital of children through time. This reveals underlying imperfections in 
insurance and credit markets, in the absence of which households would not 
have to rely on children as a form of precautionary saving. This has poten­
tially important consequences for the long-term welfare of children and the 
persistence of poverty in LDCs. However, this is only one such analysis of 
this kind, and I believe that future policy design may be greatly aided by 
further probing of the robustness of this finding across different countries. 
The analysis in chapter two was based on constructed measures of risk and 
uncertainty, which I believe to be both credible and intuitively appealing. 
However, there has been a relatively recent shift in tailoring surveys in LDCs 
towards more direct measurements of risk at the household level.1 This will 
be useful insofar as it will minimise the assumptions that must be made 
in the measurement of risk and is an extremely tantalising area of future 
research, with significant implications for the welfare of children in LDCs.
In chapter three, I examined associations between education and work 
choices, and the sibling composition of the child, in rural Mexico. I also al­
lowed for the effects of the child wage to vary by sibling composition, which 
provided evidence that competition amongst siblings for scarce resources 
within the household, may vary with the opportunity costs of schooling. An 
immediate extension of chapter three is to consider not only the number, but 
also the activities of other children in the household, and to examine how the 
child’s sensitivity to costs is affected. The analysis highlighted an important 
and under-developed area of research, that concerning the intra-household 
decision-making process. It is likely that parents make choices for children 
simultaneously, and there are many reasons why the structure of siblings 
is relevant to such choices, particularly in the presence of binding liquidity 
constraints. Ability differences among siblings are likely to be important 
(but difficult to observe) and may lead to parents choosing education levels 
to either compensate or reinforce such differences across children.2 Further,
1For example, in the Familias en Accion survey in Colombia, household heads are asked 
about their expectations of future income, which may offer some important insights into 
their perception of risk.
2  See the innovative paper by Behrman et al (1994), which is one of the few that aims
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the relationship between schooling investments and children’s endowments 
depends on such factors as how parents value the children’s distribution 
of wealth and earnings, the complementarity of endowments and schooling 
returns in the labour market and the total financial resources of parents. 
There is no conclusive evidence in existing empirical studies as to how the 
family allocates resources across children and this is an interesting and chal­
lenging area for future research. As discussed in chapter three, one way 
that it may be possible to gain some insight into this issue, is to exploit the 
design of certain existing policies in order to examine how parents choose 
to allocate resources across children. In particular, the Progresa subsidy in 
Mexico is payable to households with eligible children, up to some maximum 
amount. What this implies is that even if more children in the household 
are technically entitled to receive a subsidy, the upper threshold precludes 
them from obtaining it. This feature of the policy may be useful in order 
to examine whether there axe differential implications for the education of 
some children in the household compared to others and, if so, to identify 
which children are adversely affected.
Much of the existing work on child labour, including the analyses in 
this thesis, focuses almost exclusively on choices at the extensive margin. 
There is very little research on the determinants of the actual choice of work 
hours. This is an important shortfall, as the amount of labour supplied is 
not only indicative of welfare consequences in terms of foregone leisure, but 
the effects of child labour on human capital accumulation are likely to vary 
greatly across the wide variation in work hours and work activities. Again, 
the improvements in data collection in LDCs in recent years will greatly aid 
in the development of research in this area.
The dynamic effects of child work on the long-term welfare of children 
has, to my knowledge, not yet been explored in the empirical literature. This 
is a challenging area of research. It would ideally require a long-term anal­
ysis in which individuals were followed from childhood to adulthood, and
to identify the response of human capital investment in siblings to endowment differences 
among siblings. See also the seminal work by Becker and Tomes (1976).
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outcomes such as health, wages and other indicators of welfare were observed 
at various points. However, this is clearly a demanding data requirement, 
and even in developed economies such long-term longitudinal data sets are 
relatively few. However, various longitudinal data sets have been collected 
in LDCs, and indeed the IFLS data, which was analysed in chapter two, has 
follow-up surveys in 1997 and 2000. In future work I will use these waves 
of data to gain potentially important insights into the welfare of individuals 
up to 7 years later, and to examine human capital and other indicators of 
welfare for individuals who did and did not engage in work as children.3
There has been an increased focus of policymakers in recent years on 
the conditional subsidising of education.4 We saw in chapter four that this 
is an effective policy in the UK, in terms of encouraging participation in 
education, for low-income individuals. Whilst there is also compelling evi­
dence on the effectiveness of such policies for education in LDCs5, very little 
is known about the implications for child labour. Indeed, increased school 
attendance in response to a decrease in the price of schooling, may simply 
reduce child leisure rather than child work time.6 Future work will examine 
these issues in Colombia, a country in which such a policy is currently being 
implemented. In addition, our understanding of the important issues will 
also be greatly enhanced by formal structural modelling and rigorous econo­
metric estimation of such models. This will be an important advancement 
up on existing reduced form research.
Finally, in terms of education and work choices in the UK, the focus 
of chapter four was on decisions from post-compulsory education onwards. 
However, education choices are closely driven by prior choices and experi­
ences. In particular, the educational development of children from very early 
ages is an extremely important predictor of their educational attainment at
3In addition, this data will be useful in order to build upon chapter two, to further 
analyse measurements of risk and uncertainty using more waves of income data.
4 There is evidence that unconditional transfers have only a very small effect on school 
enrolment and child labour. See Behrman and Knowles (1999).
5See Schultz (2001) for evidence on the post-primary Progresa programme in Mexico.
6See Ravallion and Wodon (2000).
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later stages of the education cycle.7 This points towards the importance of 
considering the entire education cycle of individuals, from when they first 
commence their formal education, in order to identify the key factors and 
influences in such choices throughout the cycle. By examining education 
choices from age 16 onwards, the problem is that we ignore a very relevant 
part of this cycle, which we only capture to some degree through control­
ling for the individual’s acquired measure of ability, which is a function of 
past choices. An important future area of work is therefore to use UK data 
to consider the influence of socio-economic factors throughout the entire 
educational paths of individuals.
rSee Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001).
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